In 2010, France made the choice to breath new life into its colonial policy. This led her to instigate a regime change in the Ivory Coast and Libya, and to aim for the same result in Syria. But faced with the fiasco of the latter operation, Paris got carried away by the wave of events that she herself unleashed. After having armed and trained terrorist groups in Syria, the DGSE has now struck at the heart of the Lebanese capital.
During
a recent Round Table in Ankara, Admiral James Winnfeld, Vice-Chairman
of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, announced that Washington would
reveal its intentions toward Syria once the 6 November presidential
elections were over. He made it plainly understood to his Turkish
counterparts that a peace plan had already been negotiated with Moscow,
that Bashar al-Assad would remain in power and that the Security Council
would not authorize the creation of buffer zones. For his part, Herve
Ladsous, the U.N. Assistant Secretary General for Peacekeeping
Operations, announced that he was studying the possible deployment of
peacekeepers ("blue helmets") in Syria.
All regional actors are preparing for the cease-fire which will be
overseen by a U.N. force composed principally by troops of the
Collective Security Treaty Organization (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikstan). These events signify that the United
States is effectively continuing a process, begun in Iraq, of retreat
from the region and has accepted to share its influence with Russian.
At the same time, the New York Times revealed that direct
negotiations between Washington and Iran are slated to restart even as
the United States continues its attack on Iranian monetary values. It
is becoming clear that, after 33 years of containment, Washington is
acknowledging that Teheran is an established regional power,all the
while continuing to sabotage its economy.
This new situation comes at the expense of Saudi Arabia, France,
Israel, Qatar and Turkey all of whom had placed their bets on regime
change in Damascus. This diverse coalition is now suffering divisions
between those demanding a consolation prize and those trying to sabotage
outright the process underway.
Ankara has already changed its tune. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, previously
ready for the worst, is now actively seeking reconciliation with
Teheran and Moscow. Several days after insulting the Iranians and
harrassing the Russian diplomats in his country, he is now all smiles.
He took advantage of the Organization of Economic Cooperation in Baku to
approach President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. He proposed a complex framework
for discussing the Syrian crisis which would allow Turkey and Saudi
Arabia not to be left by the wayside. Careful not to humilate the losers
in the conflict, the Iranian president indicated he was open to such an
initiative.
As for Qatar, it is already seeking new horizons for its ambitions.
Emir Hamad took off on a trip to Gaza, posing as the self-appointed
protector of Hamas. He advocates the overthrow of the King of Jordan,
the transformation of the Hashemite monarchy into a Palestinian republic
and the installation in power of his proteges from the Muslim
Brotherhood.
Only Israel and France remain in the opposition camp. The new scheme
would offer a guarantee of protection to the state of Israel but it
would also alter its special status on the international scene and end
its expansionist dreams. Tel-Aviv would be relegated to being a
secondary power. France, also, would lose influence in the region,
particularly in Lebanon. Accordingly, the intelligence services of both
states have concocted an operation to collapse the U.S.-Russia-Iran
agreement which, even if it fails, would allow them to erase the traces
of their involvement in the Syrian crisis.
France started by circulating the rumor that President Bashar
al-Assad sponsored a Hezbollah plan to assassinate five Lebanese
leaders: the head of the security forces, the head commander of the
Ministry of the Interior, the Grand Mufti, the Maronite Patriarch and
former prime minister, Fouad Siniora. Then, Paris took out Michel
Samaha, who had served as liaison to the Syrian armed forces but who,
having been disgraced in Damascus, was no longer of use. This brilliant
and adept politician fell into the trap set for him by General Wassam
el-Hassan, head of the Free Syrian Army and himself a liaison with the
Salafists. Next, Paris eliminated General Wassam el-Hassan himself, who
had not only become useless in the eventual advent of peace in Syria but
also dangerous because of what he knew. The French rumor became reality
: the number one name on the list of targets is dead and a pro-Syrian
figure was arrested as he was preparing an attack on another name on the
list.
At the core of these machinations is General Puga. The former
Commander of Special Operations and Director of French Military
Intelligence was the head of the personal general staff of President
Nicolas Sarkozy and has been retained in that post by Francois Hollande.
Linked by his unconditional support for the Jewish colonial occupation
of Palestine [1]
and having close connections to American neoconservatives, he carried
forward French colonial policies in the Ivory Coast, Libya and Syria.
Bypassing democratic institutions, he determined on his own the
direction of French policy in the Middle East, despite his having no
official appointment.
Pierre Khalaf, Ghaleb Kandil Beirut, 30 October 2012
During the last few days, the Lebanese watched live on television
some of the chapters of the resounding collapse of the March 14 forces
in the streets of Beirut, Tripoli and Sidon, one which reached its
dramatic peak with the scandalous attempt to storm the Serail. This
constituted a failed and outrageous act, both politically and morally.
Firstly, the moral and cultural collapse of the March 14 forces has
been featured in their actions since the assassination of General Wissam
al-Hassan. Indeed, the political front that delivered lectures and
launched campaigns in rejection of the weapons, all weapons, under the
headline that the state and the national institutions were the only
guarantors of all aspects of life, and the front which claimed to be
peaceful since the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri in
2005 and tried to appear oppressed and aggressed, unleashed a campaign
of political and security violence which led the country to the brink of
civil war. It did so by exploiting the assassination, without raising
one slogan related to the investigations and the trials. It thus sought
the use of the crime to achieve an immoral goal, i.e. return to power,
without having a political program or making any pledges to change the
situation. The only aim was to replace Prime Minister Najib Mikati with
leader of the Future Movement Saad al-Hariri.
Secondly, what happened on the ground was not a street anarchy as
some like to claim to lift any responsibility which might fall on the
March 14 command for having recruits thugs and riff-raff in an organized
sabotage campaign, during which the citizens were assaulted and public
life was paralyzed due to the mobile riots and violence. Indeed, the
Lebanese regions witnessed the erection of checkpoints controlled by
armed elements that beat the passersby, attacked the cars and practiced
provocative sectarian violence against hundreds of Lebanese in the Bekaa
and the coastal road linking Beirut to the South. At this level,
information circulated about the fact that many young men were thrown
off the Awwali Bridge, while dozens were stabbed with knives in the
Naame and Katermaya regions. In the meantime, shootings occurred in an
organized way in Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon and Akkar, in addition to the
emergence of a form of political terrorism which led to the killing of a
Sunni sheikhs and cadres opposing the Future Movement on the political
level. Moreover, armed groups from the Future Movement militias, the
so-called Free Army and Takfiri organizations were deployed, thus
causing the streets to be occupied by Lebanese or Syrian armed gangs.
Hence, the street mayhem did not feature a spontaneous popular action,
and this marked the epitome of moral collapse.
Thirdly, the goal which is linked to the return to power through the
spread of methodic chaos and anarchy stripped the March 14 forces of any
moral quality and exposed the core of their action. At this level, the
facts registered a popular abstinence from cooperating with these
forces’ calls, despite their exploitation of the shed blood once again
and their use of all possible means, including the spread of rumors, the
mobilization of a massive media machine, the rallying of thousands of
Syrian refugees and the distribution of money. All these measures failed
to revive the old scenes of the consecutive events organized in the
years which followed the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik
al-Hariri. The storming of the Serail on the other hand constituted the
peak of the mental and political disorder prevailing over the March 14
command, which raised the slogan of toppling the government while
thinking it could lead to Mikati’s exit upon the orders and calls of
Al-Sanioura against the backdrop of the assassination. It was as though
the Lebanese had forgotten about the fact that the man remained
unaffected by and did not even consider resignation in light of the
series of assassinations which occurred during his term. This command
thought that its faltering political muscles had the ability to amend
the American and Israeli positions which revolved around the necessity
of sparing stability in Lebanon, as it was clearly seen in the Baabda
declaration which constituted a strong blow to Al-Hariri’s and Geagea’s
illusions.
Fourthly, the storming of the Serail in itself confirmed the moral
collapse. This was clearly detected by the citizens when comparing what
was done by the March 14 forces during the days of Al-Sanioura’s
government, i.e. when they fiercely defended the premiership and its
headquarters, and was recalled by Mufti Sheikh Rashid Qabbani. At this
level, the emergence of the gangs of the so-called Free Army constituted
a dramatic and expressive turning point, especially after they placed
their flag above the Lebanese flag on the Serail door, in parallel to
the presence of Israeli agents among the crowds which could not be
widened despite the calls of Deputy Nouhad al-Mashnouk and the shouting
of Deputy Muin al-Merhebi, with the sole purpose of enhancing the attack
on the Serail guards.
The desperate team following the collapse of the wager on Syria’s
fall and the attempts to return to power at whichever price, acted
without any cover from its American and European sponsors, knowing that
the latter have no intention of becoming involved in a battle or a coup
in Lebanon out of fear from the consequences of this the lethal
adventure inside their last area of influence. This reveals the mental
and nervous disorder prevailing over the March 14 command, one which led
it to adopt hysterical and arbitrary decisions as it is proceeding with
its game in the North and seeking the besieging of the Lebanese army
with depletion. The regional and international balances and calculations
have changed, and political stupidity mixed with spite can only lead
this team to commit foolish acts. That is the reality behind the events
witnessed during the last few days in a country whose people yearn for
civil peace and reject strife, at a time when the March 14 forces are
recruiting mercenaries to attack the Lebanese army and state which they
are trying to reach, as it was stated by the prime minister.
News Analysis.
By Nasser Kandil
... Syria.
During his meeting with United Nations Envoy to Syria Lakhdar Brahimi
and the delegation accompanying him, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad
discussed the developments affecting the situation in Syria, the efforts
deployed By Brahimi and the outcome of his recent tour in a number of
states in the region. President Al-Assad stressed Syria’s support of the
efforts of the UN envoy, assuring it was open to any honest attempts to
seek a political solution to the crisis, based on the respect of Syrian
sovereignty and the rejection of foreign intervention. He added that
any initiative or political process should be based on ending terrorism,
with all that this requires in terms of commitments by the states
implicated in supporting and arming the terrorists in Syria to stop
doing so.
...
On the other hand, President Bashar al-Assad issued a decree granting
a general pardon for all the crimes committed before 23/10/2012. In
statements to the national news agency SANA, Justice Minister Dr. Najm
Hamad al-Ahmad said that the pardon issued by President Al-Assad was the
most comprehensive in the history of the Syrian Arab Republic, and fell
in the context of social tolerance, national unity and the requirements
of coexistence on the occasion of the Holy Eid al-Adha. He considered
that this constituted a step in a series of steps announced by President
Al-Assad on more than one occasion.
En 2010, la France a fait le choix de relancer sa politique coloniale. Cela l’a conduit à changer le régime en Côte d’Ivoire et en Libye, puis à essayer de la faire en Syrie. Mais face à l’échec de cette troisième opération, Paris se trouve emporté par les événements qu’il a provoqués. Après avoir armé et encadré des groupes terroristes en Syrie, la DGSE a frappé au cœur de la capitale libanaise.
