Tuesday, 30 June 2009

global warmists silence bear's leading expert


Polar bear expert barred by global warmists

Mitchell Taylor, who has studied the animals for 30 years, was told his views 'are extremely unhelpful'.

Christopher Booker
Ap Polar bears Polar bear expert barred by warmists
According to the world's leading expert on polar bears, their numbers are higher than they were 30 years ago Photo: AP

Over the coming days a curiously revealing event will be taking place in Copenhagen. Top of the agenda at a meeting of the Polar Bear Specialist Group (set up under the International Union for the Conservation of Nature/Species Survival Commission) will be the need to produce a suitably scary report on how polar bears are being threatened with extinction by man-made global warming.

This is one of a steady drizzle of events planned to stoke up alarm in the run-up to the UN's major conference on climate change in Copenhagen next December. But one of the world's leading experts on polar bears has been told to stay away from this week's meeting, specifically because his views on global warming do not accord with those of the rest of the group.

Dr Mitchell Taylor has been researching the status and management of polar bears in Canada and around the Arctic Circle for 30 years, as both an academic and a government employee. More than once since 2006 he has made headlines by insisting that polar bear numbers, far from decreasing, are much higher than they were 30 years ago. Of the 19 different bear populations, almost all are increasing or at optimum levels, only two have for local reasons modestly declined.

Dr Taylor agrees that the Arctic has been warming over the last 30 years. But he ascribes this not to rising levels of CO2 – as is dictated by the computer models of the UN's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and believed by his PBSG colleagues – but to currents bringing warm water into the Arctic from the Pacific and the effect of winds blowing in from the Bering Sea.

He has also observed, however, how the melting of Arctic ice, supposedly threatening the survival of the bears, has rocketed to the top of the warmists' agenda as their most iconic single cause. The famous photograph of two bears standing forlornly on a melting iceberg was produced thousands of times by Al Gore, the WWF and others as an emblem of how the bears faced extinction – until last year the photographer, Amanda Byrd, revealed that the bears, just off the Alaska coast, were in no danger. Her picture had nothing to do with global warming and was only taken because the wind-sculpted ice they were standing on made such a striking image.

Dr Taylor had obtained funding to attend this week's meeting of the PBSG, but this was voted down by its members because of his views on global warming. The chairman, Dr Andy Derocher, a former university pupil of Dr Taylor's, frankly explained in an email (which I was not sent by Dr Taylor) that his rejection had nothing to do with his undoubted expertise on polar bears: "it was the position you've taken on global warming that brought opposition".

Dr Taylor was told that his views running "counter to human-induced climate change are extremely unhelpful". His signing of the Manhattan Declaration – a statement by 500 scientists that the causes of climate change are not CO2 but natural, such as changes in the radiation of the sun and ocean currents – was "inconsistent with the position taken by the PBSG".

So, as the great Copenhagen bandwagon rolls on, stand by this week for reports along the lines of "scientists say polar bears are threatened with extinction by vanishing Arctic ice". But also check out Anthony Watt's Watts Up With That website for the latest news of what is actually happening in the Arctic. The average temperature at midsummer is still below zero, the latest date that this has happened in 50 years of record-keeping. After last year's recovery from its September 2007 low, this year's ice melt is likely to be substantially less than for some time. The bears are doing fine.

Monday, 29 June 2009

housecrash in china



Nearly completed high-rise collapses in Shanghai

Sat Jun 27, 2009 11:59am IST

HONG KONG (Reuters) - A 13-storey residential building under construction in Shanghai collapsed on Saturday, killing one worker and highlighting the dangers of shoddy building in fast-urbanising China.

The building, in the outskirts of the city, collapsed at around 6 a.m. (2200 GMT), with one construction worker killed, the official Xinhua news agency reported.

The block of high-rise residential flats was shown toppled onto its side in a muddy construction site, in footage from Hong Kong's Cable Television. Exposed pilings stood in the remains of the building's foundations.

It appeared to be almost complete with fitted windows and a finished, tiled facade. Other similar-looking blocks in the same property development were still standing nearby.

Shoddy construction and the use of sub-standard materials is a concern in China's construction sector as the country scrambles to build out cities and finish massive infrastructure projects to keep pace with fast economic growth.

Construction-related accidents last year included the collapse of a steel arch on a new railway bridge, which killed at least seven and a crane which fell on a kindergarten killing five.

The collapse of dozens of schools during last year's Sichuan earthquake, sometimes when buildings around them withstood the tremor, also led to a wave of public outrage about corrupt officials and construction firms.

heroin flows freely across tadjikistan


U.S.-built bridge is windfall — for illegal Afghan drug trade

Tom Lasseter

McClatchy Newspapers

June 28, 2009 12:46:33 AM

NIZHNY PANJ, Tajikistan — In August 2007, the presidents of Afghanistan and Tajikistan walked side by side with the U.S. commerce secretary across a new $37 million concrete bridge that the Army Corps of Engineers designed to link two of Central Asia's poorest countries.

Dressed in a gray suit with an American flag pin in his lapel, then-Commerce Secretary Carlos Gutierrez said the modest two-lane span that U.S. taxpayers paid for would be "a critical transit route for trade and commerce" between Afghanistan and Tajikistan.

Today, the bridge across the muddy waters of the Panj River is carrying much more than vegetables and timber: It's paved the way for drug traffickers to transport larger loads of Afghan heroin and opium to Central Asia and beyond to Russia and Western Europe.

Standing near his truck in a dusty patch on the Afghan side of the river, Yar Mohammed said it was easy to drive drugs past the Afghan and Tajik border guards.

"It's an issue of money," Mohammed said, to the nods and grins of the small group of truckers gathered around him near the bridge at Nizhny Panj. "If you give them money, you can do whatever you want."

The roots of the global drug trade are often a murky tangle of poverty, addiction, violence and corruption. However, it's clear why the dirt-poor former Soviet Central Asian republic of Tajikistan is on the verge of becoming a narco-state.

After the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the United States and other Western powers looked the other way as opium and heroin production surged to record levels, making Afghanistan by far the world's biggest producer.

Much of the ballooning supply of drugs shipped across Afghanistan's northern border, up to one-fifth of the country's output, has traveled to and through Tajikistan. The opium and heroin funded rampant corruption in Tajikistan and turned the country, still hobbled by five years of civil war in the 1990s, into what at times seems like one big drug-trafficking organization.

Every day last year — extrapolating from United Nations estimates — an average of more than 4 metric tons of opium, which can be made into some 1,320 pounds of heroin, moved on the northern route. Put another way, the equivalent of nearly 6 million doses of pure heroin — at 100 milligrams each — is carried across the northern Afghan border each day.

After it's cut with other substances and sold on the street corners and in the apartment stairwells of Russia and Western Europe, the main retail markets for Central Asian heroin, that could produce at least 12 million doses.

Nevertheless, it's clear even to a casual visitor at the bridge that neither the Afghan or the Tajik border guards have much interest in curbing, or even inspecting, the exports that pass in front of them.

In fact, as the Afghan drug supply has grown, Tajik seizures have fallen. In 2004, Afghanistan produced 4,200 metric tons of opium, and some 5 metric tons of heroin or its equivalent in opium were seized in Tajikistan, according to U.N. figures. Last year, with Afghan cultivation rising to 7,700 metric tons of opium, Tajik authorities seized less than 2 metric tons of heroin.

Although the United States wields enormous influence in both countries, their drug problems have taken a back seat to the war against the Taliban. Until the past year, Afghanistan's growing drug production was at best a midlevel priority for Washington, and the U.S. hasn't pressed Tajik President Emomali Rahmon to rein in his country's drug trafficking, Western officials said. Nor, they said, has any other Western government with troops in Afghanistan.

All along the Afghan-Tajik border, smugglers for years have thrown sacks of heroin over the Panj River, waded across when the water is low, set up flotillas of car tires and used small ferries or footbridges.

The U.S.-financed bridge has made drug trafficking even easier, truck driver Mohammed said with a toothy smile: "You load the truck with drugs."

The ferry that used to operate at Nizhny Panj carried about 40 trucks a day. The bridge can carry 1,000 vehicles daily.

Organized crime groups now are focusing on using official checkpoints to move their drugs, a senior official at the Tajik State Committee for National Security said, speaking to a recent meeting of Central Asian counter-narcotics officers.

"Especially through the Tajik-Afghan bridge on the Panj River," Davlat Zarifov said.

Zarifov apparently didn't know that a reporter was present, and he declined further comment and quickly walked away.

To try to get the Tajik government's side of the story, a McClatchy reporter approached Sherali Mirzo, the official in charge of the country's border guards, a man with a full mustache and medals across his uniformed chest. Mirzo said he didn't talk to the media.

