http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/2011/oct/27/best-bennett-rescue-plan/?opinioncartoons
Clay Bennett
27th october 2011
international press review rassegna stampa internazionale revue de presse internationale


March 10, 2012The pioneering comic book creator and movie concept artist Moebius, aka Jean Giraud, aka Gir, has passed away at the age of 73.
I expect Rich will want to add something more in respect of his comics work in particular, so I think I’ll share some of his incredible movie work.
I believe the first film produced with designs by Giraud was Alien, though this was after he had worked for some years on projects that stalled or were cancelled, most infamously, Alejandro Jodorowsky’s Dune.
Not only did Jodorowsky complete the usual costume and set designs for Dune, he appears to have been the principle storyboard artist on the project. Had it come to be, the course of genre film making would have taken a sharp turn… even still, the influence seeped out, and a film that never went before cameras still managed to change everything.
The image to the right is one of Giraud’s space suit images for Alien. His work gelled perfectly with that of Ron Cobb, and stood in brilliant contrast to the biomechanics of HR Giger.
Throughout the years Giraud contributed to any number of visually striking pictures, pictures that impressed with no small thanks to himself: Tron, The Abyss, and The Fifth Element in particular. Just as notable, in another respect, are his unused designs for films that ended up looking rather impoverished instead.
A good case in point is Willow. It wound up being quite a drab, murky and witlessly designed picture – I’m sure everybody was just following instructions – but here’s what it might have looked like instead:
During the development of the animated Little Nemo: Adventures in Slumberland, while talent as varied as Ray Bradbury, Brad Bird and Brian Froud came and went, one draft of the script was written by Giraud. On the final film he’s given a story credit, and you can see, from time to time, pieces of his design work in the animation.
His more successful animated work would be Les Maitres du Temps, or Time Masters, created with the director Rene Laloux. The storytelling both frays and gets tied up into knots but the film has some very memorable visuals, and often packs a powerful punch from just the way it looks.
Here’s a French trailer for the film.
Giraud’s contribution to the sci-fi aesthetic of modern movies can’t easily be overstated but for all of his imitators, it’s still true that nobody did it better.
Thanks, Moebius, and goodbye.

Angry: Multinational protesters demonstrate as Tony Blair gives evidence to the Inquiry (source)
We believe there is more than what Lord Goldsmith defined a “reasonable case” for saying that the Iraq war could have been avoided through the exile of Saddam Hussein.
The entire truth needs to emerge or we will have missed an opportunity to restore the west's credibility in the promotion of human rights, rule of law and democracy.
According to a WikiLeaked cable, on 22 September 2009, in a meeting with officials of the UK administration U.S. Undersecretary for Justice Ellen Tauscher stated that the General Director of the British Ministry of Defence Jon Day had assured her that the UK had “put measures in place to protect [American] interests” during the UK inquiry into the causes of the Iraq war. The Chilcot inquiry did not ask Mr. Day to deny that statement.
19 February 2003 - The Italian Parliament with the support of Government adopted the radical proposition (345 yes, 38 no, 52 abstentions) which committed Government to seek support in all international bodies, primarily within the Security Council of the United Nations, to the option of an exiled dictator of Iraq and [...] establishment of a provisional government that will restore a control of the full exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms of all Iraqis.
During a meeting in Crawford, on 22 February 2003, Bush said to Aznar that Gaddafi told Berlusconi that Saddam wants to go.
Aznar: «Is it true that there’s a possibility of Saddam Hussein going into exile?»
Bush: «Yes, that possibility exists. Even that he gets assassinated».
Aznar: «An exile with some guarantee»?
Bush: «No guarantee. He’s a thief, a terrorist, a war criminal. Compared to Saddam, Milosevic would be a Mother Teresa. (source)
related posts:
18 March 2003 – The White House spokesperson states that the American troops and their allies will enter Iraq anyway, no matter how.
19 March 2003 – Bahrain officially offers Saddam Hussein a last-ditch proposal to go into exile.
Clare Short, on 2 February 2010: “I'm sure that's in the public domain, were initiatives from the Saudis and the Jordanians about possibly getting Saddam Hussein to go into exile, which would have been an attractive option, it seems to me.”
“As I have said, Saudi Arabia and Jordan were talking about getting him into exile. There was the possibility of the International Criminal Court. He wasn't popular in his country. There is an argument about very strong sanctions that you actually lock countries in, and it is better to open them up, because then, as with Serbia, that's the way we got -- in the end, the people of Serbia sent Milosevic to the International Criminal Court. That was all another option. “
“the Arab world was talking more and more about taking him out, getting him into exile, you know, getting more pressure on him, getting a resolution of the problem and him out without a war. It is just not true that he was jerking any strings. He was -- the pressures were mounting and mounting.”
A dispatch sent by Ellen Tauscher, the US Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, describes a conversation with Jon Day, the MOD Director General for security policy, in which he "promised that the UK had ’put measures in place to protect your [US] interestshttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cables/2009/09/09LONDON2198.html> during the UK inquiry into the causes of the Iraq War.
Freedman: So timing of your advice is determined by questions of diplomacy and readiness for armed forces - but your advice might've been different two or three weeks later?
Goldsmith: That depends what would have happened. More could have come to light. If there'd been a sea-change, if Saddam had gone into exile say, why would we then need force.
Hans Blix, 27 July 2010: “I thought it was, both then and in retrospect, a bit curious that precisely at the time when we were going upward in evidencing cooperation, at that very time the conclusion from the UK side and also from the US side was that no, inspections are useless.”
“They had opened the doors. I had said on some occasions it is not enough to open doors. You also have to be proactive. I think that's what they became when they came up with the idea of further excavations, for instance.”
“Was Iraq a danger in 2003? They were not a danger. They were practically prostrate and could not – it would have taken a lot of time – to reconstitute in selling oil.”
As Elizabeth Wilmshurst put it at the Iraq Inquiry, “I could see that the UK reputation as an upholder of the rule of law and as an upholder of the United Nations would be seriously damaged, at least that's what I foresaw.” We believe that the same applies for the reputation of democracy and the rule of law. The things Jod Day said to the American undersecretary of defense in september 2009 cast a worrying shadow over the Chilcot inquiry and its criteria and limits. Should none of the members of the inquiry look into the dark pages that Blair wrote, so that the International Criminal Court would not be able to proceed, the liberal and democratic values and society that we struggling to uphold will be compromised for generations to come.
Finally, the Cato Institute has mentioned a recent debate in which Condoleeza Rice partook, to possibly spark a debate on the fact that Saddam might have been willing to go into exile. Justin Logan (associate director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute) writes in ... that “if there was anything approaching a realistic opportunity to make this happen, we really missed out on the bargain of the century here. You’re looking at something like 500%-1000% returns, not counting several thousand American and a-hundred-or-so-thousand Iraqi lives saved.”