Lors d’une table ronde à Ankara, l’amiral James Winnefeld, chef
d’état-major adjoint des USA, a confirmé que Washington révélerait ses
intentions à l’égard de la Syrie, dès l’élection présidentielle du 6
novembre terminée. Il a clairement fait comprendre à ses interlocuteurs
turcs qu’un plan de paix avait déjà été négocié avec Moscou, que Bachar
el-Assad resterait en place et que le Conseil de sécurité
n’autoriserait pas la création de zones tampons. De son côté, le
secrétaire général adjoint de l’ONU chargé des opérations de maintien de
la paix, Hervé Ladsous, a confirmé qu’il était en train d’étudier les
possibilités de déploiement de casques bleus en Syrie.
Tous les acteurs de la région se préparent donc à un cessez-le-feu
imposé par une force onusienne principalement composée de troupes de
l’Organisation du Traité de sécurité collective (Arménie, Biélorussie,
Karazkhstan, Kirghizistan, Russie, Tadjikistan). De facto, cela
signifie que les Etats-Unis poursuivent leur retrait de la région,
débuté en Irak, et acceptent d’y partager leur influence avec la Russie.
Simultanément, le New York Times a révélé que des pourparlers
directs vont reprendre entre Washington et Téhéran, alors même que les
États-Unis s’appliquent à couler la monnaie iranienne. En clair, après
33 ans de containement, Washington admet que Téhéran est une puissance régionale incontournable, tout en continuant à saboter son économie.
Cette nouvelle donne se fait au détriment de l’Arabie saoudite, de la
France, d’Israël, du Qatar et de la Turquie qui avaient tous misé sur
un changement de régime à Damas. Cette coalition hétéroclite se divise
désormais entre ceux qui réclament un lot de consolation et ceux qui
tentent de saboter le processus en cours.
D’ores et déjà, Ankara a changé son fusil d’épaule. Recep Tayyip
Erdogan, qui se disait prêt au pire, tente de se réconcilier avec
Téhéran et Moscou. Quelques jours après avoir insulté les Iraniens et
fait molester des diplomates russes, il est devenu tout sourire. Il a
profité du sommet de l’Organisation de Coopération Economique à Bakou
pour rencontrer le président Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.Il lui a proposé de
mettre en place un dispositif complexe de discussion sur la crise
syrienne qui permette à la fois à la Turquie et à l’Arabie saoudite de
ne pas rester au bord du chemin. Soucieux de ne pas humilier les
perdants, le président iranien s’est montré ouvert à cette initiative.
Le Qatar, de son côté, est déjà en quête de nouveaux espaces pour ses
ambitions. L’émir Hamad s’est offert un voyage à Gaza et s’est posé en
protecteur du Hamas. Il verrait d’un bon œil le renversement du roi de
Jordanie, la transformation du royaume hachémite en une république
palestinienne et l’installation au pouvoir de ses protégés de la
Confrérie des Frères musulmans.
Restent Israël et la France qui ont constitué un front du refus. La
nouvelle donne serait une garantie de protection pour l’État d’Israël,
mais mettrait fin à son statut particulier sur la scène internationale
et ruinerait ses rêves expansionnistes. Tel-Aviv serait ravalé au rang
de puissance secondaire. Quand à la France, elle y perdrait son
influence dans la région, y compris au Liban. C’est dans ce contexte que
les services secrets des deux États ont conçu une opération pour faire
échouer l’accord USA-Russie-Iran. Dans l’hypothèse où cette opération
échouerait, elle devrait quand même permettre d’effacer les preuves de
l’ingérence dans la crise syrienne.
La France a d’abord fait circuler une rumeur selon laquelle le
président Bachar el-Assad aurait commandité au Hezbollah l’assassinat de
cinq personnalités libanaises : le chef des Forces de sécurité
intérieure, le directeur des forces du ministère de l’Intérieur, le
grand mufti, le patriarche maronite et l’ancien Premier ministre Fouad
Siniora. Puis, Paris a sacrifié Michel Samaha —qui lui servait d’agent
de liaison avec les services syriens, mais venait de tomber en disgrâce à
Damas et était donc devenu inutile—. Le brillant et versatile
politicien est tombé dans un piège tendu par le général Wissam el-Hassan
—chef des FSI et lui même agent de liaison avec les salafistes—. Puis,
Paris a sacrifié le général Wissam el-Hassan, qui non seulement était
devenu inutile en cas de paix en Syrie, mais dangereux tant il savait de
choses. Ainsi la rumeur française s’est réalisée : le premier sur la
liste des cibles est mort, et une personnalité pro-syrienne a été
arrêtée en préparant un attentat contre une autre cible de la liste.
Au cœur de cette machination, on trouve le général Benoît Puga. Cet
ancien commandant des Opérations spéciales et directeur du Renseignement
militaire français a été chef de l’état-major particulier du président
Nicolas Sarkozy et a été maintenu à son poste par le président François
Hollande. Affichant un soutien inconditionnel à la colonie juive de
Palestine [1]
et des relations privilégiées avec les néo-conservateurs US, il a
relancé la politique coloniale de la France en Côte d’Ivoire, en Libye
et en Syrie. Il était l’agent traitant à la fois de Michel Samaha et de
Wissam el-Hassan. Il est aujourd’hui l’homme fort à Paris. En violation
des institutions démocratiques, il gouverne seul la politique
proche-orientale de la France, bien que cette attribution ne corresponde
pas à ses fonctions officielles.
Depuis l’assassinat du général Wissam al-Hassan, le
14-Mars multiplie les erreurs politiques. Il a d’abord fait de mauvais
calculs, en pensant pouvoir rééditer le scénario de 2005, lorsqu’il a
pris le pouvoir dans le sillage de l’assassinat de l’ancien Premier
ministre, Rafic Hariri. En optant pour l’agitation populaire et la
violence dans la rue, il a pensé que, le chef du gouvernement, le
centriste Najib Mikati, intimidé, démissionnerait de son poste. Mais ce
dernier, fin limier de la politique, a su saisir les tendances
internationales et a compris que la stabilité du Liban est la priorité
des pays occidentaux. Déterminé, il a résisté à toutes les pressions et
fait face à la campagne de terreur. Et c’est avec la bénédiction de la
« communauté internationale » que l’Armée libanaise a repris le contrôle du terrain, occupé un temps par les milices du Courant du futur.
...
• Le Hezbollah a qualifié de « calomnies » les accusations du chef des Forces libanaises, Samir Geagea, dans l’affaire de l’assassinat du général Wissam al-Hassan. « Le
chef des Forces libanaises, qui est condamné dans une série de grands
crimes qu’il avait perpétrés contre des individus et des groupes
libanais, et notamment contre l’ancien Premier ministre Rachid Karamé,
nous a gratifiés d’une rengaine d’accusations infondées à propos d’un
rôle d’exécutant qu’aurait tenu le Hezbollah dans l’assassinat du
général martyr Wissam el-Hassan », indique le communiqué. « Nous
rejetons entièrement ces accusations et nous y voyons une tentative
flagrante de jeter de l’huile sur le feu sectaire et d’aggraver la
tension dans le pays ». « Cela, aucun sage ne saurait l’accepter à
l’exception de ceux qui ont bien voulu servir gratuitement l’ennemi
israélien et ses complots criminels », conclut le communiqué.
• Les enquêteurs libanais dans l’assassinat du général Wissam
al-Hassan ont reçu le soutien, jeudi, d’une équipe de la police fédérale
US. Les agents du FBI sont déjà sur le lieu de l’attentat, à
d’Achrafié, à la recherche d’éléments et d’indices. La venue
d’enquêteurs du FBI avait été convenue lors d’un entretien téléphonique,
lundi, entre Najib Mikati et Hillary Clinton. Le Hezbollah avait
exprimé son mécontentement de la venue des policiers états-uniens. Le
secrétaire général adjoint du parti, cheikh Naïm Kassem, avait réclamé
une enquête à 100 % libanaise.
• Selon le quotidien libanais Ad Diyar, une entreprise
française spécialiste de la protection des personnalités et de la
sécurité des établissements a proposé au Liban d’envoyer 300
responsables de sécurité et agents anti-terroristes contre une somme de
120 millions de dollars par an. L’entreprise indique qu’elle est en
mesure de déjouer 95 % des éventuels incidents à condition qu’elle
dispose d’une grande liberté d’action. Problème : pourra-t-elle se
rendre dans la banlieue sud de Beyrouth ?
...
Revue de presse
...
Al Akhbar (24 octobre 2012)
Ibrahim El-Amine
À la suite de l’assassinat du général Wissam el-Hassan, les forces
du 14-Mars n’ont pas tardé à pointer du doigt la Syrie. L’unique
objectif de cette accusation était de mobiliser son public, sachant
qu’elle ne sort pas du contexte politique de l’action de ce camp qui
mise sur la chute du régime syrien.
Cependant, les déclarations des responsables sécuritaires et des
ténors du 14-Mars correspondent-elles aux éléments ressortant de
l’enquête relative à l’attentat ? L’enquête s’articule, pour le moment,
sur trois éléments principaux. Le premier est lié aux données tangibles
concernant la scène de l’attentat. Il consiste à identifier les
personnes observées par une caméra de surveillance installée dans les
lieux de l’attentat. Les images montrent que quelques heures avant
l’explosion, une voiture, garée dans la ruelle où l’attentat a eu lieu, a
cédé sa place à la voiture Toyota de type RAV4, qui a était piégée.
L’enquête est en cours pour savoir si la première voiture en question y
était stationnée dans l’objectif de réserver une place au véhicule
piégé. Le deuxième élément de l’enquête relève d’un procédé déductif qui
consiste à analyser les données téléphonique et décrypter les appels
qui ont eu lieu dans la région avant et après l’explosion dans une
tentative d’identifier les auteurs potentiels de l’attentat. Le
troisième élément consiste à savoir par quels moyens le général Wissam
el-Hassan a été surveillé. À cet effet, les appels effectués par
el-Hassan avant et après avoir quitté Berlin où il était accompagné du
Directeur général des FSI, Ashraf Rifi, et d’une délégation sécuritaire,
ont été examinés. Et la liste des personnes que le responsable
sécuritaire a contactées durant cette période a été mise en place. Les
autorités judiciaires compétentes ont rapporté qu’el-Hassan avait
contacté une journaliste, et qu’ils s’étaient entendus pour se
rencontrer dans son bureau secret d’Achrafié vendredi matin, soit le
jour de l’attentat. La justice demandera, par conséquent, aux enquêteurs
de convoquer la journaliste, qui était l’un des informateurs
d’el-Hassan, afin de recueillir sa déposition. Cette mesure permettrait à
la justice de répondre aux questions suivantes : Y avait-il un moyen de
communication entre la journaliste et el-Hassan autre que le téléphone
portable ? Le contact entre eux a-t-il eu lieu avant ou après l’arrivée
d’el-Hassan au Liban ? La journaliste a-t-elle informé une partie
tierce, en personne, par téléphone, ou par un autre moyen de
télécommunication électronique de sa rencontre prévue avec el-Hassan ?
Aurait-elle évoqué la présence du bureau secret d’el-Hassan ? La
journaliste a-t-elle passé des appels téléphoniques après avoir quitté
le bureau d’el-Hassan à Achrafié ?
...