Rustam Nazarov, the director of the country's drug control agency, said in a brief interview that the declining heroin and opium seizures suggested that there was less trafficking of those drugs through Tajikistan, an analysis that the facts on the ground would seem to contradict.

Nazarov, however, did allow that, "There is corruption in Tajikistan; no one denies that. Unfortunately, we have some civil servants who are corrupt."

A few days later at the Afghan-Tajik border, as the sun began to dip below a horizon framed by jagged mountains, Mohammed Zahir, an Afghan truck driver, gave a simple explanation for how drugs get across the bridge.

"People involved with the drug business know the guards," Zahir said. "Before sending their drugs across, they pay them money."

A second driver, Qand Agha, chimed in: "If high officials on the border weren't involved, then people like me couldn't take drugs into their country."

Down the road, a line of trucks was crossing the bridge.


Sitting in a $40,000 SUV with soft leather seats and a dark orange paint job, a man named Negmatullo hitched up his shirtsleeve to show the sore on his arm from the heroin he'd been shooting up. He fiddled with his designer sunglasses, absentmindedly brushed his hair and said in a junkie's mumble that, "If you pay someone at the border, you can bring drugs up."

Negmatullo, a thin man with dirty blond hair, had just come out of a drug treatment clinic in the town of Kurgan-Tyube, a halfway point between the border and the Tajik capital of Dushanbe. He asked that his last name not be used for his own security.

When Negmatullo was asked why guards and other Tajik law-enforcement officials would be susceptible to corruption, he rubbed his fingers together and muttered "dengi, dengi," Russian for "money, money."

The car's license plate flashed by as Negmatullo pulled away; it was number 7777, a calling card of those connected to the president's inner circle.

The spoils of the drug trade are as obvious as the shiny new BMWs speeding down the dusty roads that cut from south to north across the steppes of Tajikistan, passing hunched old men who tend the cotton fields with hoes. It's an ancient setting: Alexander the Great and his men conquered parts of the territory in the fourth century B.C, and they're said to have crossed the Panj River by floating on leather hides.

These days, in a nation where some 50 percent of the population makes less than $41 a month, there's a steady stream of new Mercedes and Lexus sedans, not only in Dushanbe, but also in the hamlets that dot the way to the Afghan border.

Locals say the cars often are given in trade for loads of heroin shipped north to the Russian border. The stuff is easy to get.

"You can just take two bags over your back, walk across the Panj and bring them back filled with heroin. It's no problem," said Vazir, a Tajik who was released from a Russian prison last February after he was caught trying to take 600 grams of heroin through a Moscow airport. During an interview in Dushanbe, he asked that his last name not be used because he feared retribution.

Vazir continued: "You can give your bag of heroin to one of the guards, and he will carry it across for you."


The supply chain appears to reach far beyond hustlers such as Vazir. Many Western officials and Tajik observers suspect that the Rahmon government controls the drug trade.

"I don't know if the president is involved personally, but he gives the percentages to different groups for what they can do," said one Western diplomat in Dushanbe, who like others spoke only on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of criticizing the regime. "Just go to the airport. There are bags of heroin going through unchecked. . . . People are pretty open about it. There's more and more a culture of impunity."

After the Soviet Union fell in 1991, Russian troops continued to patrol the Tajik border. They withdrew from the area in 2005 after the Tajik government demanded that they leave — though it allowed them to stay in other parts of the country — asserting that as a sovereign nation Tajikistan was capable of securing its own frontiers.

An assortment of local conscripts replaced the relatively professional Russian contingent, which trained and financed the Tajik officer corps.

"You have conscripts earning maybe $3 a month stretched out over 1,344 kilometers of border" — 835 miles — said another Western diplomat in Dushanbe, discussing the problem of drug dealers paying border guards to look the other way. "It's obvious that if you need to eat, corruption is an option."

Some Russian and Western officials said privately that the Tajik government wanted the Russians out of the way to ensure a larger supply of opium and heroin.

It was a move designed to gain "hold of a bigger part of the drug trade," one Western diplomat in Dushanbe said.

"Frankly speaking, there were forces in the government of Tajikistan who wanted to replace the Russian troops with Tajik troops to allow more holes in the border," said a Russian official in Moscow who travels regularly to Tajikistan and has high-level contact with the Tajik government. "It was to make the penetration of drugs easier."

The State Committee for National Security, Tajikistan's version of the KGB, took control of border enforcement in 2007 and almost immediately barred the country's Interior Ministry and drug control agency from access to the border region.


When a McClatchy reporter drove to the border at Nizhny Panj to do interviews, troops turned him back because he didn't have official permission. A border guard supervisor in plainclothes pulled the reporter's driver aside and suggested in a menacing tone that the driver was a spy. The Tajik government later denied McClatchy permission to visit the southern border.

The reporter resorted to crossing the bridge into Afghanistan with a routine visa, and he saw no evidence that Afghan or Tajik officials were inspecting trucks for contraband.

Despite the public nature of the drug trade and related corruption in Tajikistan, however, the West has done relatively little to pressure President Rahmon.

Some Western officials acknowledge that it's the result of a political tradeoff: No one wants to risk alienating Rahmon on the issue of drug corruption because his authoritarian regime's cooperation is important for preventing Islamic militants from using the Tajik-Afghan border as a sanctuary.

"The Americans want to have a logistics base here, so do you think they're going to pressure the government about corruption?" said William Lawrence, a chief adviser for a U.N. Afghan border-management program based in Dushanbe. "The answer is no."

The U.S. Embassy in Dushanbe declined to comment, but a State Department official said that such balancing acts were common.

"There is always going to be a tradeoff based on different foreign-policy objectives, different security objectives, the tolerance for different types of corruption, different levels of corruption," said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of diplomatic protocol. "I don't think the situation in Tajikistan, frankly, is that much different than the rest of Central Asia in terms of these types of tradeoffs."

A second Western diplomat in Dushanbe was more blunt about Western governments ignoring reports on Tajikistan's official complicity in drug corruption.

"We send reports every month to our capitals, very negative, but they don't (care)," said the diplomat, whose country has troops in Afghanistan. "Because it's a so-called stable country leading to Afghanistan, we accept it."

The diplomat said that his country had funded projects to help train and equip the Tajiks to deal with the drug problem. The United States and other Western nations have done the same.

This month, for example, the U.S. ambassador to Tajikistan broke ground on a $2.5 million project to overhaul the border guard training academy in Dushanbe. The American Embassy said in a recent news release that it had implemented more than $37.5 million of initiatives to help Tajik law enforcement since 1992.

However, the second Western diplomat said, there isn't much arm-twisting to make sure the Tajik government cracks down.

"We don't dare to say to the president, 'We give you money for anti-corruption but the first thing you see on the streets is these police taking bribes,' " the diplomat said. "Nobody says, 'We'll give you money for border security, but in three years we want to see a reduction in drugs.' "

Saturday, 27 June 2009

bbc: study shows pro-israel bias

BBC anti-Israel bias is a myth


The broadcaster favours Israeli over Palestinian sources in its news reports – as does al-Jazeera, a new study shows

Sharif Nashashibi

guardian.co.uk, Friday 26 June 2009 09.00 BST

I am always baffled at the ferocity and frequency of accusations that the BBC's Middle East coverage is anti-Israel. I have yet to see convincing, thorough, statistical evidence that this is the case.

When it comes to the secret report on Middle East coverage by the BBC's Malcolm Balen, just about every article I have read in the mainstream British press assumes that it shows an anti-Israel bias by the corporation – despite the fact that no one has read it. I guess if you make an accusation often enough, not matter how baseless, it eventually sticks.

A study (pdf) I wrote, published by Arab Media Watch on 10 June 2009, confirms that the BBC's coverage favours Israel. This comes as no surprise, as its findings echo those of numerous previous studies by AMW, universities and others, including the major, independent impartiality review commissioned by the BBC a few years ago.

What is surprising, given the review's findings, is the continued extent of this one-sidedness, a sign that little has been learned from past mistakes.

AMW monitored BBC Online news articles about violence between Israelis and Palestinians over four months (February-May 2009). This aspect was chosen because it is one of the most reported in a conflict that is almost always in the news, and thus shapes public attitudes towards the peoples involved.

AMW analysed the prominence of each side's viewpoint and version of events by monitoring how many words were devoted to quoting and paraphrasing Israeli and Palestinian sources, and in what order they were reported. AMW also analysed the prevalence with which each side were portrayed as instigating or responding to violence.

While every BBC article included Israeli sources, 35% had no Palestinian sources. Some of those articles omitted Palestinian statements and viewpoints that were available in other respected news outlets, such as reactions to Israeli violence or explaining why Palestinian violence took place. Of the 65% of articles containing Palestinian sources, 82% devoted more words to Israeli sources. This, as the study says, is "a woeful imbalance".