The exile of Saddam Hussein would have set an important precedent as far as conflict-resolution is concerned. Had it been applied - possibly under the thrust of the UN authority - for the first time to an influential country whose strategic position and role is of the utmost importance in the development of the world order, the benefit of it would reverberated in the Middle East, in the Arab world and beyond. Thus, the most precious lesson to learn from the 2003 invasion may not be drawn by a seemingly endless analysis revolving around the (il)legality vs. (il)legitimacy of the military action, but by a deeper understanding of the reasons why a peaceful outcome was not eventually sought. So far, former rulers who peacefully ousted through include Idi Amin Dada (Uganda), Gen. Alfredo Stroessner (Paraguay), Charles Taylor (Liberia), Mobutu Sese Seko (Zaire) and Hissene Habre (Chad).
more: http://bushblairagainstsurepeacewagedwariniraqpreventingexiletosaddam.org/Rome, 21.10.2010
Duilio Giammaria: During those years, as the Iraqi situation unfolded, we obviously paid frequent visits to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which proved to be a real discovery since we found a world revolutionizing itself and of tremendous economic development. Those who know the region, know there are seven Emirates. Usually we would fly aboard military aircraft, leaving from Abu Dhabi, about 150 km north of Dubai. Travel time on these 150 km is about one hour by car on a huge highway consisting of eight lanes. Exactly in the middle of this route between Abu Dhabi and Dubai , one finds a particular place, strongly defined by a long, endless and very orderly line of fences. I asked what this place was, in the midst of the endless route between Abu Dhabi and Dubai we were travelling up and down from.
“It’s interesting, try and figure it out,” I was told half-heartedly. I happened to be lucky enough to meet someone very close to the Emirates’ Royal family. He was a close friend of one of the Emir’s sons.
... he was close to the Emir’s sons, and he gave me this news which I found extremely interesting at the time, although I have to confess not to have elaborated on it sufficiently for the exact same reasons Alberto Negri just gave.“It is a field, a special field belonging to the Emir’s family, containing many houses”, they told me. Coming from Abu Dhabi, it is on the right-hand side, towards the desert.
“Most of them are inhabited by Iraqi officials.”
“Iraqi oficials?’, I said.
“Yes, those people have been living there since 2003, and it was meant to harbor all of Saddam Hussein’s nomenclature that was supposed to be exiled with him.”
If an agreement had been secured, obviously Saddam Hussein wouldn’t have left on his own. Let’s say he would have taken his top aides and closest staff with him, since a head of state clearly doesn’t leave his country thinking that everything remains the same.
But the most amazing feat –this took place in 2004- is that this happened before one of Sheikh Maktum’s sons explicitly told Al Arabyia that the agreement negotiations had in fact been brought up to the final stage. The UAE believed up until the end that this agreement was possible. So in 2005, when this news feat became known, Al Arabyia suddenly published the declaration by one of the sons, stating the word about a hidden field in the desert of the Arab Emirates, prepared to receive Saddam Hussein’s nomenclature, was completely true. This is in 2005. Also at this point however, we didn’t elaborate on it enough, because obviously there was enough to work on, exactly as there is enough to work on today.

Britain's top civil servant, Sir Gus O'Donnell, is preventing the official inquiry into the Iraq invasion from publishing notes sent by Tony Blair to George W Bush - evidence described by the inquiry as of "central importance" in establishing the circumstances that led to war.
O'Donnell, the cabinet secretary, consulted Blair before suppressing the documents, it emerged tonight. The Cabinet Office said: "There is an established convention covering papers of a previous administration whereby former ministers would normally be consulted before release of papers from their time in government." The prime minister's spokesman said David Cameron had not been consulted.
Raising the stakes ahead of Blair's recall on Friday, Sir John Chilcot, the inquiry's chairman, released a sharp exchange of letters with O'Donnell in which he repeated requests for the notes to be declassified. Chilcot said: "The material requested provides important, and often unique, insights into Mr Blair's thinking and the commitments he made to President Bush, which are not reflected in other papers."
In a letter dated 6 January, his third to O'Donnell in less than a month, Chilcot wrote: "The question when and how the prime minister made commitments to the US about the UK's involvement in military action in Iraq and subsequent decisions on the UK's continuing involvement, is central to its considerations".
He refers to passages in memoirs, including Blair's autobiography, A Journey, and disclosures by Jonathan Powell, Blair's chief of staff, and Alastair Campbell, his former head of communications. Those publications, and the refusal to disclose Blair's notes, Chilcot said, "leads to the position that individuals may disclose privileged information (without sanction) whilst a committee of privy counsellors established by a former prime minister to review the issues, cannot".
Chilcot, who, with his four-member panel, has privately seen Blair's notes, said the documents "illuminate prime minister Blair's positions at critical points".
O'Donnell replied to Chilcot that releasing Blair's notes would damage Britain's relations with the US. and would not be in the public interest. "We have attached particular importance to protecting the privacy of the channel between the prime minister and president," he told Chilcot.
The Cabinet Office said the refusal to allow Blair's notes to be disclosed conformed to the inquiry's protocols. Chilcot said recently the protocols were "put in place to protect national security, international relations and the personal security of individuals. They are not there to prevent embarrassment."
In evidence to the inquiry last year, Campbell described the tenor of Blair's notes to Bush as: "We share the analysis, we share the concern, we are going to be with you in making sure that Saddam Hussein is faced up to his obligations and that Iraq is disarmed."
Campbell added: "If that cannot be done diplomatically and it is to be done militarily, Britain will be there. That would be the tenor of the communication to the president."
The inquiry has also heard from senior British diplomats that regime change was being discussed by Blair in meetings with Bush in 2002 even though, according to leaked documents, Lord Goldsmith, the attorney general, warned that military action aimed at regime change, as opposed to disarmament, would be unlawful.
One document, previously leaked, notes that Blair told Bush at a meeting in Washington on 31 January 2003, less than two months before the invasion, that "he was solidly with the president". That was his response after Bush said military action would be taken with or without a new UN resolution and the day after Goldsmith warned Blair that an invasion of Iraq would be unlawful without a fresh UN resolution. Goldsmith subsquently changed his mind.
An inquiry official said: "It not about what President Bush told prime minister Blair. It is about what Mr Blair said to President Bush."
The inquiry has summoned back the former prime minister, to press him about what he promised Bush in private, and why he repeatedly questioned, then shut out, his government's chief law officer, Lord Goldsmith, after receiving unwelcome advice about the legality of an invasion.
In evidence to the Iraq inquiry, Lord Goldsmith, who at the time was the government’s top legal adviser, disclosed that he was “uncomfortable” about statements made by the then-prime minister in the run up to the 2003 invasion.
Two months before the war began, in a meeting at No 10, the former attorney general told Mr Blair that war would not be legal without a fresh mandate from the UN.
In a statement to MPs the following day, however, the Labour prime minister said that there were “circumstances” in which an attack could be valid.
The following month, he gave an interview in which he suggested that war would be legal if another nation had made an “unreasonable” veto at the UN on military action.
A witness statement to the Chilcot Inquiry into the war, published today, makes clear that Lord Goldsmith considered that this did not accord with the advice he had given Mr Blair.
Asked whether Mr Blair's words were compatible with the advice he received, the former attorney general wrote simply: "No."