Ad Diyar (Quotidien libanais proche de la majorité-25 octobre 2012)
Une source officielle syrienne haut placée affirme que c’est la
France qui aurait assassiné le général Wissam el-Hassan en raison de
certaines informations confidentielles qui étaient en sa possession.
Quant à la Syrie, qui a déjà suffisamment de problèmes, elle ne fera
rien qui puisse lui en causer d’autres. Wissam el-Hassan, poursuivent
ces sources, aurait commencé, grâce à Michel Samaha, à faire la lumière
sur les relations secrètes entre la Syrie et la France : l’ancien
ministre l’aurait en effet mis au courant d’informations dangereuses
portant sur la relation entre ces deux pays ainsi que sur son propre
rôle secret d’intermédiaire. Samaha aurait donc dévoilé les dessous de
la relation syro-française, au niveau des services de renseignements en
particulier, ce qui a poussé la France à vouloir liquider Wissam
al-Hassan. Il n’est d’ailleurs pas exclu que Michel Samaha soit éliminé à
son tour pour enterrer les grands secrets relatifs aux renseignements
français et syriens. La France ne souhaiterait en tout cas pas que les
États-uniens découvrent ses relations secrètes et son rôle en Syrie et
dans la région, d’autant plus que Wissam el-Hassan avait commencé à
tisser des liens avec les États-Unis.
L’Orient-Le Jour (Quotidien francophone proche du 14-Mars)
Paris- Réplique sismique de la décapitation de la hiérarchie
militaire syrienne, le 18 juillet dernier à Damas (1), l’assassinat du
Général Wissam Al-Hassam, l’homme lige du clan Hariri sur le plan
sécuritaire au Liban, a retenti comme un revers stratégique majeur du
camp atlantiste, à forte charge symbolique, à forte portée
psychologique.
Se superposant à la destruction des sanctuaires de Tombouctou (Nord
Mali) par les affidés du Qatar, Ansar Eddine, et à l’assassinat de
l’ambassadeur des Etats-Unis en Libye, Christopher Evens, à la date
hautement symbolique du 11 septembre à Benghazi par les obligés néo
islamistes de l’Amérique, le dégagement sanglant de Wissam al Hassan, va
sans nul doute opérer un profond bouleversement du paysage politique
tant au Liban, qu’au-delà, sur l’ensemble du Moyen orient.
Survenant trois mois jour pour jour après l’attentat de Damas, la
déflagration de Beyrouth, le 19 octobre, en plein fief chrétien de la
capitale libanaise, constitue une parfaite illustration des dérives
incontrôlées du conflit syrien et de ses retombées sur le Liban, dont
les conséquences pourraient s’avérer gravement dommageables tant pour le
clan Hariri au Liban, que pour son parrain saoudien, que pour leur
parrain commun, les Etats-Unis, par ricochet pour la Syrie elle-même et
le clan Assad et ses alliés, alors que la zone frontalière syro
libanaise paraît complétement gangrénée par des trafics en tous genres,
d’infiltrations de djihadistes de tous poils et d’apprentis sorciers
sulfureux surgis de nulle part à la recherche d’odeurs de poudre,
prélude à la constitution d’un «Sunnitoland».
A cinq mois de l’ouverture du procès Hariri à la Haye, la disparition
de ce témoin faisandé, embourbé dans la gestion d’un nouveau mystérieux
faux témoin de l’affaire Michel Samaha, Milad Kfouri, pour cruel que
soit ce constat, arrangerait bon nombre de protagonistes de cette
épreuve de force interminable entre le camp atlantiste et ses
contestataires régionaux en vue de la maîtrise du jeu régional.
Quelle soit ou non impliquée dans cet attentat, quelle que soit son
degré d’implication, la Syrie va immanquablement être pointée du doigt
et criminalisée selon un processus identique à celui qui a prévalu lors
de l’attentat contre l’ancien premier ministre Rafic Hariri, le 15
Février 2005.
Au-delà des accusations fondées ou pas, force est toutefois
d’admettre que le fait que l’attentat se soit produit en plein fief
chrétien de la capitale libanaise, à proximité d’une permanence du parti
Phalangiste, une des principales formations chrétiennes libanaises,
témoigne, sept ans après le retrait syrien du Liban, sinon de la
dextérité des services syriens, si les charges anti syriennes étaient
fondées, à tout le moins de la négligence coupable de la victime et de
ses services qui n’auront su, en dépit des considérables moyens mis à
leur disposition, déjouer les menées hostiles.
L’homme bénéficiait d’une sorte de passe-droit et ses services d’un
quasi de statut d’extra-territorialité du fait de ses protections pétro
monarchiques, dont il a usé et abusé pour impulser, malgré ses déboires,
sa promotion aux plus hauts échelons de la hiérarchie militaire et doté
ses services d’un important budget et d’équipements sophistiqués
fournis abondamment par les pays occidentaux.
L’élimination du chef d’un service de renseignements à la dévotion de
la famille Hariri, ancien garde de corps rescapé lui-même de l’attentat
contre ancien premier ministre Rafic Hariri, au rôle primordial dans la
mise en circulation de «faux témoins» du procès Hariri et de l’enquête à
charge du Tribunal Spécial sur le Liban, paraît devoir fragiliser
considérablement le leadership politique du Clan Hariri au Liban,
rendant même problématique le retour dans l’immédiat à Beyrouth du chef
du clan Hariri son chef, l’ancien premier ministre Saad Hariri, en exil
depuis le début du «printemps arabe», il y a deux ans.
Personnage clé des opérations de déstabilisation anti-syriennes,
interlocuteur privilégié des services français et américains, artisan de
l’arrestation de l’ancien ministre libanais pro syrien Michel Samaha,
maître d’œuvre du rapprochement franco syrien sous la présidence de
Nicolas Sarkozy, Wissam Al Hassan était surtout et avant tout la dague
sécuritaire du dispositif régional saoudien.
Son assassinat revêt dans cette perspective un magistral camouflet au
maître d’œuvre de la contre-révolution arabe, le Prince Bandar Ben
Sultan, le chef des services de renseignements saoudiens en ce qu’elle
le prive d‘un de ses plus fidèles lieutenants, alors que le Royaume se
trouve en phase de turbulence avec les révoltes populaires de la région
d’Al Assir, fragilisé par l’absence des principaux dirigeants du pays,
Le Roi Abdallah, en hospitalisation prolongée hors du pays depuis trois
mois, de même que le ministre des Affaires étrangères, Saoud Al Faysal.
Dans la tradition des chefs du renseignement du Moyen-Orient, le général
Hassan est un personnage énigmatique, redouté dans son propre pays,
comme l’était son modèle maronite Johnny Abdo. Et si le masque
énigmatique masquait en fait une réputation non justifiée?
Johnny Abdo, le mentor maronite
Les légendes ont la vie dure, quand bien même l’état de service ne le justifie pas. Bachir Gemayel, président du Liban en 1982, et Rafic Hariri, chef du
gouvernement en 1992, auront eu le même mentor: Johnny Abdo, ancien chef
du service des renseignements de l’armée libanaise, dont son parrainage
leur sera fatal en même temps qu’il le discréditait. Mais cet homme
énigmatique, au rôle occulte, interface des services occidentaux pendant
trente ans, continue de bénéficier d’un halo de mystère.
Conseiller militaire du chef phalangiste durant la guerre civileen
infraction à ses fonctions officielles au sein de l’armée régulière
libanaise, son agent de liaison auprès des services occidentaux et de
leurs alliés régionaux, cheville ouvrière de la campagne visant à son
élection à la tête de l’état libanais en remplacement du président Elias
Sarkis, dans la foulée de l’invasion israélienne du Liban, en 1982,
puis de la campagne visant après son assassinat à propulser son frère
aîné Amine à sa succession, Johnny Abdo est un homme de l’ombre par
excellence.
Le flou entretenu sur ses origines, il serait de souche palestinienne,
la rapidité avec laquelle il aurait été naturalisé, sa facile
incorporation dans l’armée qui plus est dans un service aussi sensible
que le renseignement, la consonance anglo-saxonne de son prénom dans un
environnement arabe, la singularité pour ce colonel de décliner son
identité selon son statut civil et non par son grade dans l’armée,
contrairement à l’usage observé par tous les officiers libanais passés à
la notoriété, ont accentué le mystère qui l’entoure.
Ancien bras droit du Colonel Gaby Lahoud, véritable patron du
renseignement moderne libanais et artisan de son intrusion dans la vie
politique locale après la première guerre civile libanaise, en 1958,
homme de sang-froid sans état d’âme apparent, d’origine étrangère
cultivant le secret de surcroît, Johnny Abdo focalise une large part de
la vive suspicion que les Libanais nourrissent à l’égard d’une
institution qui pendant près de deux décennies est apparue comme le
gouvernement occulte du Liban aux procédés jugés sans rapport avec
l’éthique démocratique et républicaine.
S’il peut se targuer d’avoir propulsé ses deux poulains au pouvoir,
son bilan est sujet à caution. Bachir Gemayel, éphémère président du
Liban, a été tué dans un attentat quelques jours avant sa prise
fonction, alors que Rafic Hariri, s’il a battu un record de longévité
gouvernementale dans l’histoire du Liban avec un double mandat de dix
ans, a implosé en pleine trajectoire après avoir mis en coupe réglée
l’économie du pays et grevé le trésor d’une dette publique de 42
milliards de dollars.
Mais le reproche le plus grave que cet homme de l’ombre encourt est
d’avoir fourvoyé le camp chrétien dans une alliance exclusive avec les
Israéliens au mépris du voisinage arabe du Liban, accentuant son
isolement; d’avoir instrumentalisé son propre camp pour satisfaire des
ambitions présidentielles, et, au niveau de l’armée, d’avoir rompu la
traditionnelle fraternité d’armes lors de l’élection présidentielle
libanaise de 1998.
La ténébreuse affaire du faux témoin syrien Mohamad Zuheir Siddick,
témoin à charge contre la Syrie dans le procès en instance de
l’assassinat de Rafic Hariri, qui lui aurait été partiellement imputée,
aura été fatale à sa réputation, le signe patent de l’échec d’un homme
qui aura sinistré son pays plus qu’aucun autre et voué au bûcher deux de
ses poulains pour la satisfaction de ses ambitions présidentielles
contre les intérêts à long terme de son pays. Johnny Abdo fait l’objet d’une citation à comparaître devant le tribunal
correctionnel de Paris, sur requête du Général Jamil As Sayyed, ancien
directeur général de la sûreté libanaise, un des quatre officiers
arbitrairement détenus pendant trois sur la base des dépositions du faux
témoin en question. Un épisode qui a couvert de ridicule le Tribunal
spécial sur le Liban et les auteurs de la manipulation. L’échec est
patent. Mais la légende perdure.
Le disciple: Wissam Hassan, la version sunnite de l’homme de l’ombre
Son zèle scolaire lui a sauvé la vie, mais gâché sa vie. Lors du plus
fort séisme politique de l’histoire moderne du Liban, le plus important
attentat meurtrier de l’histoire de ce pays, qui a emporté 23 personnes
et blessés plus d’une centaine blessés, dont l’assassinat de l’espoir
de l’Occident en terre arabe, Rafic Hariri, l’homme en charge de sa
protection était tranquillement assis sur les bancs d’un amphithéâtre de
l’Université libanaise, entrain de noircir sa copie.