But arguably the most startling aspect of the study is the performance of al-Jazeera's English website. Having concluded my findings for the BBC, I decided to monitor al-Jazeera in the same way as a comparative exercise. I had expected the world-renowned Arab station to be an example for the BBC, but in fact, it fared little better.

While every al-Jazeera article had Israeli sources, 11% had no Palestinian sources. Of the 89% that did, 69% devoted more words to Israeli sources. "A further breakdown raises more concern," the study says. "The articles in question are either attributed to 'agencies', or 'al-Jazeera and agencies'. Of the articles attributed solely to agencies, 57% devoted more words to Israeli sources. However, the figure jumped to 78% for articles attributed to 'al-Jazeera and agencies'."

When articles contained more words for Israeli sources than Palestinian, the degree to which this was the case was considerable: the BBC averaged 3.3 times more words for Israeli sources per article, while al-Jazeera averaged 3.4 times more words. When articles contained more words for Palestinian sources, the ratio was significantly lower: both broadcasters averaged 1.8 times more words for Palestinian sources. Of the articles containing sources from both sides, the majority for both the BBC and al-Jazeera reported Israeli sources first: 59% and 53%, respectively.

The absence of Palestinian sources and viewpoints, and the predominance of those from the Israeli side, go against the editorial guidelines of both broadcasters. The BBC's guidelines state that "we must ensure we avoid … an imbalance of views on controversial subjects", that "we should … fairly represent opposing viewpoints when appropriate", that "we strive to reflect a wide range of opinion and explore a range and conflict of views" and that "we must ensure a wide range of significant views and perspectives are given due weight".

Al-Jazeera's guidelines stress adherence to "the journalistic values of honesty, courage, fairness, balance, independence, credibility and diversity", "giving full consideration to the feelings of victims of crime, war, persecution and disaster" and presenting "diverse points of view and opinions".

The bad news continues. The BBC and al-Jazeera both unequivocally portrayed Israeli violence as a direct response to Palestinian violence, in the use of words such as "responded", "responds", "fired back", "in response", "in retaliation" and "deterrent against". On no occasion did either portray Palestinian violence as a direct response to Israeli violence.

Furthermore, both broadcasters implicitly portrayed Israeli violence as a response to Palestinian violence by overwhelmingly reporting the former as following the latter: 10 times and seven times, respectively. "Only once did the BBC report Palestinian violence as following Israeli violence. This was one occasion more than al-Jazeera," the study said. "The effect of this is to legitimise and justify Israeli violence, while portraying Palestinians as the instigators of violence that has no explanation or cause."

I talked to several Arab journalists and media analysts about these results. None were surprised at the BBC's performance. In fact, some were not even surprised at how poorly al-Jazeera fared. Others believed that this is a result of its English-language section overshooting in its attempts to differentiate itself from its Arabic-language counterpart. Whatever the reason, this study should be a wake-up call for both news organisations

Friday, 26 June 2009

latino call for marijuana decriminalization

Drug policy in the Americas

At last, a debate

Jun 25th 2009

The Economist

And an intemperate defence of prohibition
Agencia Estado
Agencia Estado

Cardoso calls for new thinking

EVER since George Bush senior launched “the war on drugs” in earnest two decades ago, Latin American governments have been more or less willing belligerents. That was partly because of the carrot and stick of American aid and bullying, but mainly because they suffer the brunt of the violence and corruption inflicted by trafficking mafias. Yet now there are signs of a rethink.

The clearest came in February when the Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy, a group headed by three former presidents—Fernando Henrique Cardoso of Brazil, César Gaviria of Colombia and Ernesto Zedillo of Mexico—published a report arguing that the violent crime and corruption generated by drug prohibition is undermining democracy and that the drug war has “failed”. They called for a public debate on alternatives, including treating drug use as an issue of public health rather than criminal law, and decriminalising marijuana.

This approach is gaining adherents. At least one minister in Brazil’s government agreed with the report. Even as it battles the drug gangs, Mexico has decided that people caught with small amounts of drugs should be treated rather than prosecuted. Argentina and Ecuador are considering more radical decriminalisation. Mr Cardoso, who has retired from political office, has since gone further than the commission and called for the decriminalisation of cocaine. He says that many active politicians privately agree with him. And in the United States, the Obama administration has signalled a shift away from drug “war” and mass incarceration and towards policies that treat drugs as a health issue.

This fracture in the taboo on questioning drug prohibition seems to have rattled Antonio Maria Costa, the boss of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. In his preface to the annual World Drug Report, released this week, he concedes that drug users need “medical help not criminal retribution”.

But he also implies that proponents of drug legalisation—who include The Economist—are really seeking fresh sources of tax revenue to rescue failed banks. (No, Mr Costa, to pay for drug treatment and education.) Grotesquely, he equates legalising drugs and human trafficking. (Drugs primarily harm the user whereas trafficking harms others.) He claims legalisation would “unleash a drug epidemic in the developing world”. (That is what prohibition is achieving, because the criminal gangs it generates in developing countries have started supplying their local markets.) He smears his critics as “pro-drug” (as absurd as suggesting he is “pro-crime”). This kind of hysteria smacks of an organisation that is not just losing an unwinnable war but losing the argument.

Thursday, 25 June 2009

un praises portugal's drug decriminalization


Ryan Grim ryan@huffingtonpost.com

UN Backs Drug Decriminalization In World Drug Report

06-24-09 05:28 PM

In an about face, the United Nations on Wednesday lavishly praised drug decriminalization in its annual report on the state of global drug policy. In previous years, the UN drug czar had expressed skepticism about Portugal's decriminalization, which removed criminal penalties in 2001 for personal drug possession and emphasized treatment over incarceration. The UN had suggested the policy was in violation of international drug treaties and would encourage "drug tourism."

But in its 2009 World Drug Report, the UN had little but kind words for Portugal's radical (by U.S. standards) approach. "These conditions keep drugs out of the hands of those who would avoid them under a system of full prohibition, while encouraging treatment, rather than incarceration, for users. Among those who would not welcome a summons from a police officer are tourists, and, as a result, Portugal's policy has reportedly not led to an increase in drug tourism," reads the report. "It also appears that a number of drug-related problems have decreased."

In its upbeat appraisal of Portugal's policy, the UN finds itself in agreement with Salon's Glenn Greenwald.

The report, released at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., also puts to rest concerns that decriminalization doesn't comply with international treaties, which prevent countries from legalizing drugs.

U.S. Drug Czar Gil Kerlikowske is scheduled to appear at the announcement of the report. (He has said "legalization" is not "in my vocabulary.")

"The International Narcotics Control Board was initially apprehensive when Portugal changed its law in 2001 (see their annual report for that year), but after a mission to Portugal in 2004, it "noted that the acquisition, possession and abuse of drugs had remained prohibited," and said "the practice of exempting small quantities of drugs from criminal prosecution is consistent with the international drug control treaties," reads a footnote to the report.

The UN report also dives head first into the debate over full drug legalization. Last year's World Drug Report ignored the issue entirely, save for a reference to Chinese opium policy in the 19th Century. This year's report begins with a lengthy rebuttal of arguments in favor of legalization. "Why unleash a drug epidemic in the developing world for the sake of libertarian arguments made by a pro-drug lobby that has the luxury of access to drug treatment?" argues the report.

But the UN also makes a significant concession to backers of legalization, who have long argued that it is prohibition policies that lead to violence and the growth of shadowy, underground networks.

"In the Preface to the report," reads the press release accompanying the report, "[UN Office of Drugs and Crime Executive Director Antonio Maria] Costa explores the debate over repealing drug controls. He acknowledges that controls have generated an illicit black market of macro-economic proportions that uses violence and corruption."

Jack Cole, executive director of Law Enforcement Against Prohibition (LEAP) and a retired undercover narcotics detective, objected to the report's classification of current policy as "control."

"The world's 'drug czar,' Antonio Maria Costa, would have you believe that the legalization movement is calling for the abolition of drug control," he said. "Quite the contrary, we are demanding that governments replace the failed policy of prohibition with a system that actually regulates and controls drugs, including their purity and prices, as well as who produces them and who they can be sold to. You can't have effective control under prohibition, as we should have learned from our failed experiment with alcohol in the U.S. between 1920 and 1933."

Ryan Grim's book, This Is Your Country On Drugs: The Secret History of Getting High in America, is now on sale

Wednesday, 24 June 2009

teheran: la cia seule dans la rue / cia alone in the street

english text below


La technique des coups d’État par en bas

La « révolution colorée » échoue en Iran

par Thierry Meyssan*

La « révolution verte » de Téhéran est le dernier avatar des « révolutions colorées » qui ont permis aux États-unis d’imposer des gouvernements à leur solde dans plusieurs pays sans avoir à recourir à la force. Thierry Meyssan, qui a conseillé deux gouvernements face à ces crises, analyse cette méthode et les raisons de son échec en Iran.