He added: "I was uncomfortable about them (the prime minister's comments) ...
"My concern was that we should not box ourselves in by the public statements that were made, and create a situation which might then have to be unravelled."
Lord Goldsmith evidence to the inquiry has come under scrutiny after he admitted changing his mind about the legality of military action on the eve of the war.
His views were swayed during meetings he was encouraged to have with American government lawyers and Sir Jeremy Greenstock, Britain's ambassador to the UN.
Giving evidence to the inquiry last year, he denied that he was “leant on” by No 10 to change his legal opinion.
Until two weeks before the invasion, in March 2003, Lord Goldsmith had been of the view that UN resolution 1441, which was passed in November 2002 and declared Iraq in “material breach” of its obligations to disarm, was not sufficient to sanction war by the UK and United States.
In the new evidence to the inquiry, Lord Goldsmith said in his statement that the phrasing of resolution 1441 was "problematic".
He was not actively consulted on the final drafting of the resolution after telling Mr Blair in October that the text as it stood did not authorise the use of force.
The former attorney general said: "I was not being sufficiently involved in the meetings and discussions about the resolution and the policy behind it that were taking place at ministerial level.
...
Documents reveal how Goldsmith repeatedly warned Blair of the consequences of invading Iraq without fresh UN authority.
A note from Goldsmith to Blair, marked secret and dated 30 January 2003, stated: "I thought you might wish to know where I stand on the question of whether a further decision of the [UN] security council is legally required in order to authorise the use of force against Iraq."
Goldsmith warned Blair that "the correct legal interpretation of resolution 1441 [the last security council decision on Iraq] is that it does not authorise the use of force without a further determination by the security council". He concluded: "My view remains that a further [UN] decision is required."
The document contains a handwritten note, by David Manning, Blair's chief foreign policy adviser, which warned: "Clear advice from attorney on need for further resolution."
...By 7 March, 2003, Goldsmith had told Blair that a new UN resolution might not be needed after all, though war without one would risk Britain's indictment before an international court.
On 17 March, Goldsmith, published a short note saying an invasion was lawful.
...Further questions have been raised over the death of Dr David Kelly after police admitted that two personal items found with his body – his mobile phone and a watch – did not have any fingerprints on them.
The news brings the number of objects without fingerprints at the site where the weapons inspector’s body was discovered to five – the other three being the knife he allegedly used to slash his wrist, the packs of pills he is said to have overdosed on, and a water bottle.
It had been suggested that the lack of fingerprints on the knife might be due to the presence of gaffer tape on it. But Thames Valley Police have now confirmed that the knife had no tape on its handle.

The credibility of the Chilcot inquiry into the invasion of Iraq is "on the edge of an abyss" because of its lack of transparency, a leading international lawyer warned today.
Philippe Sands QC, professor of international law at University College London, said the inquiry had been undermined by its inability to refer publicly to documents it had seen.
He said it had shown an inability to tackle the central question of the illegality – or otherwise – of the US-led military action head on.
Sands said he had seen some unpublished documents which contradicted or undermined the testimony by witnesses to the inquiry. The inquiry had also had a series of "private chats" with a number of "notable individuals", he said.
The lawyer referred to what he called a "curious advertisement" the inquiry had placed, asking international lawyers to submit their view of the invasion. More than 30 had done so more than two months ago, yet the submissions have not been posted on the inquiry's website.
"Why did the inquiry not issue personal invitations to key individuals to appear before it in a public session? Why has it not even convened a private seminar amongst invited international legal experts, as it has done on other matters?" Sands asked.
His comments came in the 2010 Remembrance Sunday lecture on war and law at the Imperial War Museum in London. The lecture was sponsored by the Movement for the Abolition of War.
Sands noted that the Chilcot inquiry had appointed an "adviser on international law" - Dame Rosalyn Higgins, a former judge and president of the international court of justice – but said it was unclear what her role was.
He said he hoped the inquiry would insist that, in future, the attorney general must provide early and full advice on the legality of a future use of force, ensure the attorney provided advice to all of government, not just the prime minister, and give a parliamentary committee an oversight role on legal advice relating to war.
Tony Blair must be prosecuted, not indulged like Peter Mandelson. Both have produced self-serving memoirs for which they have been paid fortunes; Blair's, which has earned him a £4.6m advance, will appear next month.
Now consider the Proceeds of Crime Act. Blair conspired in and executed an unprovoked war of aggression against a defenceless country, of a kind the Nuremberg judges in 1946 described as the "paramount war crime". This has caused, according to scholarly studies, the deaths of more than a million people, a figure that exceeds the Fordham University estimate of deaths in the Rwandan genocide.
In addition, four million Iraqis have been forced to flee their homes and a majority of children have descended into malnutrition and trauma. Cancer rates near the cities of Fallujah, Najaf and Basra (the latter "liberated" by the British) are now higher than those at Hiroshima. "UK forces used about 1.9 metric tonnes of depleted uranium ammunition in the Iraq war in 2003," the Defence Secretary, Liam Fox, told parliament on 22 July. A range of toxic "anti-personnel" weapons, such as cluster bombs, was employed by British and US forces.
Such carnage was justified with lies that have been exposed repeatedly. On 29 January 2003, Blair told parliament: "We do know of links between al-Qaeda and Iraq . . ." Last month, the former head of MI5 Eliza Manningham-Buller told the Chilcot inquiry: "There is no credible intelligence to suggest that connection . . . [it was the invasion] that gave Osama Bin Laden his Iraqi jihad." Asked to what extent the invasion exacerbated the threat to Britain from terrorism, she replied: "Substantially."
...
http://www.itv.com/presscentre/presspacks/johnpilgerthewaryoudontsee/default.htmlJohn Pilger:
I testified last week to the Chilcot inquiry. My experience demonstrates an emerging and dangerous problem with the process. This is not so much a problem with Sir John Chilcot and his panel, but rather with the government bureaucracy – Britain's own "deep state" – that is covering up its mistakes and denying access to critical documents.
There is only one solution to this problem, and it requires decisive action.
After I was invited to testify, I was contacted by the Foreign Office, from which I had resigned after giving testimony to the Butler inquiry in 2004, to offer its support for my appearance. I asked for access to all the documents I had worked on as Britain's Iraq "expert" at the UN Security Council, including intelligence assessments, records of discussions with the US, and the long paper trail on the WMD dossier.
Large files were sent to me to peruse at the UK mission to the UN. However, long hours spent reviewing the files revealed that most of the key documents I had asked for were not there.
In my testimony I had planned to detail how the UK government failed to consider, let alone implement, available alternatives to military action. To support this I had asked for specific records relating to the UK's failure to deal with the so-called Syrian pipeline, through which Iraq illegally exported oil, thereby sustaining the Saddam regime. I was told that specific documents, such as the records of prime minister Tony Blair's visit to Syria, could not be found. This is simply not plausible.
I had also asked for all the Joint Intelligence Committee assessments on Iraq, some of which I helped prepare. Of dozens of these documents, only three were provided to me – 40 minutes before I was due to appear before the Chilcot panel.