Un hasard qui lui a certes sauvé la vie, mais gâché sa vie,
l’empoisonnant même au-delà de toute attente, tant est lourde la
suspicion qui pèse sur cet homme animé d’un pressant besoin de
respectabilité universitaire.
Son nom sera ainsi irrémédiablement associé au grand ratage de sa
vie, l’assassinat de Rafic Hariri, dont il était chargé de sa protection
rapprochée, qu’il n’a ni prévu, ni anticipé, ni entravé, ni déjoué,
davantage préoccupé par sa promotion universitaire que par la sauvegarde
de son bienfaiteur.
En pleine épreuve de force entre la Syrie et son patron, au paroxysme
d’un conflit régional, dont des personnalités libanaises, notamment
Marwane Hamadé, ministre des télécommunications (octobre 2004), en
étaient déjà les victimes, au titre de dommage collatéral, signe
annonciateur de plus grands malheurs, sur fond d’un traumatisme
psychologique majeur provoqué par l’éviction du pouvoir des sunnites
d’Irak et la propulsion, pour la première fois depuis Saladin (Salah
Eddine Al Ayoubi), d’un Kurde à la tête de l’ancien siège de l’Empire,
Bagdad, ancienne capitale des abbassides, (Janvier 2005), à
l’arrière-plan d’un bain de sang quotidien et d’une fermentation
intégriste au Liban, Wissam Al-Hassan, avait demandé d’anticiper la
soutenance de sa thèse, couronnement d’un enseignement en informatique à
l’Université libanaise sous la conduite du professeur Yahya Rabih.
Une thèse qui portait, non sur la stratégie de contre guérilla, ou,
les règles d’engagement des actions armées en milieu insurrectionnel
urbain, voire même le décryptage des réseaux de télécommunications,
alors noyautées par les services occidentaux et Israéliens, mais en
Sciences Humaines sur le “Management et relations humaines” sans qu’il
ait été possible de savoir si cet intitulé anodin couvait l’art de la
manipulation de l’opinion ou la gestion de faux témoin comme cela se
révélera par la suite.
Un étrange alibi
Responsable de la sécurité de Rafic Hariri au moment de son
assassinat, il était devenu le principal point de contact entre
l’enquête et les Forces de sécurité intérieure. Sauf que le chef des
gardes de corps, grassement payé, n’était pas dans le convoi le jour de
l’explosion. Et son alibi manque de conviction.
Selon les révélations de la télévision publique canadienne CBC, en
date du 22 novembre 2010, le Colonel Wissam Hassan dira aux enquêteurs
de l’ONU, le 9 juillet 2005, que la veille de l’assassinat, le 13
février, son professeur, Yahya Rabih, lui avait téléphoné pour
l’informer qu’il devait passer un examen le lendemain.
Vingt minutes plus tard, a-t-il dit aux enquêteurs, Hariri l’a appelé
pour lui demander de venir le voir. Le colonel Hassan s’est présenté à
la résidence de Hariri à 21 h 30 ce soir-là, et a obtenu la permission
de son patron d’aller passer son examen le lendemain. Il a passé toute
la matinée du lendemain à étudier pour cet examen, a-t-il expliqué aux
enquêteurs de l’ONU, et a débranché son téléphone à son arrivée à
l’université, soit à peu près au moment où Hariri est mort. “Si je
n’avais pas passé cet examen, a dit Hassan aux enquêteurs, j’aurai été
avec Hariri au moment de sa mort.
Mais le relevé des appels téléphoniques de Hassan donnait une toute
autre version des faits. En réalité, c’est en fait tait le colonel
Hassan qui avait pris l‘initiative d’appeler son professeur, et non
l’inverse.
Les stations cellulaires autour de la maison du colonel Hassan
montraient également que, le lendemain, il avait passé les heures
précédant l’assassinat de Hariri au téléphone, soit le temps qu’il avait
soi-disant passé à étudier. Il a fait 24 appels, soit en moyenne un
appel toutes les neuf minutes.
Ce que les enquêteurs de l’ONU trouvaient également bizarre, c’était
que, normalement, les hauts responsables des services de sécurité du
Liban ne passent pas d’examens. “Son alibi est faible et incohérent, dit
un rapport confidentiel de l’ONU, qui qualifie Hassan de “possible
suspect dans le meurtre de Hariri”.
Le rapport, dont CBC News a obtenu une copie, a été rédigé fin 2008
pour Garry Loeppky, un ancien haut gradé de la GRC qui avait repris le
poste d’enquêteur en chef de l’ONU cet été là. L’alibi de Hassan,
pouvait-on lire dans le document, «ne semble pas avoir fait l’objet
d’une vérification indépendante”. Ce n’était pas par manque de volonté
de la part des enquêteurs de l’ONU. Ceux-ci auraient voulu vérifier
l’alibi de Hassan. Mais M. Serge Brammertz, le deuxième commissaire de
l’ONU, avait catégoriquement rejeté l’idée. Il considérait Hassan comme
un contact trop important et que toute enquête de ce genre serait trop
dérangeante.
Une enquête sous tension
Le rapport confidentiel concède qu’une enquête sur Hassan pourrait
avoir des inconvénients: “Les relations de la commission avec les FSI
pourraient en souffrir et si, d’une manière ou d’une autre, il a été
impliqué dans le meurtre de Hariri, le réseau pourrait décider de
l’éliminer”.
Néanmoins, le rapport affirme que le colonel Hassan “est un
interlocuteur clé pour la commission – il est particulièrement bien
placé pour influencer notre enquête. C’est pourquoi il importe de
résoudre certaines questions concernant sa loyauté et ses intentions. Il
est donc recommandé de mener une enquête discrète sur WAH ” Mais même
cela n’a pas été fait.
La direction de la commission de l’ONU a ignoré la recommandation.
Aujourd’hui encore, d’anciens enquêteurs de l’ONU ont des soupçons sur
Hassan qui, font-ils remarquer, a finalement été éliminé du cercle de
l’enquête. “C’était un personnage louche, a dit de lui un ancien haut
responsable de l’ONU. Je ne crois pas qu’il ait participé au meurtre,
mais il est impossible de dire ce qu’il savait”.
Bien qu’il leur ait été intimé l’ordre d’abandonner cette piste, les
enquêteurs de l’ONU ont réussi à récupérer les registres des appels
téléphoniques de Hassan pour la fin de 2004 et pour 2005 au complet.
Durant cette période, il avait eu 279 discussions avec Hussein Khalil,
l’adjoint principal du chef du Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah. Khalil, de
son côté, avait parlé 602 fois avec Wafik Safa, connu dans le milieu du
renseignement comme étant l’homme fort du service de sécurité interne du
Hezbollah.
Mais personne n’a interrogé Hassan non plus au sujet de ces appels.
Toutefois, Hassan avait également ses défenseurs. Il est resté un
proche allié du fils de Hariri, Saad, l’ancien premier ministre du
Liban, qui lui a renouvelé sa confiance après ses révélations.
L’homme pouvait rendre service et le prouvera dans sa gestion du faux
témoin Zuhayr Muhammad Siddiq remonte à septembre 2005. Le 26 septembre
2005, la commission d’enquête internationale entend la déposition de
Siddiq en présence du Colonel Hassan. Le lendemain, Siddiq établit une
reconnaissance de sa participation directe à l’assassinat de Hariri, un
document contresigné par l’officier libanais.
Depuis, Hassan était accusé d’avoir participé à la falsification de
la déposition. Le colonel rejettera cette accusation assurant que sa
présence était uniquement justifiée pour les besoins de la traduction
des propos tenus en arabe par Siddiq. Des accusations persistantes de
l’opposition libanaise désignent le Colonel Hassan comme l’homme qui,
sous l’autorité du clan Hariri, a assuré la gestion du dossier du faux
témoin Zouheir Siddiq.
Dans un zèle compensatoire, Wissam Hassan veillera à maintenir
l’enquête sur les rails menant à la Syrie, dégageant de son passage,
pour s’y substituer, les quatre officiers supérieurs en charge de la
sécurité du pays, qu’il expédiera en prison, tant pour mettre la main
sur les dossiers sensibles de l’affairisme syro-Haririen au Liban, que
pour pourvoir au ravitaillement du Tribunal Spécial sur le Liban de son
contingent de faux témoins.
L’homme que l’héritier vouait à prendre la tête d’un appareil
sécuritaire ultramoderne, à l’effet de faire contrepoids à l’armée et au
Hezbollah, la milice chiite armée, l’homme destiné à être le commandant
en chef de l’armée sunnite, représentée par les Forces de Sécurité
Intérieures (FSI), est, en fait, le talon d’Achille de Saad Hariri dans
sa confrontation avec son opposition. Dans le feu de la bataille, alors
que le tribunal international menaçait de faire des révélations sur
l’implication des plus hautes autorités iraniennes et syriennes,
l’Ayatollah Ali Khaménéi, via les troupes d’élite des Pasdarans -la
brigade Al Qods »- une fuite opportune révélait au grand jour la nature
duplique de cet homme de l’ombre.
La chaîne de télévision libanaise « New TV » diffusait, le 15 janvier
2011, à l’avant-veille de la remise des conclusions de l’enquête
internationale, un documentaire montrant Saad Hariri, Wissam Al Hassan,
Gerhard Lehman, l’assistant du procureur international, et le faux
témoin Zouhair Siddiq, dans des conciliabules s’apparentant à une
conjuration de cloportes. Sous réserve de son authenticité, ce document a
démasqué, au grand jour, la connivence entre les divers protagonistes
du clan pro occidental dans la fabrication des « faux témoins ».
L’origine de la fuite est sujette à controverse. Une hypothèse
privilégie la piste de Gerhard Lehman, se fondant sur les précédentes
accusations d‘Hassan Nasrallah selon lesquelles l’enquêteur allemand
avait cherché à vendre la déposition des témoins de l’enquête
internationale. Une autre hypothèse pencherait plutôt vers la piste
Wissam Al-Hassan qui, selon cette thèse, aurait fait fuiter la vidéo
vers les services syriens pour se prémunir contre un éventuel retour de
bâton.
Dans la tradition des chefs du renseignement du Moyen-Orient, le général
Hassan est un personnage énigmatique, redouté dans son propre pays,
comme l’était son modèle maronite. Et si le masque énigmatique masquait
en fait une réputation non justifiée? Et si ces fameux hommes de l’ombre
n’étaient que l’ombre de leur réputation? Une meilleure exposition
aurait-elle bridé les corrosives nuisances de leurs sombres manigances?
Rendue la démocratie au Liban moins ténébreuse?
Le mentor maronite a assisté impuissant à l’implosion de ses deux
poulains, le disciple, lui, s’est débattu de l’accusation de désertion,
consécutive à son soupçon d’abandon de poste, en pleine bataille
politique qui a coûté la vie au sens de sa mission. Wissam Al Hassan a échoué dans les trois missions majeures à lui
assignées durant sa carrière: la protection de Rafic Hariri, la gestion
du dossier des faux témoins et le maintien sous verrou des quatre
officiers libanais, qui seront libérés après quatre ans de détention
avec leur concert de révélations.