Depuis Beyrouth (Liban) 24 juin 2009

Les « révolution colorées » sont aux révolutions ce que le Canada Dry est à la bière. Elles y ressemblent, mais n’en ont pas la saveur. Ce sont des changements de régime ayant l’apparence d’une révolution, en ce qu’ils mobilisent de vastes segments du Peuple, mais relevant du coup d’État, en ce qu’il ne visent pas à changer les structures sociales, mais à substituer une élite à une autre pour conduire une politique économique et étrangère pro-US. La « révolution verte » de Téhéran en est le dernier exemple.
Origine du concept

Ce concept est apparu dans les années 90, mais trouve ses origines dans les débats US des années 70-80. Après les révélations en chaîne sur les coups d’État fomentés par la CIA dans le monde, et le grand déballage des commissions parlementaires Church et Rockefeller [1], l’amiral Stansfield Turner fut chargé par le président Carter de nettoyer l’agence et de cesser tout soutien aux « dictatures maison ». Furieux, les sociaux démocrates états-uniens (SD/USA) quittèrent le Parti démocrate et rejoignirent Ronald Reagan. Il s’agissait de brillants intellectuels trotskistes [2], souvent liés à la revue Commentary. Lorsque Reagan fut élu, il leur confia la tâche de poursuivre l’ingérence US, mais par d’autres moyens. C’est ainsi qu’ils créent en 1982 la National Endowment for Democracy (NED) [3] et, en 1984, l’United States Institute for Peace (USIP). Les deux structures sont organiquement liées : des administrateurs de la NED siègent au conseil d’administration de l’USIP et vice-versa.

Juridiquement, la NED est une association à but non lucratif, de droit US, financée par une subvention annuelle votée par le Congrès à l’intérieur du budget du département d’État. Pour mener ses actions, elle les fait co-financer par l’US Agency for International Development (USAID), elle-même rattachée au département d’État.
En pratique, cette structure juridique n’est qu’un paravent utilisé conjointement par la CIA états-unienne, le MI6 britannique et l’ASIS australien (et occasionnellement par les services canadiens et néo-zélandais).
La NED se présente comme un organe de « promotion de la démocratie ». Elle intervient soit directement ; soit par ses quatre tentacules : l’une destinée à corrompre les syndicats, une seconde chargée de corrompre les patronats, une troisième pour les partis de gauche et une quatrième pour ceux de droite ; soit encore par l’intermédiaire de fondations amies, telles que la Westminster Foundation for Democracy (Royaume-Uni), l’International Center for Human Rights and Democratic Development (Canada), la Fondation Jean-Jaurès et la Fondation Robert-Schuman (France), l’International Liberal Center (Suède), l’Alfred Mozer Foundation (Pays-Bas), la Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, la Friedrich Naunmann Stiftung, la Hans Seidal Stiftung et la Heinrich Boell Stiftung (Allemagne). La NED revendique avoir corrompu ainsi plus de 6 000 organisations dans le monde en une trentaine d’années. Tout ça, bien entendu, étant camouflé sous l’apparence de programmes de formation ou d’assistance.

L’USIP, quant à lui, est une institution nationale états-unienne. Il est subventionné annuellement par le Congrès dans le budget du département de la Défense. À la différence de la NED, qui sert de couverture aux services des trois États alliés, l’USIP est exclusivement états-unien. Sous couvert de recherche en sciences politique, il peut salarier des personnalités politiques étrangères.

Dès qu’il a disposé de ressources, l’USIP a financé une nouvelle et discrète structure, l’Albert Einstein Institution [4]. Cette petite association de promotion de la non-violence était initialement chargée d’imaginer une forme de défense civile pour les populations d’Europe de l’Ouest en cas d’invasion par le Pacte de Varsovie. Elle a rapidement pris son autonomie et modélisé les conditions dans lesquelles un pouvoir étatique, de quelque nature qu’il soit, peut perdre son autorité et s’effondrer.
Premières tentatives

La première tentative de « révolution colorée » a échoué en 1989. Il s’agissait de renverser Deng Xiaoping en s’appuyant sur un de ses proches collaborateurs, le secrétaire général du Parti communiste chinois Zhao Ziyang, de manière à ouvrir le marché chinois aux investisseurs états-uniens et à faire entrer la Chine dans l’orbite US. Les jeunes partisans de Zhao envahirent la place Tienanmen [5]. Ils furent présentés par les médias occidentaux comme des étudiants a-politiques se battant pour la liberté face à l’aile traditionnelle du Parti, alors qu’il s’agissait d’une dissidence à l’intérieur le courant de Deng entre nationalistes et pro-US. Après avoir longtemps résisté aux provocations, Deng décida de conclure par la force. La répression fit entre 300 et 1000 morts selon les sources.
20 ans plus tard, la version occidentale de ce coup d’État raté n’a pas variée. Les médias occidentaux qui ont couvert récemment cet anniversaire en le présentant comme une « révolte populaire » se sont étonnés de ce que les Pékinois n’ont pas gardé souvenir de l’événement. C’est qu’une lutte de pouvoir au sein du Parti n’avait rien de « populaire ». Ils ne se sentaient pas concernés.

La première « révolution colorée » réussit en 1990. Alors que l’Union soviétique était en cours de dissolution, le secrétaire d’État James Baker se rendit en Bulgarie pour participer à la campagne électorale du parti pro-US, abondamment financé par la NED [6]. Cependant, malgré les pressions du Royaume-Uni, les Bulgares, effrayés par les conséquences sociales du passage de l’URSS à l’économie de marché, commirent l’impardonnable faute d’élire au Parlement une majorité de post-communistes. Alors que les observateurs de la Communauté européenne certifièrent la bonne tenue du scrutin, l’opposition pro-US hurla à la fraude électorale et descendit dans la rue. Elle installa un campement au centre de Sofia et plongea le pays dans le chaos six mois durant, jusqu’à ce que le Parlement élise le pro-US Zhelyu Zhelev comme président.
La « démocratie » : vendre son pays à des intérêts étrangers à l’insu de sa population

Depuis lors, Washington n’a cessé d’organiser des changements de régime, un peu partout dans le monde, par l’agitation de rue plutôt que par des juntes militaires. Il importe ici de cerner les enjeux.
Au-delà du discours lénifiant sur la « promotion de la démocratie », l’action de Washington vise à l’imposition de régimes qui lui ouvrent sans conditions les marchés intérieurs et s’alignent sur sa politique étrangère. Or, si ces objectifs sont connus des dirigeants des « révolutions colorées », ils ne sont jamais discutés et acceptés par les manifestants qu’ils mobilisent. Et, dans le cas où ces coup d’État réussissent, les citoyens ne tardent pas à se révolter contre les nouvelles politiques qu’on leur impose, même s’il est trop tard pour revenir en arrière.
Par ailleurs, comment peut-on considérer comme « démocratiques » des oppositions qui, pour prendre le pouvoir, vendent leur pays à des intérêts étrangers à l’insu de leur population ?

En 2005, l’opposition kirghize conteste le résultat des élections législatives et amène à Bichkek des manifestants du Sud du pays. Ils renversent le président Askar Akaïev. C’est la « révolution des tulipes ». L’Assemblée nationale élit comme président le pro-US Kourmanbek Bakiev. Ne parvenant pas à maîtriser ses supporters qui pillent la capitale, ils déclare avoir chassé le dictateur et feint de vouloir créer un gouvernement d’union nationale. Il fait sortir de prison le général Felix Kulov, ancien maire de Bichkek, et le nomme ministre de l’Intérieur, puis Premier ministre. Lorsque la situation est stabilisée, Bakaiev se débarrasse de Kulov et vend, sans appel d’offre et avec des dessous de table conséquents, les quelques ressources du pays à des sociétés US et installe une base militaire US à Manas. Le niveau de vie de la population n’a jamais été aussi bas. Felix Kulov propose de relever le pays en le fédérant, comme par le passé, à la Russie. Il ne tarde pas à retourner en prison.
Un mal pour un bien ?

On objecte parfois, dans le cas d’États soumis à des régimes répressifs, que si ces « révolutions colorées » n’apportent qu’une démocratie de façade, elles procurent néanmoins un mieux-être aux populations. Or, l’expérience montre que rien n’est moins sûr. Les nouveaux régimes peuvent s’avérer plus répressifs que les anciens.