Playing by the rules, I had submitted my written testimony to Chilcot before my appearance. In the hours before my appearance, invited to visit the Foreign Office to see further documents (mostly irrelevant), an official repeatedly sought to persuade me to delete references to certain documents in my testimony.
He told me that the Cabinet Office wanted the removal of a critical reference in my evidence to a memo from a senior Foreign Office official to the foreign secretary's special adviser, in which the official pointed out, with mandarin understatement, that the paper sent that week to the Parliamentary Labour Party dramatically – and inaccurately – altered the UK's assessment of Iraq's nuclear threat.
In a clear example of the exaggeration of Iraq's military capabilities, that paper claimed that if Iraq's programmes remained unchecked, it could develop a nuclear device within five years.
The official's memo pointed out that this was not, in fact, the UK assessment: the UK believed that Iraq's nuclear programme had been checked by sanctions.
The paper to the PLP was instead sent by the foreign secretary to "brief" the wider cabinet. This paper was pure overstated propaganda, filled with ludicrous statements like "one teaspoon of anthrax can kill a million people". The paper was soon made public, as part of the campaign to create public hysteria.
The official's memo about the PLP paper contained nothing secret. It relates to a public document, the PLP paper. Yet, of all the references in my testimony, this was the one that the Cabinet Office most wanted removed. I refused. Strikingly, this memo has never been mentioned to the inquiry, including by its author, who testified earlier this year. Neither has the author of the PLP paper been questioned, or the paper itself discussed.
I was repeatedly warned by inquiry staff not to mention any classified material during my testimony. The only problem is that almost every document I ever wrote or read in my work was classified. It was made clear to me, and to journalists attending the hearing, that if I mentioned specific documents the broadcast of my testimony would be cut off. Other forms of retribution (Official Secrets Act prosecution?) hung in the air. It was a form of subtle intimidation.
Meanwhile, my requests to see documents about the infamous Number 10 WMD dossier were ignored, including requests for letters I had written.
This experience and the inquiry's record so far is cause for concern. It is clear from testimonies so far that most witnesses, most of whom went along with the war at the time, are offering a very one-sided account to the panel. A story is being peddled that sanctions on Iraq were collapsing and the allied policy of containment was failing. Thus, the military alternative to deal with the Iraqi threat was more or less unavoidable.
Though there is some truth to this argument, it was not what the Foreign Office, or the government as a whole, believed at the time. The true story is there to be seen in the documents. In memos, submissions to ministers and telegrams, the official view is very clear: while there was concern at the erosion of sanctions, containment had prevented Iraq from rearmament.
When invasion was promoted by Washington, the available alternative – to squeeze Saddam financially by stopping oil exports or seizing the regime's assets, which I and some colleagues had repeatedlyadvocated, was ignored. Here the documents tell a different but equally clear and appalling story: there is not a single mention of any formal discussion, by ministers or officials, of alternatives to military action. It is hard to pinpoint a graver indictment of the government's failure.
The oral testimonies delivered to the inquiry have not given an accurate picture of what the government really thought. Unfortunately, the panel is neither equipped, nor apparently inclined, to challenge witnesses on the contradictions of their testimonies with this documentary record. This may not be the panel's fault: how can they know which pertinent documents exist?
In these circumstances, it is very worrying that the government machine is still trying to withhold key documents, and silence those of us with detailed knowledge of the policy history – and documents. I have been told too, from secondary sources, that members of the panel have been refused documents they have specifically requested.
There is a clear solution to these problems: break down the continued obstruction by the bureaucracy by releasing the documents – all of them. Only the most secret documents deserve continued protection, and there are very few of these. The vast majority of relevant documents relate to policy discussion inside the government before the war. Though profoundly embarrassing, there is little here that damages national security, except in the hysterical assessment of officials protecting their own reputation. Nick Clegg said a few weeks ago that almost all documents must now be released. He is right.
Carne Ross was the UK's Iraq expert at the UN from 1997 to 2002. He now heads Independent Diplomat, a non-profit diplomatic advisory group.
Nick Clegg was tonight forced to clarify his position on the Iraq war after he stood up at the dispatch box of the House of Commons and pronounced the invasion illegal.
The deputy prime minister insisted he was speaking in a personal capacity, as a leading international lawyer warned that the statement by a government minister in such a formal setting could increase the chances of charges against Britain in international courts.
Philippe Sands, professor of law at University College London, said: "A public statement by a government minister in parliament as to the legal situation would be a statement that an international court would be interested in, in forming a view as to whether or not the war was lawful."
The warning came after a faltering performance by Clegg in the Commons when he stood in for David Cameron at prime minister's questions. The deputy prime minister made an initial mistake when he announced that the government would close the Yarl's Wood centre as it ends the detention of children awaiting deportation. The Home Office was forced to issue a statement saying that the family unit at Yarl's Wood would close but that the rest of the centre would remain open.
Shortly before that slip-up, Clegg threw the government's position concerning the legality of the Iraq war into confusion when, at the end of heated exchanges with Jack Straw, foreign secretary at the time of the war, Clegg said: "We may have to wait for his memoirs, but perhaps one day he will account for his role in the most disastrous decision of all: the illegal invasion of Iraq."
Clegg's remarks could be legally significant because he was standing at the government dispatch box in the Commons.
Downing Street played down the significance of the remarks by issuing a statement saying that he was expressing his "long-held view" about the Iraq conflict. In an attempt to avoid speculation about splits with Cameron, who voted in favour of the war, Downing Street added that the government would await the findings of the Chilcot inquiry before reaching a view on the war.
"The coalition government has not expressed a view on the legality or otherwise of the Iraq conflict," the No 10 spokesman said. "But that does not mean that individual members of the government should not express their individual views. These are long-held views of the deputy prime minister.
"The Iraq inquiry is currently examining many issues surrounding the UK's involvement in Iraq, including the legal basis of the war. The government looks forward to receiving the inquiry's conclusions."
But this appeared to be contradicted by the Chilcot inquiry, which issued a statement saying it was examining the legal issues in the run-up to the war but would not make a judgment about the legality of the war. A spokesman said: "The inquiry is not a court of law, and no one is on trial."
The government also faced a challenge in explaining an apparently new constitutional convention that the second most senior member of the cabinet is now free to stand at the dispatch box and express opinions of his own that do not reflect government policy.
Asked whether Clegg had been speaking as the leader of the Liberal Democrats and not as deputy prime minister, a Downing Street spokeswoman said: "Yes."
Asked how MPs could establish in future whether Clegg is speaking as deputy prime minister or as leader of the Liberal Democrats, the spokeswoman said: "The deputy prime minister is entitled to express his own view at the dispatch box."
The Lib Dems were keen to play down the significance of Clegg's remarks. But it is understood that the Lib Dem leader feels freer to speak out against the alleged illegality of the Iraq war after the recent publication of previously classified documents by the Chilcot inquiry.