Dans la grande épreuve de leur vie, tous les deux ont glané, non le
prix d’excellence, mais le zéro pointé. Wissam Hassan, étymologiquement
“la distinction honorifique au meilleur”, a assurément démérité son nom.
De sa vie, il en a payé le prix.
Pour solde de tout compte sans pour autant que cette mort ne mette un
terme à la guerre de l‘ombre que se livrent les deux grands fauves de la
guerre clandestine interarabe, Bandar Ben Sultan, l’ancien Great Gatsby
de l’establishment américain et son rival syrien,
le colonel Hafez Makhlouf, l’home secret du régime baasiste.
Références
1 – Un attentat-suicide a visé mercredi 18 juillet 2012 à Damas le
centre du pouvoir syrien, emportant l’une des figures le plus
emblématiques du clan Assad, le général Assef Chawkat, le propre
beau-frère de Bachar Al-Assad. L’attentat, qui aurait été mené par un
membre de la garde rapprochée d’un des participants à une réunion du
Conseil national de sécurité, a emporté plusieurs hauts responsables de
l’appareil militaro sécuritaire syrien, notamment le ministre de la
défense, Daoud Rajha et le responsable de la cellule de crise chargée de
la rébellion, le général Hassan Turkmani.
L’attaque est survenue deux semaines après la défection d’un membre
du premier cercle du pouvoir baasiste, le général Manaf Tlass, officier
supérieur de la garde présidentielle et fils de l’ancien ministre de la
défense, le général Moustapha Tlass..
Cauda
La polémologie du Moyen orient recense de nombreux attentats
infiniment plus spectaculaires et meurtriers que l’attentat de Damas du
18 juillet 2012, dont voici les plus importants
• 1980 : Attentat des Moudjahidine Khalq contre le centre du pouvoir à
Téhéran, entraînant l’élimination des certains des principaux
dirigeants la hiérarchie politico religieuse de la République islamique
iranienne.
• 6 octobre 1981 : Assassinat du président égyptien Anouar El Sadate
• 15 septembre 1982 : Assassinat du président élu libanais Bachir Gemayel, la veille de son entrée en fonction
• 1983 : Attentat de Beyrouth contre l’ambassade américaine provoquant
la décapitation de l’Etat-major de la CIA au Moyen orient.
• 1984 : Attentat contre le QG israélien à Tyr, faisant deux cent vingt
victimes, dont le commandant des forces israéliennes au Sud Liban.
• 1984 : Double attentat de Beyrouth contre le Quartier général des
forces américaines et le Drakkar, le PC français, provoquant une
hécatombe, fauchant près de quatre cents soldats et civils.
• 1986 : Attentat d’Aden ourdi par le propre premier ministre Ali Nasser
Mohamad contre ses rivaux entrainant la décapitation de toute la
hiérarchie marxiste du Yémen sud, provoquant par ricochet une guerre
civile et la fuite de M. Ali Nasser vers Damas.
L’équipe de l’AFP Beyrouth durant la première phase de la guerre civile libanaise (1975-1979). De droite à gauche sur la photo :
Boni De Torhout, envoyé spécial au Liban et futur chef du service diplomatique de l’AFP, René Naba, correspondant tournant de l’AFP et futur responsable du monde arabo-musulman au service diplomatique de l’AFP,
Georges Herbouze, directeur du bureau régional de l’AFP
Xavier Baron, directeur adjoint du bureau de Beyrouth et futur Rédacteur en chef de l’AFP
On October 19, Israeli Mossad car bombing killed
Lebanese internal security chief Brigadier General Wissam al-Hassan near
Sassine Square in Beirut’s predominantly Christian district of
Ashrafiya. Wissam al-Hassan, a close Sunni ally of President Michel
Sulaiman, had recently earthed an Israeli spy cell in Lebanon. The
deadly blast killed 8 people and injured another 78, mostly Lebanese
Christians.
American Jewish film-maker, political commentator and former personal
secretary of Bertrand Russell, Ralph Schoeman 77, told Iranian Press TV that the bombing has all marks of Israeli Mossad.
“As 1992 to today in the day bombing of Beirut the identical
scenario, who benefits from attempting to divide Lebanon and spread the
turmoil, who benefits destabilizing the government in Damascus, who
states to destabilize Beirut and subject Lebanon to civil war, the
Zionist regime, the Mossad. It is a classical operation of Mossad,” he said.
Lebanese Islamic Resistance, Hizballah, has condemned the bombing.
The pro-USrael opposition group March 14 lead by Sa’ad Hariri called for
the resignation of Lebanese prime minister Najib Mikati, which he did –
but Lebanese president Michel Sulaiman refused to accept it saying that
Mikati cannot be blamed for the security breach. Both Hariri and Mikati
are Sunni billionaires and are not connected to Hizballah in any way.
Hizballah is member of the ruling March 8 Alliance.
It seems, the Zionist regime is playing its old covert operations to
pit Lebanese against each other. It carried a similar car bombing to assassinate Rafik Hariri in February 2005.
It was part of Israeli soft revolution before its invasion of Lebanon
in Summer 2006. However, to western powers’ great surprise – the Jewish
army met its first major military defeat at the hands of Hizballah
fighters.
Israel and western Arab puppet rulers are trying to influence the
June 2013 parliamentary election by the western-sponsored armed
insurgency in neighboring Syria. In March 2012, United Nations’ envoy
for the Middle East, Israel-Firster Jew Jeffrey Feltman told
pro-Israel-Saudi, ‘Lebanese American Organization’ that Hizballah and
its allies will be defeated in June 2013 election.
However, the recent Hizballah’s successful launching of a spy drone over Israel proves that the Jewish army is to face worse surprises than it faced in 2006.
Un quotidien saoudien dément la mort du prince Bandar
4 août 2012
Le quotidien saoudien Arab Newsdément dans son édition du 4 août la mort du prince Bandar ben Sultan [1]. Arab News est un quotidien autorisé à parler au nom de la famille royale. Il est la propriété du prince Salman ben Abdulaziz, prince héritier et ministre de la Défense du royaume. L’auteur de l’article, Ali Bluwi, est journaliste économique et… consultant en communication de crise à… Washington.
Selon Arab News, la dépêche du Réseau Voltaire [2] aurait été écrite par Thierry Meyssan qui serait proche des services secrets iraniens (La Vanguardia assurait au contraire, également ce matin, qu’il était financé par le général déserteur Manaf Tlass, tandis que Le Monde de ce soir le qualifiait de « propagandiste de la dictature baasiste » – à défaut de répondre à ses objections, chacun de ces journaux agite l’épouvantail qui lui parait le mieux discréditer leur brillant contradicteur).
Selon le quotidien saoudien, le prince Bandar aurait participé à deux réunions officielles depuis son prétendu décès.
Le quotidien poursuit, toujours sous la signature du consultant en communication de crise : « Tous les sites internet [qui se sont intéressés au sort du prince Bandar] attendent une confirmation ou une infirmation [de la nouvelle] par le gouvernement saoudien. Mais cela n’aura pas lieu et le prince Bandar n’apparaîtra pas en public, à moins que des raisons politiques ou de sécurité le requièrent. La propagande iranienne et syrienne et leurs médias seront confondus ».
Arab News évoque l’attentat du 26 juillet et le possible décès de Mishaal Al-Qani, adjoint du prince Bandar, là encore sans confirmer, ni infirmer.
Prenant acte des informations d’Arab News sur les activités du prince Bandar, le Réseau Voltaire lui souhaite un prompt rétablissement et espère qu’aucune obligation officielle ne viendra troubler sa convalescence.
Syria reportedly eliminated Bandar bin Sultan in retaliation for Damascus bombing
29 July 2012
Though not yet announced by the Saudi authorities, the death of Prince Bandar bin Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al Saud has been confirmed to Voltaire Network by unofficial souces.
Prince Bandar had just been appointed head of Saudi intelligence on July 24: a promotion which was interpreted as a reward for having organized the attack in Damascus on July 18. The Saudi services, with logistical support from the CIA, had managed to blow up the headquarters of the Syrian National Security during a Crisis Cell meeting: Generals Assef Chaoukat, Daoud Rajha and Hassan Tourkmani were killed instantly. General Amin Hicham Ikhtiar died soon after from his wounds. This operation, called "Damascus Volcano" was the signal for the attack on the capital by a swarm of mercenaries, mainly coming from Jordan.
Prince Bandar was himself the target of a bomb attack on July 26, and subsequently succumbed to his injuries.
A brilliant and cynical personality, Prince Bandar was 63 years old. He was the son of Prince Sultan (irremovable defense minister from 1963 until his death in 2011) and of a slave. Confidant of King Fahd, Bandar was ambassador to Washington throughout his reign (1983-2005). He became close to George H. Bush (then Vice-President of the United States), who regarded him as an "adopted son," prompting the U.S. press to dub him "Bandar Bush". Endowed with an outstanding genius for covert action, he brokered the Al-Yamamah arms deal, managing to divert more than one billion pounds, according to British official sources. He then used this windfall, and many more, to finance the activities of jihadist groups around the world, including Al Qaeda.
In early 2010, Prince Bandar attempted to overthrow King Abdullah to place his own father on the throne. The plot failed and he was banished from the kingdom, but the monarch’s declining health enabled him to return to Saudi Arabia a year later. Since the death of Prince Sultan in October 2011, he had become the de facto leader of the Sudairi clan, the hawkish wing within the royal family.
His death constitutes a serious blow to the whole system of Western covert action in the Muslim world. It took Syria only one week to mount this spectacular reprisal operation.
Angry: Multinational protesters demonstrate as Tony Blair gives evidence to the Inquiry (source)
We believe there is more than what Lord Goldsmith defined a “reasonable case” for saying that the Iraq war could have been avoided through the exile of Saddam Hussein. The entire truth needs to emerge or we will have missed an opportunity to restore the west's credibility in the promotion of human rights, rule of law and democracy.
According to a WikiLeaked cable, on 22 September 2009, in a meeting with officials of the UK administration U.S. Undersecretary for Justice Ellen Tauscher stated that the General Director of the British Ministry of Defence Jon Day had assured her that the UK had “put measures in place to protect [American] interests” during the UK inquiry into the causes of the Iraq war. The Chilcot inquiry did not ask Mr. Day to deny that statement.
Main facts
19 February 2003 - The Italian Parliament with the support of Government adopted the radical proposition (345 yes, 38 no, 52 abstentions) which committed Government to seek support in all international bodies, primarily within the Security Council of the United Nations, to the option of an exiled dictator of Iraq and [...] establishment of a provisional government that will restore a control of the full exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms of all Iraqis.
During a meeting in Crawford, on 22 February 2003, Bush said to Aznar that Gaddafi told Berlusconi that Saddam wants to go.