En 2003, Washington, Londres et Paris [7] organisent la « révolution des roses » en Géorgie [8]. Selon un schéma classique, l’opposition dénonce des fraudes électorales lors des élections législatives et descend dans la rue. Les manifestants contraignent le président Edouard Chevardnadze à fuir et prennent le pouvoir. Son successeur Mikhail Saakachvili ouvre le pays aux intérêts économiques US et rompt avec le voisin russe. L’aide économique promise par Washington pour se substituer à l’aide russe ne vient pas. L’économie, déjà compromise, s’effondre. Pour continuer à satisfaire ses commanditaires, Saakachvili doit imposer une dictature [9]. Il ferme des médias et remplit les prisons, ce qui n’empêche absolument pas la presse occidentale de continuer à le présenter comme « démocrate ». Condamné à la fuite en avant, Saakachvili décide de se refaire une popularité en se lançant dans une aventure militaire. Avec l’aide de l’administration Bush et d’Israël auquel il a loué des bases aériennes, il bombarde la population d’Ossétie du Sud, faisant 1600 morts, dont la plupart ont la double nationalité russe. Moscou riposte. Les conseillers états-uniens et israéliens s’enfuient [10]. La Géorgie est dévastée.
Assez !

Le mécanisme principal des « révolutions colorées » consiste à focaliser le mécontentement populaire sur la cible que l’on veut abattre. Il s’agit d’un phénomène de psychologie des masses qui balaye tout sur son passage et auquel aucun obstacle raisonnable ne peut être opposé. Le bouc-émissaire est accusé de tous les maux qui accablent le pays depuis au moins une génération. Plus il résiste, plus la colère de la foule croît. Lorsqu’il cède ou qu’il esquive, la population retrouve ses esprits, les clivages raisonnables entre ses partisans et ses opposants réapparaissent.

En 2005, dans les heures qui suivent l’assassinat de l’ex-Premier ministre Rafik Hariri, la rumeur se répand au Liban qu’il a été tué par « les Syriens ». L’armée syrienne, qui —en vertu de l’Accord de Taëf— maintient l’ordre depuis la fin de la guerre civile, est conspuée. Le président syrien, Bachar el-Assad, est personnellement mis en cause par les autorités états-uniennes, ce qui tient lieu de preuve pour l’opinion publique. À ceux qui font remarquer que —malgré des moments orageux— Rafik Hariri a toujours été utile à la Syrie et que sa mort prive Damas d’un collaborateur essentiel, on rétorque que le « régime syrien » est si mauvais en soi qu’il ne peut s’empêcher de tuer même ses amis. Les Libanais appellent de leurs vœux un débarquement des GI’s pour chasser les Syriens. Mais, à la surprise générale, Bachar el-Assad, considérant que son armée n’est plus la bienvenue au Liban alors que son déploiement lui coûte cher, retire ses hommes. Des élections législatives sont organisées qui voient le triomphe de la coalition « anti-syrienne ». C’est la « révolution du cèdre ». Lorsque la situation se stabilise, chacun se rend compte et que, si des généraux syriens ont par le passé pillé le pays, le départ de l’armée syrienne ne change rien économiquement. Surtout, le pays est en danger, il n’a plus les moyens de se défendre face à l’expansionnisme du voisin israélien. Le principal leader « anti-syrien », le général Michel Aoun, se ravise et passe dans l’opposition. Furieux, Washington multiplie les projets pour l’assassiner. Michel Aoun s’allie au Hezbollah autour d’une plate-forme patriotique. Il était temps : Israël attaque.

Dans tous les cas, Washington prépare à l’avance le gouvernement « démocratique », ce qui confirme bien qu’il s’agit d’un coup d’État déguisé. La composition de la nouvelle équipe est gardée secrète le plus longtemps possible. C’est pourquoi la désignation du bouc-émissaire se fait sans jamais évoquer d’alternative politique.

En Serbie, les jeunes « révolutionnaires » pro-US ont choisi un logo appartenant à l’imaginaire communiste (le poing levé) pour masquer leur subordination aux États-Unis. Ils ont pris comme slogan « Il est fini ! », fédérant ainsi les mécontents contre la personnalité de Slobodan Milosevic qu’ils ont rendu responsable des bombardements du pays pourtant effectués par l’OTAN. Ce modèle a été dupliqué en nombre, par exemple le groupe Pora ! en Ukraine, ou Zubr en Biélorussie.
Une non-violence de façade

Les communicants du département d’État veillent à l’image non-violente des « révolutions colorées ». Toutes mettent en avant les théories de Gene Sharp, fondateur de l’Albert Einstein Institution. Or, la non-violence est une méthode de combat destinée à convaincre le pouvoir de changer de politique. Pour qu’une minorité s’empare du pouvoir et l’exerce, il lui faut toujours, à un moment ou à une autre, utiliser la violence. Et toutes les « révolutions colorées » l’ont fait.

En 2000, alors que le mandat du président Slobodan Milosevic courait encore pour un an, il convoqua des élections anticipées. Lui-même et son principal opposant, Vojislav Koštunica, se retrouvèrent en ballotage. Sans attendre le second tour de scrutin, l’opposition cria à la fraude et descendit dans la rue. Des milliers de manifestants affluèrent vers la capitale, dont les mineurs de Kolubara. Leurs journées de travail étaient indirectement payées par la NED, sans qu’ils aient conscience d’être rémunérés par les États-Unis. La pression de la manifestation étant insuffisante, les mineurs attaquèrent des bâtiments publics avec des bulldozers qu’ils avaient acheminé avec eux, d’où le nom de « révolution des bulldozers ».

Dans le cas où la tension s’éternise et que des contre-manifestations s’organisent, la seule solution pour Washington est de plonger le pays dans le chaos. Des agents provocateurs sont alors postés dans les deux camps qui tirent sur la foule. Chaque partie peut constater que ceux d’en face ont tiré alors qu’ils s’avançaient pacifiquement. L’affrontement se généralise.

En 2002, la bourgeoisie de Caracas descend dans la rue pour conspuer la politique sociale du président Hugo Chavez [11]. Par d’habiles montages, les télévisions privées donnent l’impression d’une marée humaine. Ils sont 50 000 selon les observateurs, 1 million d’après la presse et le département d’État. Survient alors l’incident du pont Llaguno. Les télévisions montrent clairement des pro-chavistes armes à la main tirant sur la foule. Dans une conférence de presse, le général de la Garde nationale et vice-ministre de la sécurité intérieure confirme que les « milices chavistes » ont tiré sur le peuple faisant 19 morts. Il démissionne et appelle au renversement de la dictature. Le président ne tarde pas à être arrêté par des militaires insurgés. Mais le Peuple par millions descend dans la capitale et rétablit l’ordre constitutionnel.
Une enquête journalistique ultérieure reconstituera en détail la tuerie du pont Llaguno. Elle mettra en évidence un montage fallacieux des images, dont l’ordre chronologique a été falsifié comme l’attestent les cadrans des montres des protagonistes. En réalité, ce sont les chavistes qui étaient agressés et qui, après s’être repliés, tentaient de se dégager en utilisant des armes à feu. Les agents provocateurs étaient des policiers locaux formés par une agence US [12].

En 2006, la NED réorganise l’opposition au président kenyan Mwai Kibaki. Elle finance la création du Parti orange de Raila Odinga. Celui-ci reçoit le soutien du sénateur Barack Obama, accompagné de spécialistes de la déstabilisation (Mark Lippert, actuel chef de cabinet du conseiller de sécurité nationale, et le général Jonathan S. Gration, actuel envoyé spécial du président US pour le Soudan). Participant à un meeting d’Odinga, le sénateur de l’Illinois s’invente un vague lien de parenté avec le candidat pro-US. Cependant Odinga perd les élections législatives de 2007. Soutenu par le sénateur John McCain, en sa qualité de président de l’IRI (le pseudopode républicain de la NED), il conteste la sincérité du scrutin et appelle ses partisans à descendre dans la rue.
C’est alors que des messages SMS anonymes sont diffusés en masse aux électeurs de l’ethnie Luo. « Chers Kenyans, les Kikuyu ont volé l’avenir de nos enfants…nous devons les traiter de la seule manière qu’ils comprennent… la violence ». Le pays, pourtant un des plus stables d’Afrique, s’embrase soudainement. Après des journées d’émeutes, le président Kibaki est contraint d’accepter la médiation de Madeleine Albright, en sa qualité de présidente du NDI (le pseudopode démocrate de la NED). Un poste de Premier ministre est créé qui revient à Odinga. Les SMS de la haine n’ayant pas été envoyés depuis des installations kenyanes, on se demande quelle puissance étrangère a pu les expédier.
La mobilisation de l’opinion publique internationale

Au cours des dernières années, Washington a eu l’occasion de lancer des « révolutions colorées » avec la conviction qu’elles échoueraient à prendre le pouvoir mais qu’elle permettrait de manipuler l’opinion publique et les institutions internationales.