Sir Gus O'Donnell, the cabinet secretary, wrote to Sir John Chilcot on 25 June to allow the inquiry to publish more documents relating to the legal advice. The most significant of these documents was a note on 30 January 2003 by the then attorney general, Lord Goldsmith, to Tony Blair.
In the note Goldsmith wrote: "I remain of the view that the correct legal interpretation of [UN security council] resolution 1441 is that it does not authorise the use of military force without a further determination by the security council."
Goldsmith famously changed his mind on the legality of the war in March 2003 after Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, the former chief of the defence staff, demanded a clear undertaking that military action would be lawful. Boyce feared that British forces could face legal action unless the invasion had legal cover.
On 7 March 2003, after visiting Washington, Goldsmith told Blair that a new UN resolution may not be necessary, although invading Iraq without one could lead to Britain being indicted before an international court. Ten days later Goldsmith ruled that an invasion would be lawful.
Sands said: "Lord Goldsmith never gave a written advice that the war was lawful. Nick Clegg is only repeating what Lord Goldsmith told Tony Blair on 30 January 2003: that without a further UN security resolution the war would be illegal and Jack Straw knows that."
Tony Blair's evidence to the Chilcot Inquiry that toppling Saddam Hussein helped make Britain safe from terrorists was dramatically undermined by the former head of MI5 yesterday.
Giving evidence to the same inquiry, Eliza Manningham-Buller revealed that there was such a surge of warnings of home-grown terrorist threats after the invasion of Iraq that MI5 asked for – and got – a 100 per cent increase in its budget. Baroness Manningham-Buller, who was director general of MI5 in 2002-07, told the Chilcot panel that MI5 started receiving a "substantially" higher volume of reports that young British Muslims being drawn to al-Qa'ida.
...Lady Manningham-Buller also hinted at tension between Mr Blair's office and MI5 over the dossier that the Prime Minister presented to Parliament in September 2002, to prepare public opinion for the likelihood of war.
"We were asked to put in some low-grade, small intelligence to it and we refused because we didn't think it was reliable," she said.
Evidence: What he said – and what she said
False claims of links between al-Qa'ida and Saddam Hussein
Tony Blair claimed on 21 Jan 2003:
"There is some intelligence evidence about loose links between al-Qa'ida and various people in Iraq... It would not be correct to say there is no evidence whatever of linkages between al-Qa'ida and Iraq."
Foreign Office spokesman claimed on 29 Jan 2003:
"We believe that there have been, and still are, some al-Qa'ida operatives in parts of Iraq controlled by Baghdad. It is hard to imagine that they are there without the knowledge and acquiescence of the Iraqi government."
Eliza Manningham-Buller, former head of MI5, yesterday:
"There was no credible intelligence to suggest that connection and that was the judgment, I might say, of the CIA."
Hand-picking flimsy 'intelligence'
Blair, to the Commons 24 Sept 2002:
"It [the intelligence service] concludes that Iraq has chemical and biological weapons, that Saddam has continued to produce them, that he has existing and active military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons, which could be activated within 45 minutes; and that he is actively trying to acquire nuclear weapons capability..."
Blair, to the Commons 25 Feb 2003:
"The intelligence is clear: He [Saddam] continues to believe his WMD programme is essential both for internal repression and for external aggression. The biological agents we believe Iraq can produce include anthrax, botulinum, toxin, aflatoxin and ricin. All eventually result in excruciatingly painful death."
Manningham-Buller, yesterday:
"The nature of intelligence – it is a source of information, it is rarely complete, it needs to be assessed, it is fragmentary... We were asked to put in some low-grade, small intelligence to it [the September 2002 dossier] and we refused because we didn't think it was reliable."
Iraq posed no risk to Britain
Blair, to the Commons 10 April 2002:
"Saddam Hussein is developing weapons of mass destruction, and we cannot leave him doing so unchecked. He is a threat to his own people and to the region and, if allowed to develop these weapons, a threat to us also."
Manningham-Buller, yesterday:
"We regarded the direct threat from Iraq as low... we didn't believe he had the capability to do anything in the UK."
Ministers were told that invading Iraq would increase the threat of terrorism to Britain
Blair, farewell speech at the Labour conference, 26 September 2006:
"This terrorism isn't our fault. We didn't cause it. It's not the consequence of foreign policy."
Manningham-Buller, yesterday:
"It was communicated through the JIC assessments, to which I fed in... I believe they [senior ministers] did read them. If they read them, they can have had no doubt."
The Iraq war made Britain a more dangerous place and allowed al-Qa'ida to gain a hold in Iraq
Blair, 29 Jan 2010:
"If I am asked whether I believe we are safer, more secure, that Iraq is better, that our own security is better, I believe we are. The world is safer as a result."
Manningham-Buller, yesterday:
"Our involvement in Iraq radicalised a generation of young people who saw our involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan as an attack on Islam. We [MI5] were pretty well swamped... with intelligence on a broad scale that was pretty well more than we could cope with in terms of plots, leads to plots and things that we needed to pursue.
"We gave Osama bin Laden his Iraqi jihad so that he was able to move into Iraq in a way that he was not before.
...Tony Blair's government "intentionally and substantially" exaggerated assessments of Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction culminating in highly misleading statements about the threat that amounted to lies, the inquiry into the war in Iraq was told today
Carne Ross, a British diplomat to the UN who was responsible for Iraq in the runup to the invasion, said intelligence was "massaged" into "more robust and terrifying" statements about Saddam's supposed WMD.
...
Dans le contexte communautaire belge, la déclaration, à la mi-octobre, du colonel Luc Gennart, patron de la base aérienne de Florennes, a eu l’effet d’une bombe. L’officier déclarait que la plupart des postes de décision dans les forces belges étaient systématiquement attribués à des officiers néerlandophones dans le cadre d’un processus de « flamandisation », dans la foulée des premières déclarations sur le sujet du vice-président de la Commission de la défense, Denis Ducarme. Dans le même temps, il indiquait que l’avenir de la base de Florennes était menacé. Ses déclarations, très inhabituelles, n’ont pas tardé à lui causer des ennuis : devant déjà être muté prématurément, il a été relevé de son commandement et interdit de participation aux fastes de son unité. Il portera ensuite plainte au Conseil d’Etat, qui lui donnera raison et le rétablira dans ses fonctions. Alors que le ministre indiquait qu’aucun plan concernant la fermeture de Florennes n’était établi et qu’une commission sur la flamandisation allait être mise en place, le conflit s’est déplacé.
Le Chief of Defense (CHOD – l’équivalent du CEMA), le général Delcour, a remis sa démission au ministre, qui l’a refusé, une rumeur qui courrais ces derniers jours et qui a été confirmée par le quotidien La Dernière Heure. Quelques heures plus tard, le général Delcour convoquait une conférence de presse où il indiquera – fait unique pour un officier d’une armée européenne – que « Notre déontologie militaire et nos normes d’ordre et de discipline semblent devenues incompatibles avec les lois, ou avec les conventions signées par la Belgique« , ajoutant qu’un certain nombre de conventions internationales, « principalement en matière de droits de l’Homme » sont incompatibles avec la profession militaire. Dans le microcosme militaire, déclaration a eu l’effet d’une bombe : en Belgique, les officiers prêtent serment en jurant « d’observer la Constitution et les lois du peuple belge« . Par ailleurs, en tant que membres de l’exécutif, ils sont tenus respecter la séparation des pouvoirs, en l’occurrence, en ne critiquant pas une décision de justice. La déclaration n’est donc pas anodine et ne trouve aucun équivalent en Europe ou aux Etats-Unis ces cinquante dernières années. Etonnament, la presse n’a réagit qu’aujourd’hui.