Aznar: «Is it true that there’s a possibility of Saddam Hussein going into exile?» Bush: «Yes, that possibility exists. Even that he gets assassinated». Aznar: «An exile with some guarantee»? Bush: «No guarantee. He’s a thief, a terrorist, a war criminal. Compared to Saddam, Milosevic would be a Mother Teresa. (source)
1 March 2003 – Colonel Gaddafi disrupts the Arab League meeting of Sharm el-Sheik where the United Arab Emirates (UAE) representatives were supposed to table the document outlining the exile plan as agreed by Saddam Hussein.
18 March 2003 – The White House spokesperson states that the American troops and their allies will enter Iraq anyway, no matter how.
19 March 2003 – Bahrain officially offers Saddam Hussein a last-ditch proposal to go into exile.
Clare Short, on 2 February 2010: “I'm sure that's in the public domain, were initiatives from the Saudis and the Jordanians about possibly getting Saddam Hussein to go into exile, which would have been an attractive option, it seems to me.” “As I have said, Saudi Arabia and Jordan were talking about getting him into exile. There was the possibility of the International Criminal Court. He wasn't popular in his country. There is an argument about very strong sanctions that you actually lock countries in, and it is better to open them up, because then, as with Serbia, that's the way we got -- in the end, the people of Serbia sent Milosevic to the International Criminal Court. That was all another option. “ “the Arab world was talking more and more about taking him out, getting him into exile, you know, getting more pressure on him, getting a resolution of the problem and him out without a war. It is just not true that he was jerking any strings. He was -- the pressures were mounting and mounting.”
A dispatch sent by Ellen Tauscher, the US Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, describes a conversation with Jon Day, the MOD Director General for security policy, in which he "promised that the UK had ’put measures in place to protect your [US] interestshttp://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cables/2009/09/09LONDON2198.html> during the UK inquiry into the causes of the Iraq War.
Freedman: So timing of your advice is determined by questions of diplomacy and readiness for armed forces - but your advice might've been different two or three weeks later?
Goldsmith: That depends what would have happened. More could have come to light. If there'd been a sea-change, if Saddam had gone into exile say, why would we then need force.
Hans Blix, 27 July 2010: “I thought it was, both then and in retrospect, a bit curious that precisely at the time when we were going upward in evidencing cooperation, at that very time the conclusion from the UK side and also from the US side was that no, inspections are useless.” “They had opened the doors. I had said on some occasions it is not enough to open doors. You also have to be proactive. I think that's what they became when they came up with the idea of further excavations, for instance.”
“Was Iraq a danger in 2003? They were not a danger. They were practically prostrate and could not – it would have taken a lot of time – to reconstitute in selling oil.”
As Elizabeth Wilmshurst put it at the Iraq Inquiry, “I could see that the UK reputation as an upholder of the rule of law and as an upholder of the United Nations would be seriously damaged, at least that's what I foresaw.” We believe that the same applies for the reputation of democracy and the rule of law. The things Jod Day said to the American undersecretary of defense in september 2009 cast a worrying shadow over the Chilcot inquiry and its criteria and limits. Should none of the members of the inquiry look into the dark pages that Blair wrote, so that the International Criminal Court would not be able to proceed, the liberal and democratic values and society that we struggling to uphold will be compromised for generations to come.
Finally, the Cato Institute has mentioned a recent debate in which Condoleeza Rice partook, to possibly spark a debate on the fact that Saddam might have been willing to go into exile. Justin Logan (associate director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute) writes in ... that “if there was anything approaching a realistic opportunity to make this happen, we really missed out on the bargain of the century here. You’re looking at something like 500%-1000% returns, not counting several thousand American and a-hundred-or-so-thousand Iraqi lives saved.”
The exile of Saddam Hussein would have set an important precedent as far as conflict-resolution is concerned. Had it been applied - possibly under the thrust of the UN authority - for the first time to an influential country whose strategic position and role is of the utmost importance in the development of the world order, the benefit of it would reverberated in the Middle East, in the Arab world and beyond. Thus, the most precious lesson to learn from the 2003 invasion may not be drawn by a seemingly endless analysis revolving around the (il)legality vs. (il)legitimacy of the military action, but by a deeper understanding of the reasons why a peaceful outcome was not eventually sought. So far, former rulers who peacefully ousted through include Idi Amin Dada (Uganda), Gen. Alfredo Stroessner (Paraguay), Charles Taylor (Liberia), Mobutu Sese Seko (Zaire) and Hissene Habre (Chad).
Testimony by Rai journalist Duilio Giammaria to Radio Radicale
Rome, 21.10.2010
Duilio Giammaria: During those years, as the Iraqi situation unfolded, we obviously paid frequent visits to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which proved to be a real discovery since we found a world revolutionizing itself and of tremendous economic development. Those who know the region, know there are seven Emirates. Usually we would fly aboard military aircraft, leaving from Abu Dhabi, about 150 km north of Dubai. Travel time on these 150 km is about one hour by car on a huge highway consisting of eight lanes. Exactly in the middle of this route between Abu Dhabi and Dubai , one finds a particular place, strongly defined by a long, endless and very orderly line of fences. I asked what this place was, in the midst of the endless route between Abu Dhabi and Dubai we were travelling up and down from.
“It’s interesting, try and figure it out,” I was told half-heartedly. I happened to be lucky enough to meet someone very close to the Emirates’ Royal family. He was a close friend of one of the Emir’s sons.
... he was close to the Emir’s sons, and he gave me this news which I found extremely interesting at the time, although I have to confess not to have elaborated on it sufficiently for the exact same reasons Alberto Negri just gave.
“It is a field, a special field belonging to the Emir’s family, containing many houses”, they told me. Coming from Abu Dhabi, it is on the right-hand side, towards the desert.
“Most of them are inhabited by Iraqi officials.”
“Iraqi oficials?’, I said.
“Yes, those people have been living there since 2003, and it was meant to harbor all of Saddam Hussein’s nomenclature that was supposed to be exiled with him.”
If an agreement had been secured, obviously Saddam Hussein wouldn’t have left on his own. Let’s say he would have taken his top aides and closest staff with him, since a head of state clearly doesn’t leave his country thinking that everything remains the same.
But the most amazing feat –this took place in 2004- is that this happened before one of Sheikh Maktum’s sons explicitly told Al Arabyia that the agreement negotiations had in fact been brought up to the final stage. The UAE believed up until the end that this agreement was possible. So in 2005, when this news feat became known, Al Arabyia suddenly published the declaration by one of the sons, stating the word about a hidden field in the desert of the Arab Emirates, prepared to receive Saddam Hussein’s nomenclature, was completely true. This is in 2005. Also at this point however, we didn’t elaborate on it enough, because obviously there was enough to work on, exactly as there is enough to work on today.
Iran's top security official Saeed Jalili has called for an international tribunal to put former British Prime Minister Tony Blair on trial for war crimes.
The Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council told a press conference in Istanbul, Turkey that Blair should be tried as a war criminal at an international court for his complicity in the killing of hundreds of thousands of people in Iraq. In his second appearance at the Iraq War Inquiry in London on Friday, Blair unleashed an all-out attack on Iran, accusing the Islamic Republic of posing a “looming challenge” to the West by pursuing its nuclear activities. The Iranian official reacted to the allegations, noting that “Blair should first save himself at the trial.” “A dispute arises at this point over the fact that why some people allow themselves to violate the rights of other nations and kill hundreds of thousands of innocent people, but nobody neither issues a resolution against them nor questions them in this regard,” Jalili said. Bringing up the question that why the UK government is the only nation that tries Blair, the top Iranian official stressed that “he attacked Iraq without United Nation's authorization, an act that contributed to the death of hundreds of thousands of people. But nobody questions him today.” The former British Prime Minister and the then US president George W. Bush are complicit in the killing of hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan. Blair made all the crucial decisions that led Britain to become the second-biggest contributor of troops to the US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003.
Whitehall chief blocks release of Blair's notes to Bush on Iraq
Sir Gus O'Donnell stops publication of documents Chilcot inquiry says are crucial to understanding how invasion happened
Richard Norton-Taylor 18 January 2011
Sir Gus O'Donnell giving evidence to a Commons committee last year. Photograph: PA
Britain's top civil servant, Sir Gus O'Donnell, is preventing the official inquiry into the Iraq invasion from publishing notes sent by Tony Blair to George W Bush - evidence described by the inquiry as of "central importance" in establishing the circumstances that led to war.
O'Donnell, the cabinet secretary, consulted Blair before suppressing the documents, it emerged tonight. The Cabinet Office said: "There is an established convention covering papers of a previous administration whereby former ministers would normally be consulted before release of papers from their time in government." The prime minister's spokesman said David Cameron had not been consulted.
Raising the stakes ahead of Blair's recall on Friday, Sir John Chilcot, the inquiry's chairman, released a sharp exchange of letters with O'Donnell in which he repeated requests for the notes to be declassified. Chilcot said: "The material requested provides important, and often unique, insights into Mr Blair's thinking and the commitments he made to President Bush, which are not reflected in other papers."
In a letter dated 6 January, his third to O'Donnell in less than a month, Chilcot wrote: "The question when and how the prime minister made commitments to the US about the UK's involvement in military action in Iraq and subsequent decisions on the UK's continuing involvement, is central to its considerations".
He refers to passages in memoirs, including Blair's autobiography, A Journey, and disclosures by Jonathan Powell, Blair's chief of staff, and Alastair Campbell, his former head of communications. Those publications, and the refusal to disclose Blair's notes, Chilcot said, "leads to the position that individuals may disclose privileged information (without sanction) whilst a committee of privy counsellors established by a former prime minister to review the issues, cannot".
Chilcot, who, with his four-member panel, has privately seen Blair's notes, said the documents "illuminate prime minister Blair's positions at critical points".
O'Donnell replied to Chilcot that releasing Blair's notes would damage Britain's relations with the US. and would not be in the public interest. "We have attached particular importance to protecting the privacy of the channel between the prime minister and president," he told Chilcot.
The Cabinet Office said the refusal to allow Blair's notes to be disclosed conformed to the inquiry's protocols. Chilcot said recently the protocols were "put in place to protect national security, international relations and the personal security of individuals. They are not there to prevent embarrassment."
In evidence to the inquiry last year, Campbell described the tenor of Blair's notes to Bush as: "We share the analysis, we share the concern, we are going to be with you in making sure that Saddam Hussein is faced up to his obligations and that Iraq is disarmed."
Campbell added: "If that cannot be done diplomatically and it is to be done militarily, Britain will be there. That would be the tenor of the communication to the president."
The inquiry has also heard from senior British diplomats that regime change was being discussed by Blair in meetings with Bush in 2002 even though, according to leaked documents, Lord Goldsmith, the attorney general, warned that military action aimed at regime change, as opposed to disarmament, would be unlawful.
One document, previously leaked, notes that Blair told Bush at a meeting in Washington on 31 January 2003, less than two months before the invasion, that "he was solidly with the president". That was his response after Bush said military action would be taken with or without a new UN resolution and the day after Goldsmith warned Blair that an invasion of Iraq would be unlawful without a fresh UN resolution. Goldsmith subsquently changed his mind.
An inquiry official said: "It not about what President Bush told prime minister Blair. It is about what Mr Blair said to President Bush."
The inquiry has summoned back the former prime minister, to press him about what he promised Bush in private, and why he repeatedly questioned, then shut out, his government's chief law officer, Lord Goldsmith, after receiving unwelcome advice about the legality of an invasion.