En 2007, de nombreux Birmans s’insurgent contre l’augmentation des prix du fuel domestique. Les manifestations dégénèrent. Les moines bouddhistes prennent la tête de la contestation. C’est la « révolution safran » [13]. En réalité, Washington n’a que faire du régime de Rangoon ; ce qui l’intéresse, c’est d’instrumenter le Peuple birman pour faire pression sur la Chine qui a des intérêts stratégiques en Birmanie (pipelines et base militaire de renseignement électronique). Dès lors, l’important est de mettre en scène la réalité. Des images prises par des téléphones portables apparaissent sur YouTube. Elles sont anonymes, invérifiables et hors contexte. Précisément, leur apparente spontanéité leur donne autorité. La Maison-Blanche peut imposer son interprétation des vidéos.

Plus récemment, en 2008, des manifestations estudiantines paralysent la Grèce à la suite du meurtre d’un jeune homme de 15 ans par un policier. Rapidement des casseurs font leur apparition. Ils ont été recrutés au Kosovo voisin et acheminés par autobus. Les centre-villes sont saccagés. Washington cherche à faire fuir les capitaux vers d’autres cieux et à se réserver le monopole des investissements dans les terminaux gaziers en construction. Une campagne de presse va donc faire passer le poussif gouvernement Karamanlis pour celui des colonels. Facebook et Twittter sont utilisés pour mobiliser la diaspora grecque. Les manifestations s’étendent à Istanbul, Nicosie, Dublin, Londres, Amsterdam, La Haye, Copenhague, Francfort, Paris, Rome, Madrid, Barcelone, etc.

La révolution verte

L’opération conduite en 2009 en Iran s’inscrit dans cette longue liste de pseudos révolutions. En premier lieu, le Congrès vote en 2007 une enveloppe de 400 millions de dollars pour « changer le régime » en Iran. Celle-ci s’ajoute aux budgets ad hoc de la NED, de l’USAID, de la CIA et tutti quanti. On ignore comment cet argent est utilisé, mais trois groupes principaux en sont destinataires : la famille Rafsandjani, la famille Pahlevi, et les Moudjahidines du peuple.

L’administration Bush prend la décision de commanditer une « révolution colorée » en Iran après avoir confirmé la décision de l’état-major de ne pas attaquer militairement ce pays. Ce choix est validé par l’administration Obama. Par défaut, on rouvre donc le dossier de « révolution colorée », préparé en 2002 avec Israël au sein de l’American Enterprise Institute. À l’époque j’avais publié un article sur ce dispositif [14]. Il suffit de s’y reporter pour identifier les protagonistes actuels : il a été peu modifié. Une partie libanaise a été ajoutée prévoyant un soulèvement à Beyrouth en cas de victoire de la coalition patriotique (Hezbollah, Aoun) aux élections législatives, mais elle a été annulée.

Le scénario prévoyait un soutien massif au candidat choisi par l’ayatollah Rafsandjani, la contestation des résultats de l’élection présidentielle, des attentats tous azimuts, le renversement du président Ahmadinejad et du guide suprême l’ayatollah Khamenei, l’installation d’un gouvernement de transition dirigé par Mousavi, puis la restauration de la monarchie et l’installation d’un gouvernement dirigé par Sohrab Shobani.

Comme imaginé en 2002, l’opération a été supervisée par Morris Amitay et Michael Ledeen. Elle a mobilisé en Iran les réseaux de l’Irangate.
Ici un petit rappel historique est nécessaire. L’Irangate est une vente d’armes illicite : la Maison-Blanche souhaitait approvisionner en armes les Contras nicaraguayens (pour lutter contre les sandinistes) d’une part et l’Iran d’autre part (pour faire durer jusqu’à épuisement la guerre Iran-Irak), mais en était interdit par le Congrès. Les Israéliens proposèrent alors de sous-traiter les deux opérations à la fois. Ledeen, qui est double national États-unien/Israélien sert d’agent de liaison à Washington, tandis que Mahmoud Rafsandjani (le frère de l’ayatollah) est son correspondant à Téhéran. Le tout sur fond de corruption généralisée. Lorsque le scandale éclate aux États-Unis, une commission d’enquête indépendante est dirigée par le sénateur Tower et le général Brent Scowcroft (le mentor de Robert Gates).
Michael Ledeen est un vieux briscard des opérations secrètes. On le trouve à Rome lors de l’assassinat d’Aldo Moro, on le retrouve dans l’invention de la piste bulgare lors de l’assassinat de Jean-Paul II, ou plus récemment dans l’invention de l’approvisionnement de Saddam Hussein en uranium nigérian. Il travaille aujourd’hui à l’American Enterprise Institute [15] (aux côtés de Richard Perle et Paul Wolfowitz) et à la Foundation for the Defense of Democracies [16].
Morris Amitay est ancien directeur de l’American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). Il est aujourd’hui vice-président du Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA) et directeur d’un cabinet conseil pour de grandes firmes d’armement.

Le 27 avril dernier, Morris et Ledeen organisaient un séminaire sur l’Iran à l’American Enterprise Institute à propos des élections iraniennes, autour du sénateur Joseph Lieberman. Le 15 mai dernier, nouveau séminaire. La partie publique consistait en une table ronde animée par l’ambassadeur John Bolton à propos du « grand marchandage » : Moscou accepterait-il de laisser tomber Téhéran en échange du renoncement de Washington au bouclier anti-missile en Europe centrale ? L’expert français Bernard Hourcade participait à ces échanges. Simultanément, l’Institut lançait un site internet destiné à la presse dans la crise à venir : IranTracker.org. Le site inclut une rubrique sur les élections libanaises.

En Iran, il appartenait à l’ayatollah Rafsandjani de renverser son vieux rival, l’ayatollah Khamenei. Issu d’une famille d’agriculteurs, Hachemi Rafsandjani a fait fortune dans la spéculation immobilière sous le Chah. Il est devenu le principal grossiste en pistaches du pays et a arrondi sa fortune durant l’Irangate. Ses avoirs sont évalués à plusieurs milliards de dollars. Devenu l’homme le plus riche d’Iran, il a été successivement président du parlement, président de la République et aujourd’hui président du Conseil de discernement (instance d’arbitrage entre le parlement et le Conseil des gardiens de la constitution). Il représente les intérêts du bazar, c’est-à-dire des commerçants de Téhéran.
Durant la campagne électorale, Rafsandjani avait fait promettre à son ex-adversaire devenu son poulain, Mirhossein Mousavi, de privatiser le secteur pétrolier.

Sans connexion aucune avec Rafsandjani, Washington a fait appel aux Moudjahidines du peuple [17]. Cette organisation protégée par le Pentagone est considérée comme terroriste par le département d’État et l’a été par l’Union européenne. Elle a effectivement mené de terribles opérations dans les années 80, dont un méga-attentat qui coûta la vie à l’ayatollah Behechti ainsi qu’à quatre ministre, six ministres adjoints et le quart du groupe parlementaire du Parti de la république islamique. L’organisation est commandée par Massoud Rajavi, qui épouse en première noces la fille du président Bani Sadr, puis la cruelle Myriam en seconde noces. Son siège est installé en région parisienne et ses bases militaires en Irak, d’abord sous la protection de Saddam Husein, puis aujourd’hui sous celle du département de la Défense. Ce sont les Moudjahidines qui ont assuré la logistique des attentats à la bombe durant la campagne électorale [18]. C’est à eux qu’il revenait de provoquer des accrochages entre militants pro et anti-Ahmadinejad, ce qu’ils ont probablement fait.

Dans le cas où le chaos se serait installé, le Guide suprême aurait pu être renversé. Un gouvernement de transition, dirigé par Mirhussein Mousavi aurait privatisé le secteur pétrolier et rétabli la monarchie. Le fils de l’ancien Shah, Reza Cyrus Pahlavi, serait remonté sur le trône et aurait désigné Sohrab Sobhani comme Premier ministre.
Dans cette perspective, Reza Pahlavi a publié en février un livre d’entretiens avec le journaliste français Michel Taubmann. Celui-ci est directeur du bureau d’information parisien d’Arte et préside le Cercle de l’Observatoire, le club des néo-conservateurs français.
On se souvient que Washington avait prévu identiquement le rétablissement de la monarchie en Afghanistan. Mohammed Zaher Shah devait reprendre son trône à Kaboul et Hamid Karzai devait être son Premier ministre. Malheureusement, à 88 ans, le prétendant était devenu sénile. Karzai devint donc président de la République. Comme Karzai, Sobhani est double national états-unien. Comme lui, il travaille dans le secteur pétrolier de la Caspienne.

Côté propagande, le dispositif initial était confié au cabinet Benador Associates. Mais il a évolué sous l’influence de l’assistante du secrétaire d’État pour l’Éducation et la Culture, Goli Ameri. Cette iranienne-états-unienne est une ancienne collaboratrice de John Bolton. Spécialiste des nouveaux médias, elle a mis en place des programmes d’équipement et de formation à l’internet pour les amis de Rafsandjani. Elle a aussi développé des radios et télévisions en langue farsi pour la propagande du département d’État et en coordination avec la BBC britannique.