Or, elle intervient dans un contexte passablement complexe : les négociations politiques entre Flamands et Francophones sont dans l’impasse depuis les élections de juin et la perception générale est que la future réforme de l’Etat décidera de l’avenir du pays. Comparativement, le processus de flamandisation est effectivement en cours et plusieurs militaires confient dans l’anonymat leur crainte de voir, petit à petit, passer en Flandre la majorité des bases et équipements lourds de l’armée – que ce soit ou non dans l’optique d’une éventuelle indépendance du nord du pays. Si le ministre de la défense pouvait souligner un léger déséquilibre entre généraux flamands et francophones, c’est toutefois au sein des postes intermédiaires dans les unités qu’il est le plus flagrant. Dans le même temps, si la fermeture de la base de Florennes ne fait pas l’objet d’un plan, l’option a été envisagée.
On comprend d’autant mieux le colonel qu’il n’existe aucun consensus politique en Belgique sur le remplacement des F-16 – une escadre est basée à Florennes – et que ces derniers commenceront à sortir de service vers 2020. Ne resteraient sur place qu’un escadron de drones B-Hunter… sur une base d’une taille très supérieure aux besoins réels. In fine, si les déclarations du général Delcour peuvent être interprétées comme un « suicide de carrière », il n’en demeure pas moins qu’il laisse derrière lui une armée dans une situation passablement complexe : sous-financée au niveau des équipements, réformée essentiellement par des coupes budgétaires mais non réorganisée en profondeur, doctrinalement placée sous la tutelle des affaires étrangères et souffrant de modes de gestion excessivement lourds, elle pourrait également bien être l’objet de convoitises de part et d’autres de la frontière linguistique. Si ces convoitises ne déboucheront certainement pas sur un scénario à la bosniaque, les forces armées belges sont indubitablement en train de connaître leur pire crise depuis leur création.
Le député MR et membre de la commission Défense Denis Ducarme estime que par ses déclarations à propos de l'affaire Gennart le général Delcour porte atteinte à la séparation des pouvoirs. "Il n'est plus crédible pour occuper des fonctions de ce rang"
Le colonel Luc Gennart avait dénoncé la flamandisation de l'armée, ce qui lui avait valu une mutation accélérée, mutation contestée devant la conseil d'Etat qui lui avait donné raison. Une décision judiciaire mal prise par le général Delcour qui ne s'était pas privé de le dire publiquement au cours d'une conférence de presse. Le général qui avait aussi, dit La Dernière Heure, donné sa démission au ministre De Crem qui l'aurait refusée.
Une affaire qui manifestement n'est pas terminée. Denis Ducarme estime que par ses déclarations le général Delcour porte atteinte à la séparation des pouvoirs.
Denis Ducarme veut un débat à la Chambre : "J'ai lu qu'il avait déjà proposé sa démission au ministre de la Défense, qui a été refusée, donc le débat aura lieu à la Chambre, c'est ce que je demande, c'est que la commission de la Défense se réunisse très vite tout de même, pour se poser sur ces déclarations. Mais je ne vois pas aussi, aux yeux de nos alliés de l'OTAN, des pays de l'Union européenne, comment nous pourrions continuer au niveau de la Défense à travailler de manière crédible par rapport à ses alliés, compte tenu de déclarations tout à fait surréalistes, telles qu'elles, telles que le général Delcour a pu les tenir".
Pour Denis Ducarme, le général Delcour ne peut plus être aujourd'hui le chef d'état major de l'armée en Belgique : "Aujourd'hui, en effet, compte tenu de ces déclarations, je pense qu'il faut oser le dire, clairement, il n'est plus crédible pour occuper des fonctions de ce rang".
Arnaud Ruyssen
Le commandant de la base de Florennes obtient raison au Conseil d’État; une décision critiquée par le chef de la Défense
NAMUR Des hommes politiques namurois ont apporté vendredi leur soutien au commandant de la base de Florennes, le colonel Luc Gennart, un moment relevé de son commandement pour avoir dénoncé face caméra la “flamandisation” de l’armée, jusqu’à ce que le Conseil d’État suspende cette sanction hier en matinée.
“La parole est d’or, le silence n’est que de plomb ”, a lancé le gouverneur de la province de Namur, Denis Mathen, lors des fastes du 2e wing tactique – que commande le colonel Gennart – organisés à Namur, ville-marraine de la 350e escadrille. “La liberté d’expression est un principe premier dans notre État de droit”, a-t-il ajouté.
Le bourgmestre de Namur, Jacques Étienne (CDH), a pour sa part fait part de l’“avenir incertain” de la base, soulignant que le colonel Gennart avait eu le mérite de “donner l’alerte” et parlant lui aussi d’“appréhensions” sur l’avenir de la base de Florennes, le plus gros employeur de la province avec ses quelque 1.300 personnes.
Le Conseil d’État a donné raison vendredi matin au colonel Gennart, estimant qu’il existait un préjudice grave et difficilement réparable pour le plaignant, victime d’une atteinte à l’honneur et à sa réputation. Il a aussi tenu compte du premier moyen développé par la défense, à savoir le défaut d’audition.
L’officier a été vivement applaudi par son personnel et, dans une moindre mesure, par le public lors de son arrivée sur la place Saint-Aubain, peu après 13 h, lorsqu’il a passé les troupes en revue.
Pour sa part, le chef de la Défense, le général Charles-Henri Delcour, a appelé vendredi le législateur à prendre une initiative qui permettrait de continuer à garantir l’ordre et la discipline au sein de l’armée.
Selon le patron de la Défense, la décision rendue hier par le Conseil d’État met au jour la difficulté pour l’armée de prendre des mesures d’ordre et disciplinaires dans le cadre légal actuel. “Notre déontologie militaire et nos normes d’ordre et de discipline semblent devenues incompatibles avec les lois, ou avec les conventions signées par la Belgique.”
Le général Delcour a souligné vendredi le caractère exceptionnel des déclarations du colonel Gennart. C’est “du jamais-vu dans notre armée” , a-t-il dit.
Le colonel Luc Gennart, commandant la base aérienne de Florennes, dénonçait la "flamandisation" de l’armée hier soir à la télévision publique. Il explique qu’au sein de l’état-major général, les décisions sont prises sans tenir compte de l’avis des francophones. De plus, ces derniers ne sont pas placés à des postes de décision, mais dans "des postes annexes" : "Ils sont soit envoyés dans les écoles, soit envoyés à l’étranger", explique le colonel au micro de Florin Hossu pour Bel RTL.