Tony Blair 'misled' Commons over legal advice on war in Iraq Tony
Blair misled Parliament by claiming that Britain could legally attack Iraq in the face of United Nations opposition despite being given clear advice to the contrary, new evidence suggests.
Rosa Prince 17 Jan 2011
In evidence to the Iraq inquiry, Lord Goldsmith, who at the time was the government’s top legal adviser, disclosed that he was “uncomfortable” about statements made by the then-prime minister in the run up to the 2003 invasion.
Two months before the war began, in a meeting at No 10, the former attorney general told Mr Blair that war would not be legal without a fresh mandate from the UN.
In a statement to MPs the following day, however, the Labour prime minister said that there were “circumstances” in which an attack could be valid.
The following month, he gave an interview in which he suggested that war would be legal if another nation had made an “unreasonable” veto at the UN on military action.
A witness statement to the Chilcot Inquiry into the war, published today, makes clear that Lord Goldsmith considered that this did not accord with the advice he had given Mr Blair.
Asked whether Mr Blair's words were compatible with the advice he received, the former attorney general wrote simply: "No."
He added: "I was uncomfortable about them (the prime minister's comments) ...
"My concern was that we should not box ourselves in by the public statements that were made, and create a situation which might then have to be unravelled."
Lord Goldsmith evidence to the inquiry has come under scrutiny after he admitted changing his mind about the legality of military action on the eve of the war.
His views were swayed during meetings he was encouraged to have with American government lawyers and Sir Jeremy Greenstock, Britain's ambassador to the UN.
Giving evidence to the inquiry last year, he denied that he was “leant on” by No 10 to change his legal opinion.
Until two weeks before the invasion, in March 2003, Lord Goldsmith had been of the view that UN resolution 1441, which was passed in November 2002 and declared Iraq in “material breach” of its obligations to disarm, was not sufficient to sanction war by the UK and United States.
In the new evidence to the inquiry, Lord Goldsmith said in his statement that the phrasing of resolution 1441 was "problematic".
He was not actively consulted on the final drafting of the resolution after telling Mr Blair in October that the text as it stood did not authorise the use of force.
The former attorney general said: "I was not being sufficiently involved in the meetings and discussions about the resolution and the policy behind it that were taking place at ministerial level.
Documents reveal how Goldsmith repeatedly warned Blair of the consequences of invading Iraq without fresh UN authority.
A note from Goldsmith to Blair, marked secret and dated 30 January 2003, stated: "I thought you might wish to know where I stand on the question of whether a further decision of the [UN] security council is legally required in order to authorise the use of force against Iraq."
Goldsmith warned Blair that "the correct legal interpretation of resolution 1441 [the last security council decision on Iraq] is that it does not authorise the use of force without a further determination by the security council". He concluded: "My view remains that a further [UN] decision is required."
The document contains a handwritten note, by David Manning, Blair's chief foreign policy adviser, which warned: "Clear advice from attorney on need for further resolution."
...
By 7 March, 2003, Goldsmith had told Blair that a new UN resolution might not be needed after all, though war without one would risk Britain's indictment before an international court.
On 17 March, Goldsmith, published a short note saying an invasion was lawful.
David Kelly death riddle grows as it emerges personal items found on his body did not have fingerprints on them
Miles Goslett 27th January 2011
Further questions have been raised over the death of Dr David Kelly after police admitted that two personal items found with his body – his mobile phone and a watch – did not have any fingerprints on them.
The news brings the number of objects without fingerprints at the site where the weapons inspector’s body was discovered to five – the other three being the knife he allegedly used to slash his wrist, the packs of pills he is said to have overdosed on, and a water bottle.
It had been suggested that the lack of fingerprints on the knife might be due to the presence of gaffer tape on it. But Thames Valley Police have now confirmed that the knife had no tape on its handle.
Dr Kelly is said to have killed himself in 2003 after being named as the prime source of a BBC report accusing Tony Blair’s government of lying to take Britain into war in Iraq. No coroner’s inquest has been held. Instead, a public inquiry found he killed himself in woods near his Oxfordshire home.
Chilcot inquiry's credibility 'is on edge of an abyss'
Leading international lawyer Philippe Sands says inquiry has shown inability to tackle central question of illegality – or otherwise – of Iraq invasion
Richard Norton-Taylor 14 November 2010
Philippe Sands says the credibility of the Chilcot inquiry into the invasiona of Iraq is 'on the edge of an abyss'. Photograph: Linda Nylind for the Guardian
The credibility of the Chilcot inquiry into the invasion of Iraq is "on the edge of an abyss" because of its lack of transparency, a leading international lawyer warned today.
Philippe Sands QC, professor of international law at University College London, said the inquiry had been undermined by its inability to refer publicly to documents it had seen.
He said it had shown an inability to tackle the central question of the illegality – or otherwise – of the US-led military action head on.
Sands said he had seen some unpublished documents which contradicted or undermined the testimony by witnesses to the inquiry. The inquiry had also had a series of "private chats" with a number of "notable individuals", he said.
The lawyer referred to what he called a "curious advertisement" the inquiry had placed, asking international lawyers to submit their view of the invasion. More than 30 had done so more than two months ago, yet the submissions have not been posted on the inquiry's website.
"Why did the inquiry not issue personal invitations to key individuals to appear before it in a public session? Why has it not even convened a private seminar amongst invited international legal experts, as it has done on other matters?" Sands asked.
His comments came in the 2010 Remembrance Sunday lecture on war and law at the Imperial War Museum in London. The lecture was sponsored by the Movement for the Abolition of War.
Sands noted that the Chilcot inquiry had appointed an "adviser on international law" - Dame Rosalyn Higgins, a former judge and president of the international court of justice – but said it was unclear what her role was.
He said he hoped the inquiry would insist that, in future, the attorney general must provide early and full advice on the legality of a future use of force, ensure the attorney provided advice to all of government, not just the prime minister, and give a parliamentary committee an oversight role on legal advice relating to war.
Tony Blair must be prosecuted, not indulged like Peter Mandelson. Both have produced self-serving memoirs for which they have been paid fortunes; Blair's, which has earned him a £4.6m advance, will appear next month.
Now consider the Proceeds of Crime Act. Blair conspired in and executed an unprovoked war of aggression against a defenceless country, of a kind the Nuremberg judges in 1946 described as the "paramount war crime". This has caused, according to scholarly studies, the deaths of more than a million people, a figure that exceeds the Fordham University estimate of deaths in the Rwandan genocide.
In addition, four million Iraqis have been forced to flee their homes and a majority of children have descended into malnutrition and trauma. Cancer rates near the cities of Fallujah, Najaf and Basra (the latter "liberated" by the British) are now higher than those at Hiroshima. "UK forces used about 1.9 metric tonnes of depleted uranium ammunition in the Iraq war in 2003," the Defence Secretary, Liam Fox, told parliament on 22 July. A range of toxic "anti-personnel" weapons, such as cluster bombs, was employed by British and US forces.
Such carnage was justified with lies that have been exposed repeatedly. On 29 January 2003, Blair told parliament: "We do know of links between al-Qaeda and Iraq . . ." Last month, the former head of MI5 Eliza Manningham-Buller told the Chilcot inquiry: "There is no credible intelligence to suggest that connection . . . [it was the invasion] that gave Osama Bin Laden his Iraqi jihad." Asked to what extent the invasion exacerbated the threat to Britain from terrorism, she replied: "Substantially."
His ongoing theme of injustices perpetrated by our foreign policy, and the lies told to keep us in the dark, always carries with it a critique of the media for not exposing the truth. But now, reporters are his specific target. Pilger's thesis is that uncomfortable facts, such as the extent of civilian casualties, are not part of a mainstream media narrative instead dominated by officialdom's talk of "spreading democracy", "fighting terror" and so on. The film argues that this censorship by omission dates back to the First World War. Journalists who are now on the outside looking in, including Rageh Omaar (now of Al Jazeera) and CBS's Dan Rather, speak about the pressure they worked under; Julian Assange of Wikileaks likens modern whistleblowers to the conscientious objectors of previous wars; and BBC and ITV news chiefs face Pilger's admirably direct questioning. Conventional wisdom about modern warfare comes under a sustained assault. ..
Carne Ross, the UK’s Iraq expert at the UN from 1997-2002, says all the invasion documents should now be made public. Photograph: Sarah Lee for the Guardian
I testified last week to the Chilcot inquiry. My experience demonstrates an emerging and dangerous problem with the process. This is not so much a problem with Sir John Chilcot and his panel, but rather with the government bureaucracy – Britain's own "deep state" – that is covering up its mistakes and denying access to critical documents.
There is only one solution to this problem, and it requires decisive action.
After I was invited to testify, I was contacted by the Foreign Office, from which I had resigned after giving testimony to the Butler inquiry in 2004, to offer its support for my appearance. I asked for access to all the documents I had worked on as Britain's Iraq "expert" at the UN Security Council, including intelligence assessments, records of discussions with the US, and the long paper trail on the WMD dossier.
Large files were sent to me to peruse at the UK mission to the UN. However, long hours spent reviewing the files revealed that most of the key documents I had asked for were not there.
In my testimony I had planned to detail how the UK government failed to consider, let alone implement, available alternatives to military action. To support this I had asked for specific records relating to the UK's failure to deal with the so-called Syrian pipeline, through which Iraq illegally exported oil, thereby sustaining the Saddam regime. I was told that specific documents, such as the records of prime minister Tony Blair's visit to Syria, could not be found. This is simply not plausible.
I had also asked for all the Joint Intelligence Committee assessments on Iraq, some of which I helped prepare. Of dozens of these documents, only three were provided to me – 40 minutes before I was due to appear before the Chilcot panel.
Playing by the rules, I had submitted my written testimony to Chilcot before my appearance. In the hours before my appearance, invited to visit the Foreign Office to see further documents (mostly irrelevant), an official repeatedly sought to persuade me to delete references to certain documents in my testimony.
He told me that the Cabinet Office wanted the removal of a critical reference in my evidence to a memo from a senior Foreign Office official to the foreign secretary's special adviser, in which the official pointed out, with mandarin understatement, that the paper sent that week to the Parliamentary Labour Party dramatically – and inaccurately – altered the UK's assessment of Iraq's nuclear threat.
In a clear example of the exaggeration of Iraq's military capabilities, that paper claimed that if Iraq's programmes remained unchecked, it could develop a nuclear device within five years.
The official's memo pointed out that this was not, in fact, the UK assessment: the UK believed that Iraq's nuclear programme had been checked by sanctions.
The paper to the PLP was instead sent by the foreign secretary to "brief" the wider cabinet. This paper was pure overstated propaganda, filled with ludicrous statements like "one teaspoon of anthrax can kill a million people". The paper was soon made public, as part of the campaign to create public hysteria.
The official's memo about the PLP paper contained nothing secret. It relates to a public document, the PLP paper. Yet, of all the references in my testimony, this was the one that the Cabinet Office most wanted removed. I refused. Strikingly, this memo has never been mentioned to the inquiry, including by its author, who testified earlier this year. Neither has the author of the PLP paper been questioned, or the paper itself discussed.