La déstabilisation de l’Iran a échoué parce que le principal ressort des « révolutions colorées » n’a pas été correctement activé. MirHussein Mousavi n’est pas parvenu à cristalliser les mécontentements sur la personne de Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Le Peuple iranien ne s’est pas trompé, il n’a pas rendu le président sortant responsables des conséquences des sanctions économiques états-uniennes sur le pays. Dès lors, la contestation s’est limitée à la bourgeoisie des quartiers nord de Téhéran. Le pouvoir s’est abstenu d’opposer des manifestations les unes contre les autres et a laissé les comploteurs se découvrir.
Cependant, il faut admettre que l’intoxication des médias occidentaux a fonctionné. L’opinion publique étrangère a réellement cru que deux millions d’Iraniens étaient descendus dans la rue, lorsque le chiffre réel est au moins dix fois inférieur. Le maintien en résidence des correspondants de presse a facilité ces exagérations en les dispensant de fournir les preuves de leurs imputations.

Ayant renoncé à la guerre et échoué à renverser le régime, quelle carte reste-t-il dans les mains de Barack Obama ?

Thierry Meyssan est analyste politique, fondateur du Réseau Voltaire. Dernier ouvrage paru : L’Effroyable imposture 2 (le remodelage du Proche-Orient et la guerre israélienne contre le Liban).

[1] Les multiples rapports et documents publiés par ces commissions sont disponibles en ligne sur le site The Assassination Archives and Research Center. Les principaux extraits des rapports ont été traduits en français sous le titre Les Complots de la CIA, manipulations et assassinats, Stock, 1976, 608 pp.
[2] « Les New York Intellectuals et l’invention du néo-conservatisme », par Denis Boneau, Réseau Voltaire, 26 novembre 2004.
[3] « La NED, nébuleuse de l’ingérence démocratique », par Thierry Meyssan, Réseau Voltaire, 22 janvier 2004.
[4] « L’Albert Einstein Institution : la non-violence version CIA », par Thierry Meyssan, Réseau Voltaire, 4 janvier 2005.
[5] « Tienanmen, 20 ans après », par le professeur Domenico Losurdo, Réseau Voltaire, 9 juin 2009.
[6] À l’époque, la NED s’appuie en Europe orientale sur la Free Congress Foundation (FCF), animée par des républicains. Par la suite, cette organisation disparaît et cède la place à la Soros Foundation, animée par des démocrates, avec laquelle la NED fomente de nouveaux « changements de régime ».
[7] Soucieux d’apaiser les relations franco-US après la crise irakienne, le président Jacques Chirac tente de se rapprocher de l’administration bush sur le dos des Géorgiens, d’autant que la France a des intérêts économiques en Géorgie. Salomé Zourabichvili, n°2 des services secrets français, est nommée ambassadrice à Tbilissi, puis change de nationalité et devient ministre des Affaires étrangères de la « révolution des roses ».
[8] « Les dessous du coup d’État en Géorgie », par Paul Labarique, Réseau Voltaire, 7 janvier 2004.
[9] « Géorgie : Saakachvili jette son opposition en prison » et « Manifestations à Tbilissi contre la dictature des roses », Réseau Voltaire, 12 septembre 2006 et 30 septembre 2007.
[10] L’administration Bush espérait que ce conflit ferait diversion. Les bombardiers israéliens devaient simultanément décoller de Géorgie pour frapper l’Iran voisin. Mais, avant même d’attaquer les installations militaires géorgiennes, la Russie bombarde les aéroports loués à Israël et cloue ses avions au sol.
[11] « Opération manquée au Venezuela », par Thierry Meyssan, Réseau Voltaire, 18 mai 2002.
[12] Llaguno Bridge. Keys to a Massacre. Documentaire d’Angel Palacios, Panafilms 2005.
[13] « Birmanie : la sollicitude intéressée des États-Unis », par Thierry Meyssan, Réseau Voltaire, 5 novembre 2007.
[14] « Les bonnes raisons d’intervenir en Iran », par Thierry Meyssan, Réseau Voltaire, 12 février 2004.
[15] « L’Institut américain de l’entreprise à la Maison-Blanche », Réseau Voltaire, 21 juin 2004.
[16] « Les trucages de la Foundation for the Defense of Democracies », Réseau Voltaire, 2 février 2005.
[17] « Les Moudjahidin perdus », par Paul Labarique, Réseau Voltaire, 17 février 2004.
[18] « Le Jundallah revendique des actions armées aux côtés des Moudjahidines du Peuple », Réseau Voltaire, 13 juin 2009.

teheran: cia alone in the street

The grassroots takeover technique


« Color revolution » fails in Iran

by Thierry Meyssan*

Tehran’s « green revolution » is the latest version of the « color revolutions » which have allowed the United States to impose subservient governments in several countries without needing to use force. Thierry Meyssan, who advised two governments facing this type of crisis, analyses this method and the reasons for its failure in Iran.

27 June 2009

Beirut (Lebanon)