Enormément d'entente mais aucune place pour les francophones
Il admet toutefois qu’au niveau de l’armée, il y a "énormément d’entente" entre Flamands et francophones "On opère de manière tout à fait remarquable. Notre grande force, c’est d’être ensemble, unis, mais malheureusement, au niveau de la hiérarchie, il y a un mouvement de flamandisation qui exclut toute réflexion francophone".
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------On le dit mal préparé. Faux. A 50 ans, Philippe dispose d’une expérience que peu de politiciens actuels possèdent au moment d’occuper des postes stratégiques – il suffit de se souvenir de la ministre Freya Vanden Bossche, dont l’échancrure du corsage était inversement proportionnelle à ses compétences ; et que dire d’Isabelle Durant, Fadila Laanan et autres Philippe Henry et Eric Tomas, qui ne parviendra jamais à faire croire qu’il est chevronné en quoi que ce soit ?
Là où la classe politique s’ingénie à embrouiller les cartes, Philippe apparaît comme le phare au milieu de la tempête. Nous entretenons à grands frais des présences des trois Régions un peu partout dans le monde. Les Flamands le reconnaissent : vendre la Flandre à l’étranger, c’est nul. Et c’est pire encore pour la Wallonie, où la plupart des ministres ne pipent pas un mot d’anglais, même avec l’accent d’Angleur. Quant aux Bruxellois, ils doivent être des hommes liges de Charles Picqué, qui a l’art de s’entourer de snuls.
Alors que peu de responsables étrangers savent où se trouve la Belgique et ignorent que ce pays possède une capitale nommée Bruxelles ["quelque part en Europe", disent les Américains et les représentants des pays émergents, primordiaux pour notre avenir économique], Philippe est devenu le visage et la référence of Belgium.
La malédiction des Saxe-Cobourg
Deuxième raison, peut-être moins palpable : la poisse qui colle à notre famille royale. Sauf pour Léopold II, jamais une succession ne s’est déroulée de manière normale et sans drame.
On sait que Léopold Ier vécut un drame familial avant d’accepter le trône de Belgique. Léopold II mourut sans héritier. Albert Ier, cinquième fils du frère de Léopold II, accéda au trône sans s’y attendre et sans le désirer. Son fils, Léopold III, fut couronné, insuffisamment aguerri à son rôle de roi, en raison de la mort tragique d’Albert. Si son frère Charles exerça une régence appréciée, après la Seconde Guerre mondiale, il n’en reçut aucune reconnaissance et laissa la place à un mineur, Baudouin Ier, qui se révéla, contre toute attente, un souverain de haute valeur.
Dans son ombre, Albert s’apprêtait à mener une vie sans souci, préparant son fils aîné à la succession. La mort inopinée de Baudouin propulsa Albert à l’avant-scène, où il apprit son métier sur le tas, et avec un brio que personne ne lui dénie.
Au total et en raison de tragédies, tant personnelles que résultant des aléas de l’Histoire, aucun de nos souverains n’a été préparé à la fonction royale comme Philippe, qui sera le premier universitaire à monter sur le trône de Belgique.
Le paradoxe se trouve dans le fait que plus le rôle officiel du Roi s’est vu raboter au fil des années, plus le monarque se révèle un maillon indispensable dans le pays, au point d’en devenir une sorte d’indispensable pierre d’angle !
Le scénario du couronnement, point par point
Jusqu’à présent, la succession d’Albert II tenait pour certaine une succession à la disparition naturelle du Roi. L’hypothèse prend de moins en moins corps. Si elle aboutissait, elle s’avèrerait désastreuse.
On entend d’ici tous les agités du républicanisme, du PS au FDF, des Verts à l’extrême-droite, unis en un mariage contre nature, dont le seul programme consisterait à supprimer la monarchie. Chaos assuré, et c’est tout ce dont la Belgique n’a pas besoin dans l’état où l’ont précipitée nos chers politiciens férus du seul électoralisme.
Autre possibilité : l’abdication. Si Elizabeth II d’Angleterre semble ne pas vouloir abandonner le trône, vivante, nous sommes entourés d’exemples de situations contraires. L’exemple est venu du Nord ; au Danemark, aux Pays-Bas, où Beatrix est devenue Reine après le retrait de Juliana. Même évolution au Grand-Duché de Luxembourg.
On pense donc à une abdication d’Albert II en faveur de son fils aîné. Sans doute ne ferait-elle pas taire les anti-monarchistes, qui parviendraient à faire avancer leurs pions, aidés en cela par des sondages manipulés et des manœuvres dignes du PS de Charleroi où Magnette se fait élire triomphalement à 97 % par… moins de 20 % des membres carolos !
Le scénario le plus vraisemblable du couronnement de Philippe se passe en deux temps. Dans son allocution du 24 décembre, Albert II annonce son retrait et la passation de ses pouvoirs à Philippe.
Surfant sur sa popularité personnelle, Albert II propose de seconder son fils le temps qu’il faudra – un peu comme Dehaene soutenant Leterme, mais en plus sérieux. Cela permettrait à Philippe Ier de voler de ses propres ailes, de s’initier, de se “muscler”, de gagner le cœur de ses sujets, tout en capitalisant sur la renommée de son père.
Un 24 décembre 2009 décisif
Pourquoi le prochain discours royal devient-il si dramatiquement capital ? Plus le temps passe, plus les chances de survie de la monarchie et du pays s’amenuisent. Habitués à ne tenir aucun compte des désirs de la population, les états-majors politiques se partagent déjà le gâteau, ourdissent les manœuvres destinées à faire accepter une république.
Ils y ont avantage : toute situation institutionnelle nouvelle introduit un flou juridique, permettant tous les abus, instituant l’innommable et la mafia politicienne. En d’autres termes : le choix entre la monarchie et la chienlit cornaquée par les Uyttendaele et autres… dynasties à la Moureaux, Michel, Daerden, Wathelet et consorts.
Il s’agit donc de prendre de vitesse cette dérive qui, mal accueillie par la population, nous précipiterait dans un gourbi, dont personne n’ose prédire sur quoi il débouchera.
John UBU
Par Yann le 6 mai 2009
Le prince Laurent a envisagé de se marier avec une femme originaire de Mauritanie et de devenir lui-même musulman, selon Jan van den Berghe, spécialiste de la monarchie dans son ouvrage God in Laken.
Le prince Laurent est sur certains points le canard boiteux de la famille royale. Petit, il reçoit la même éducation que son frère et sa sœur mais se révolte dès son plus jeune âge contre ses parents et son oncle, le roi Baudouin.
Le prince a aussi eu des divergences avec le reste de la famille royale sur le plan religieux. Il ne s’est jamais déclaré athée mais il n’a jamais non plus fait partie du cercle des dévots de Laeken. C’est peut être son amitié profonde avec le prêtre français Guy Gilbert, qu’il considère comme un père de substitution, qui l’a gardé dans la religion catholique.