I was repeatedly warned by inquiry staff not to mention any classified material during my testimony. The only problem is that almost every document I ever wrote or read in my work was classified. It was made clear to me, and to journalists attending the hearing, that if I mentioned specific documents the broadcast of my testimony would be cut off. Other forms of retribution (Official Secrets Act prosecution?) hung in the air. It was a form of subtle intimidation.
Meanwhile, my requests to see documents about the infamous Number 10 WMD dossier were ignored, including requests for letters I had written.
This experience and the inquiry's record so far is cause for concern. It is clear from testimonies so far that most witnesses, most of whom went along with the war at the time, are offering a very one-sided account to the panel. A story is being peddled that sanctions on Iraq were collapsing and the allied policy of containment was failing. Thus, the military alternative to deal with the Iraqi threat was more or less unavoidable.
Though there is some truth to this argument, it was not what the Foreign Office, or the government as a whole, believed at the time. The true story is there to be seen in the documents. In memos, submissions to ministers and telegrams, the official view is very clear: while there was concern at the erosion of sanctions, containment had prevented Iraq from rearmament.
When invasion was promoted by Washington, the available alternative – to squeeze Saddam financially by stopping oil exports or seizing the regime's assets, which I and some colleagues had repeatedlyadvocated, was ignored. Here the documents tell a different but equally clear and appalling story: there is not a single mention of any formal discussion, by ministers or officials, of alternatives to military action. It is hard to pinpoint a graver indictment of the government's failure.
The oral testimonies delivered to the inquiry have not given an accurate picture of what the government really thought. Unfortunately, the panel is neither equipped, nor apparently inclined, to challenge witnesses on the contradictions of their testimonies with this documentary record. This may not be the panel's fault: how can they know which pertinent documents exist?
In these circumstances, it is very worrying that the government machine is still trying to withhold key documents, and silence those of us with detailed knowledge of the policy history – and documents. I have been told too, from secondary sources, that members of the panel have been refused documents they have specifically requested.
There is a clear solution to these problems: break down the continued obstruction by the bureaucracy by releasing the documents – all of them. Only the most secret documents deserve continued protection, and there are very few of these. The vast majority of relevant documents relate to policy discussion inside the government before the war. Though profoundly embarrassing, there is little here that damages national security, except in the hysterical assessment of officials protecting their own reputation. Nick Clegg said a few weeks ago that almost all documents must now be released. He is right.
Carne Ross was the UK's Iraq expert at the UN from 1997 to 2002. He now heads Independent Diplomat, a non-profit diplomatic advisory group.
Nick Clegg was tonight forced to clarify his position on the Iraq war after he stood up at the dispatch box of the House of Commons and pronounced the invasion illegal.
The deputy prime minister insisted he was speaking in a personal capacity, as a leading international lawyer warned that the statement by a government minister in such a formal setting could increase the chances of charges against Britain in international courts.
Philippe Sands, professor of law at University College London, said: "A public statement by a government minister in parliament as to the legal situation would be a statement that an international court would be interested in, in forming a view as to whether or not the war was lawful."
The warning came after a faltering performance by Clegg in the Commons when he stood in for David Cameron at prime minister's questions. The deputy prime minister made an initial mistake when he announced that the government would close the Yarl's Wood centre as it ends the detention of children awaiting deportation. The Home Office was forced to issue a statement saying that the family unit at Yarl's Wood would close but that the rest of the centre would remain open.
Shortly before that slip-up, Clegg threw the government's position concerning the legality of the Iraq war into confusion when, at the end of heated exchanges with Jack Straw, foreign secretary at the time of the war, Clegg said: "We may have to wait for his memoirs, but perhaps one day he will account for his role in the most disastrous decision of all: the illegal invasion of Iraq."
Clegg's remarks could be legally significant because he was standing at the government dispatch box in the Commons.
Downing Street played down the significance of the remarks by issuing a statement saying that he was expressing his "long-held view" about the Iraq conflict. In an attempt to avoid speculation about splits with Cameron, who voted in favour of the war, Downing Street added that the government would await the findings of the Chilcot inquiry before reaching a view on the war.
"The coalition government has not expressed a view on the legality or otherwise of the Iraq conflict," the No 10 spokesman said. "But that does not mean that individual members of the government should not express their individual views. These are long-held views of the deputy prime minister.
"The Iraq inquiry is currently examining many issues surrounding the UK's involvement in Iraq, including the legal basis of the war. The government looks forward to receiving the inquiry's conclusions."
But this appeared to be contradicted by the Chilcot inquiry, which issued a statement saying it was examining the legal issues in the run-up to the war but would not make a judgment about the legality of the war. A spokesman said: "The inquiry is not a court of law, and no one is on trial."
The government also faced a challenge in explaining an apparently new constitutional convention that the second most senior member of the cabinet is now free to stand at the dispatch box and express opinions of his own that do not reflect government policy.
Asked whether Clegg had been speaking as the leader of the Liberal Democrats and not as deputy prime minister, a Downing Street spokeswoman said: "Yes."
Asked how MPs could establish in future whether Clegg is speaking as deputy prime minister or as leader of the Liberal Democrats, the spokeswoman said: "The deputy prime minister is entitled to express his own view at the dispatch box."
The Lib Dems were keen to play down the significance of Clegg's remarks. But it is understood that the Lib Dem leader feels freer to speak out against the alleged illegality of the Iraq war after the recent publication of previously classified documents by the Chilcot inquiry.
Sir Gus O'Donnell, the cabinet secretary, wrote to Sir John Chilcot on 25 June to allow the inquiry to publish more documents relating to the legal advice. The most significant of these documents was a note on 30 January 2003 by the then attorney general, Lord Goldsmith, to Tony Blair.
In the note Goldsmith wrote: "I remain of the view that the correct legal interpretation of [UN security council] resolution 1441 is that it does not authorise the use of military force without a further determination by the security council."
Goldsmith famously changed his mind on the legality of the war in March 2003 after Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, the former chief of the defence staff, demanded a clear undertaking that military action would be lawful. Boyce feared that British forces could face legal action unless the invasion had legal cover.
On 7 March 2003, after visiting Washington, Goldsmith told Blair that a new UN resolution may not be necessary, although invading Iraq without one could lead to Britain being indicted before an international court. Ten days later Goldsmith ruled that an invasion would be lawful.
Sands said: "Lord Goldsmith never gave a written advice that the war was lawful. Nick Clegg is only repeating what Lord Goldsmith told Tony Blair on 30 January 2003: that without a further UN security resolution the war would be illegal and Jack Straw knows that."
Former MI5 chief demolishes Blair's defence of the Iraq war
Andy McSmith 21 July 2010
Tony Blair's evidence to the Chilcot Inquiry that toppling Saddam Hussein helped make Britain safe from terrorists was dramatically undermined by the former head of MI5 yesterday.
Giving evidence to the same inquiry, Eliza Manningham-Buller revealed that there was such a surge of warnings of home-grown terrorist threats after the invasion of Iraq that MI5 asked for – and got – a 100 per cent increase in its budget. Baroness Manningham-Buller, who was director general of MI5 in 2002-07, told the Chilcot panel that MI5 started receiving a "substantially" higher volume of reports that young British Muslims being drawn to al-Qa'ida.
...
Lady Manningham-Buller also hinted at tension between Mr Blair's office and MI5 over the dossier that the Prime Minister presented to Parliament in September 2002, to prepare public opinion for the likelihood of war.
"We were asked to put in some low-grade, small intelligence to it and we refused because we didn't think it was reliable," she said.
Evidence: What he said – and what she said
False claims of links between al-Qa'ida and Saddam Hussein
Tony Blair claimed on 21 Jan 2003:
"There is some intelligence evidence about loose links between al-Qa'ida and various people in Iraq... It would not be correct to say there is no evidence whatever of linkages between al-Qa'ida and Iraq."
Foreign Office spokesman claimed on 29 Jan 2003:
"We believe that there have been, and still are, some al-Qa'ida operatives in parts of Iraq controlled by Baghdad. It is hard to imagine that they are there without the knowledge and acquiescence of the Iraqi government."
Eliza Manningham-Buller, former head of MI5, yesterday:
"There was no credible intelligence to suggest that connection and that was the judgment, I might say, of the CIA."
Hand-picking flimsy 'intelligence'
Blair, to the Commons 24 Sept 2002:
"It [the intelligence service] concludes that Iraq has chemical and biological weapons, that Saddam has continued to produce them, that he has existing and active military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons, which could be activated within 45 minutes; and that he is actively trying to acquire nuclear weapons capability..."
Blair, to the Commons 25 Feb 2003:
"The intelligence is clear: He [Saddam] continues to believe his WMD programme is essential both for internal repression and for external aggression. The biological agents we believe Iraq can produce include anthrax, botulinum, toxin, aflatoxin and ricin. All eventually result in excruciatingly painful death."
Manningham-Buller, yesterday:
"The nature of intelligence – it is a source of information, it is rarely complete, it needs to be assessed, it is fragmentary... We were asked to put in some low-grade, small intelligence to it [the September 2002 dossier] and we refused because we didn't think it was reliable."
Iraq posed no risk to Britain
Blair, to the Commons 10 April 2002:
"Saddam Hussein is developing weapons of mass destruction, and we cannot leave him doing so unchecked. He is a threat to his own people and to the region and, if allowed to develop these weapons, a threat to us also."
Manningham-Buller, yesterday:
"We regarded the direct threat from Iraq as low... we didn't believe he had the capability to do anything in the UK."
Ministers were told that invading Iraq would increase the threat of terrorism to Britain
Blair, farewell speech at the Labour conference, 26 September 2006:
"This terrorism isn't our fault. We didn't cause it. It's not the consequence of foreign policy."
Manningham-Buller, yesterday:
"It was communicated through the JIC assessments, to which I fed in... I believe they [senior ministers] did read them. If they read them, they can have had no doubt."
The Iraq war made Britain a more dangerous place and allowed al-Qa'ida to gain a hold in Iraq
Blair, 29 Jan 2010:
"If I am asked whether I believe we are safer, more secure, that Iraq is better, that our own security is better, I believe we are. The world is safer as a result."
Manningham-Buller, yesterday:
"Our involvement in Iraq radicalised a generation of young people who saw our involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan as an attack on Islam. We [MI5] were pretty well swamped... with intelligence on a broad scale that was pretty well more than we could cope with in terms of plots, leads to plots and things that we needed to pursue.
"We gave Osama bin Laden his Iraqi jihad so that he was able to move into Iraq in a way that he was not before.
Iraq war inquiry: Blair government 'massaged' Saddam Hussein WMD threat
Former diplomat Carne Ross says exaggeration, accretion and editing of intelligence documents led to lies in threat assessment
Richard Norton-Taylor 12 July 2010
Tony Blair's government "intentionally and substantially" exaggerated assessments of Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction culminating in highly misleading statements about the threat that amounted to lies, the inquiry into the war in Iraq was told today
Carne Ross, a British diplomat to the UN who was responsible for Iraq in the runup to the invasion, said intelligence was "massaged" into "more robust and terrifying" statements about Saddam's supposed WMD.
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