Détail croustillant: selon Noël Vassen, le prince aurait voulu devenir musulman avant de rencontrer le père Gilbert, et cela toujours afin de faire enrager sa famille. «Il avait comme projet d’épouser une femme de Mauritanie, la fille du numéro deux du pays. Une femme très riche. Il aurait certainement utilisé le Coran à des fins politiques. Il trouvait le statut du roi du Maroc taillé sur mesure pour lui. La Belgique compte un demi-million de musulmans, se disait Laurent. En devenant lui-même musulman, il serait devenu le prince des musulmans de Belgique. La famille de la femme mauritanienne n’a jamais été mise au courant de la proposition du prince Laurent et le mariage n’a pas pu avoir lieu. »
Source : Le Vif
Merci à Thierry
La grande presse subsidiée et hagiographique n’e s’est jamais réellement penchée sur les circonstances du décès du Roi Baudouin. Ubu a retracé pour vous le film du drame.
Le Roi Baudouin est décédé le 31 juillet 1993 à Motril en vacances dans sa villa Astrida. Se trouvaient sur place : la Reine Fabiola, deux militaires de la Marine [Robert Timmers, 1er maître et Jan Dressen, 1er maître principal], l’intendant de la villa [Juan Bermudez] et une cuisinière [la bonne amie de l'intendant]. Aucun médecin n’était présent alors que le Roi avait été [mal] opéré des piliers valvulaires [le coeur] à Paris par le Pr Carpentier peu auparavant.
Le Roi n’adorait pas trop la villa Astrida. Il l’avait équipée d’un matériel téléphonique de pointe pour rester en contact permanent pour gérer les affaires du pays. Le Roi installait en général, en fin de journée, vers 18h, son bureau sur la terrasse du 1er étage et s’enfermait à clé pour avoir la paix pour travailler et échapper ainsi à ses gardes du corps. Il prenait quantité de notes dans ses cahiers Atoma et consultait ses interlocuteurs via son répertoire téléphonique pour se faire une opinion avant de conseiller ses ministres.
La Reine, elle, avait fort à faire avec les nombreux enfants qui séjournaient à la villa pendant l’été. Il s’agissait le plus souvent de cousins et neveux de sa famille espagnole et d’enfants de princes d’autres familles royales qui adoraient venir jouer sur le bateau, l’Avila, un très beau yacht de plaisance anglais en bois [du tek] dont le salon était habillé en cuir de biches du Nil.
En plein soleil à 40°C
Ce jour là, il faisait quasi 40°. La terrasse était en plein soleil. Le Roi est en bermuda et en tee-shirt, sans chapeau. Il a verrouillé la porte de l’intérieur pour pouvoir s’isoler. Il fait littéralement torride.
A 19h00, la Reine appelle le Roi pour le dîner. Pas de réponse. Elle le pense toujours occupé à téléphoner avec la Belgique. 10 minutes plus tard, elle rappelle, toujours pas de réponse.
A 19h15, elle fait envoyer un des deux militaires qui prévient la Reine que la porte est verrouillée. La Reine monte le rejoindre, suivie par le 2e militaire. Ils décident d’enfoncer la porte et découvrent le Roi Baudouin en pleine crise cardiaque, dans le coma, par terre sur le petit tapis de plage qui se trouvait à côté de son bureau.
Matériel inadéquat
La Reine, infirmière de formation, lui administre les tous premiers soins [bouche à bouche et massage cardiaque], sans résultat. Pendant ce temps, l’intendant de la villa, Juan Bermudez, se rend à 150 mètres à la villa du médecin de garde attitré du Roi à Motril, le cardiologue Juan Yanguao [qui est en congé et absent] et tombe sur son beau fils le Dr Carlos Aguado, médecin généraliste, qui est en vacances dans la villa de son beau-père. Dare-dare, celui se rend, en sandales et tenue d’été, au chevet du Roi mais sans aucun matériel spécifique pour débloquer la coronnaire [pas de défribilateur, ni de quoi faire une injection d'adrénaline]. Il fallait un spécialiste pour tenter de sauver le Roi. Le Roi est en apnée totale, le médecin ne peut que constater l’arrêt cardio-respiratoire. Malgré l’arrivée de son confrère cardiologue Antonio Cano et de l’infirmière Belem Poyo Ferrer du centre de santé de Motril, qui tentèrent de le ranimer par tous les moyens pendant 50 minutes, le Roi ne reprit pas connaissance.
Au vu du diagnostic, la Reine n’a pas souhaité qu’on s’acharne médicalement sur le Roi en le plaçant sous assitance respiratoire. Elle a demandé aux militaires de le descendre dans sa chambre, elle est restée un long moment avec lui, lui a fermé les yeux, déposé un rosaire et mis ses mains en croix.
A 22h, le médecin s’en va et un légiste est venu faire les constats d’usage.
Défaut de prévoyance
Un incroyable défaut de prévoyance a donc été à la base du décès du Roi, alors qu’il disposait d’une armée de conseillers et que n’importe quel cardiologue belge aurait accepté gratuitement de l’accompagner sur place !
De plus, chaque année, le Roi faisait un check-up cardiaque chez le Dr Yanguao avant de s’exposer au soleil et d’aller sur son bateau. En juillet 1993, rien de tout cela, son voisin cardiologue était en vacances. Personne n’a été prévu pour le remplacer !
Pas même un médecin militaire ou de garde. Rien ! Il s’agissait d’un chef d’Etat tout de même…
La terrasse sur laquelle s’est passé le drame était sans la moindre zone d’ombre. On pouvait y tenir 20 à 30 minutes maximum. Il n’y avait aucun parasol, pas d’arbre. Le Roi, sans chapeau ni protection solaire, aimait y aller pour s’isoler du brouhaha ambiant et y travailler.
Pourquoi toute cette improvisation ?
Par comparaison, dans la tradition militaire, quand un dragueur côtier prend le large, il y a toujours un infirmier diplômé à bord. Et dès qu’il y a plus de 40 personnes à bord, il y a un médecin militaire présent [sur les frégates par exemple].
Ici, rien alors qu’il s’agit du Roi ! Pas d’hélicoptère, pas d’hôpital à moins de 30 kilomètres, aucun médecin sur place alors que le Roi connaissait des problèmes cardiaques avérés. Pas de garde, pas de remplacant, pas de check up avant de s’exposer à de fortes températures.
L’entourage du roi a gravement failli à la protection du Chef de l’Etat. Pourquoi ? Le Roi Baudouin dérangeait. Il ne laissait pas faire n’importe quoi à ses ministres, en les mettant au pas au besoin. Il n’aurait jamais admis le cirque qui a eu lieu cet été avec le chantage odieux de la NV-A. Il tenait son pays et tenait à son unité au nom de la cohésion des Belges.
Après son décès, la Reine a fait cadeau au Musée de la Marine à Anvers [au Steenkaai] de l’Avila, ce beau bateau de plaisance sur lequel elle n’a plus voulu retourner. Ce bateau était du temps du Roi entretenu par les militaires pour des questions de sécurité. Des deux militaires de faction lors des événements, seul Robert Timmers est toujours en vie : il est toujours technicien de marine pour le compte du Roi Albert.
Baudouin UBU
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