« Color revolutions » are to revolutions what Canada Dry is to beer. They look like the real thing, but they lack the flavor. They are regime changes which appear to be revolutions because they mobilize huge segments of the population but are more akin to takeovers, because they do not aim at changing social structures. Instead they aspire to replace an elite with another, in order to carry out pro-American economic and foreign policies. The « green revolution » in Tehran is the latest example of this trend. Origin of the concept This concept appeared in the 90s, but its roots lie in the American public debate of the 70s-80s. After a string of revelations about CIA instigated coups around the world, as well as the dramatic disclosures of the Church and Rockefeller Senate Committees [1], admiral Stansfield Turner was given the task by President Carter to clean up the agency and to stop supporting « local dictatorships ». Furious, the American Social Democrats (SD/USA) left the Democratic party and sided with Ronald Regan. They were brilliant Trotskyist intellectuals [2], often linked to Commentary magazine. After Regan was elected, he charged them with pursuing the American interference policy, this time using different methods. This is how the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) was created in 1982 [3] and the United States Institute for Peace (USIP) in 1984. Both of these institutions are organically intertwined: NED administrators sit on the USIP board of directors and vice versa. Legally the NED is a not-for-profit organization under US law, financed by an annual grant voted by Congress as part of the State Department budget. In order to operate, this organization is co-financed by the US Agency for International Development (USAID), which is part of the State Department. This legal structure is used jointly as a cover by the American CIA, the British MI6 and the Australian ASIS (and occasionally by Canadian and New Zealand secret services). The NED presents itself as an agency promoting democracy. It intervenes either directly or using one of its four tentacles: one designed to subvert unions, the second responsible for corrupting management organizations, the third for left-wing parties and the fourth for right-wing parties. It also intervenes through friendly foundations, such as the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (UK), the International Center for Human Rights and Democratic Development (Canada), the Fondation Jean-Jaurès and the Fondation Robert-Schuman (France), the International Liberal Center (Sweden), the Alfred Mozer Foundation (Netherlands), the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, the Friedrich Naunmann Stiftung, the Hans Seidal Stiftung and the Heinrich Boell Stiftung (Germany). The NED thus claims to have corrupted over 6000 organizations throughout the world over roughly 30 years. All of this, of course, under the disguise of training and assistance programs. As for the USIP, it is an American national institution. It is financed annually by Congress as part of the Defense Department budget. Contrary to the NED which serves as a cover for the three allied states, the USIP is exclusively American. Under the guise of political science research, it can pay salaries to foreign politicians. As soon as it commanded resources, the USIP financed a new and discrete structure, the Albert Einstein Institution [4]. This small association for the promotion of nonviolent action was initially charged with designing a form of civil defense for the populations of Western Europe in case of an invasion by the Warsaw Pact. It quickly became autonomous and designed a model following which a state, whatever its nature, can lose its authority and collapse. First attempts The first attempted « color revolution » failed in 1989. The goal was to overthrow Deng Xiaoping by using one of his close collaborators, the Chinese Communist Party secretary-general Zhao Ziyang, in order to open Chinese markets to American investors and to bring China into the US orbit. Young supporters of Zhao invaded Tiananmen square [5]. They were presented in the Western media as unpoliticized students fighting for freedom against the party’s Conservative wing, when in fact this was infighting within the Deng entourage between pro-American and nationalist factions. After having ignored provocations for a long time Deng decided to use force. Depending on sources, the repression ended with 300 to 1000 dead. 20 years later, the Western version of this failed coup has not changed. Western media which recently covered the anniversary of that event presented it as a « popular uprising » and expressed surprise that people in Beijing do not remember the event. This is because there was nothing « popular » about this struggle for power within the Party. This was not a concern for people. The first successful « color revolution » succeeded in 1990. As the Soviet Union was disintegrating, state secretary James Baker went to Bulgaria to participate in the electoral campaign of the pro-American party, heavily financed by the NED [6]. However, despite pressure from the UK, the Bulgarians – afraid of the social consequences induced by the transformation from soviet union to market economy – made the unforgivable mistake to elect in Parliament a post communist majority. While European community observers testified to the legality of the voting process, the pro-American opposition screamed that electoral fraud had occurred and took to the streets. They set up camp in the center of Sofia and threw the country into chaos for the following six months, until pro-American Zhelyu Zhelev was elected president by the parliament. « Democracy » : selling your country to foreign interests behind the people’s back Since then, Washington has kept instigating regime changes everywhere in the world, using street unrest rather than military juntas. It is important here to understand what is at stake. Behind the soothing rhetoric of « the promotion of democracy », Washington’s actions aim to impose regimes that are opening their markets to the US without conditions and which are aligning themselves to their foreign policy. However, while these goals are known by the leaders of the « color revolutions », they are never discussed and accepted by the mobilized demonstrators. In the event when these takeovers succeed, citizens soon rebel against the new policies imposed on them, even if it is too late to turn back. Besides, how can opposition groups who sold their country to foreign interests behind their populations’ backs be considered « democratic »? In 2005, the Kyrgyz opposition contested the legislative elections and brought to Bishkek demonstrators from the south of the country. They toppled President Askar Akayev. This was the « Tulip Revolution ». The national assembly elected Kurmanbek Bakiyev as president. Unable to control his supporters who were looting the capital, he announced having chased the dictator and pretended that he intended to create a national union government. He pulled General Felix Kulov (former Bishkek Mayor) out of prison and named him prime minister. After the situation was back under control, Bakiyev got rid of Kulov and sold the country’s few resources to US companies with no invitation to tender but with significant backhanders. He set up a US military base in Manas. The population’s standard of living had never been lower. Felix Kulov offered to get the country back on its feet by federating it to Russia as it used to be. He was quickly sent back to jail. A blessing in disguise? It is sometimes objected that for states which were subjected to repressive regimes, even if these « color revolutions » only bring the appearance of democracy, they nonetheless constitute an improvement for their populations. Experience shows however that this is far from certain. The new regimes can turn out to be far more repressive than the old ones. In 2003, Washington, London and Paris [7] organized the « Rose Revolution » in Georgia [8]. According to a classic scheme, the opposition blew the whistle about electoral fraud during legislative elections and took to the streets. The demonstrators forced president Eduard Shevardnadze to flee and they seized power. His successor, Mikheil Saakashvili, opened the country to US economic interests and broke off from his Russian neighbor. The economic aid that Washington promised to replace Russian aid never came. The already weakened economy collapsed. In order to continue to please his backers, Saakashvili needed to impose a dictatorship [9]. He shut down the media and filled up the prisons, which did not prevent Western media from continuing to describe him as a « democrat ». Continuing on his collision course, Saakashvili decided to bolster his popularity by engaging in a military adventure. With the help of the Bush administration and of Israel to which he rented air bases, he ordered the bombing of the population of South Ossetia, killing 1600 people, most of whom also held Russian citizenship. Moscow stroke back. American and Israeli advisers fled [10]. Georgia was left devastated. Enough! The main mechanism of the « color revolutions » consists in focusing popular anger on the desired target. This is an aspect of the psychology of the masses which destroys everything in its path and against which no reasonable argument can be opposed. The scapegoat is accused of all the evils plaguing the country for at least one generation. The more he resists, the angrier the mob gets. After he gives in or slips away, the normal division between his opponents and his supporters reappears. In 2005, in the hours following the assassination of former prime minister Rafik Hariri, a rumor spread in Lebanon according to which he was killed by « the Syrians ». The Syrian army, which had been maintaining order since the end of the civil war according to the Taëf agreement, was now booed. Syrian president Bashar al-Assad was personally accused by the US authorities, which was as good as proof for the public opinion. To those who noted that Rafik Hariri, despite stormy episodes, had always been useful to Syria and that’s his death deprived Damas of a central collaborator, it was answered that the « Syrian regime » is so fundamentally evil that it cannot help but killing even its friends. The Lebanese people were calling for the G.I.s to come and get rid of the Syrians. But to everyone’s surprise, Bashar al-Assad, considering that the costly deployment of his army was not welcome in Lebanon any longer, decided to pull it back. Legislative elections were organized in which the « anti-Syrian » coalition triumphed. This was the « Cedar Revolution ». After the situation calmed down everyone realized that even if Syrian generals had looted the country in the past, the departure of the Syrian army did not change anything to the country’s economic situation. Furthermore, the country was now in danger: it was not able to defend itself from the expansionism of the Israeli neighbor. The main « anti-Syrian » leader, general Michel Aoun, thought better of it and joined the opposition. Furious, Washington multiplied assassination plans to get rid of him. Michel Aoun formed an alliance with Hezbollah on a patriotic platform. It was about time: Israel attacked. In every case, Washington prepared the « democratic » government in advance, which confirms that these are takeovers in disguise. The names composing the new team are kept secret for as long as possible. This is why the pointing out of the scapegoat is always done without suggesting a political alternative. In Serbia, young pro-US « revolutionaries » chose a logo that belonged to the Communist popular imagination (the raised fist) to hide their subordination to the United States. They used « he is done! » as a slogan, which federated the anger against the personality of Slobodan Milosevic, who was held responsible for the bombing of the country even though it was done by NATO. This model was replicated numerous times, for example by the Pora! group in Ukraine, or by Zubr in Bielorussia. The deceiving appearance of nonviolence The PR staff members of the State Department maintain the non-violent image of the « color revolutions ». They all put forward the theories of Gene Sharp, who founded the Albert Einstein Institution. Yet nonviolence is a combat method used to persuade authorities to a political change. In order for a minority to seize power and to exercise it, it must always use violence at some point. All « color revolutions » did. In 2000, Slobodan Milosevic called for anticipated elections despite still having a year to run as president. After the first round, neither he nor his principal opponent, Vojislav Koštunica, had secured a majority of the votes. Without waiting for the second round, the opposition claimed voting fraud and took to the streets. Thousands of demonstrators walked on the capital, including the miners from Kolubara. Their daily salaries were paid indirectly by the NED, without them realizing that they were paid by the United States. The pressure from the demonstration was insufficient so the miners started attacking buildings with bulldozers that they had brought, hence the name « bulldozer revolution ». In cases when the tension is just dragging on, and when counterdemonstrations are being organized, the only solution for Washington is to throw the country into chaos. Inciting agents are then placed in both camps to fire on the crowd. Each party can then observe that the others are shooting while they are peacefully advancing. The confrontation spreads. In 2002, Caracas’ upper-class took to the streets to protest the social policies of President Hugo Chavez [11]. Using clever manipulation, private TV stations created the impression of a human tidal wave. There were 50,000 people according to observers and 1 million according to the press and the State Department. Then there was the Llaguno Bridge incident. TV stations clearly showed armed pro-Chavez supporters firing on the crowd. In a press conference, the National Guard general and vice minister of domestic security confirmed that the « Chavez militias » fired and killed 19 people. He resigned and called for the dictator to be overthrown. The president was quickly arrested by military rebels. However millions of people descended in the capital’s streets and constitutional order was restored. A subsequent journalistic investigation went over the details of the massacre of the Llaguno Bridge. It brought to light a deceptive picture manipulation, where chronological order was modified as proved by the protagonists’ watch dials. In reality, the pro-Chavez supporters were under attack and after having fallen back, they were trying to escape by using their weapons. The inciting agents were local policemen trained by a US agency [12]. In 2006, the NED reorganized the opposition to Kenyan President Mwai Kibaki. It funded the creation of the Orange party of Raila Odinga. He received the support of Senator Barack Obama, who was accompanied by destabilization experts (Mark Lippert, current chief of staff for the national security adviser, and general Jonathan S. Gration, current US special envoy to Sudan). During a meeting with Odinga, the Illinois Senator invented a vague family relationship with the pro-US candidate. However Odinga was defeated during the 2007 legislative elections. Supported by Senator John McCain as president of the IRI (the NED’s Republican pseudopod), he disputed the validity of the vote and called for his supporters to take to the streets. This is when anonymous text messages were sent en masse to ethnic Luo voters. « Dear Kenyans, the Kikuyu have stolen the future of our children… we must treat them in the only way that they understand… with violence ». The country, despite being one of the most stable in Africa, suddenly erupted in violence. After days of rioting, president Kibaki was forced to accept the mediation of Madeleine Albright as president of the NDI (the NED’s Democrat pseudopod). A prime minister position was created and offered to Odinga. Since the hate text messages had not been sent from the Kenyan installations, one can wonder which foreign power was behind them. Mobilizing the international public opinion During the last few years, Washington had the opportunity to instigate « color revolutions » with the understanding that they would fail to seize power but that they would help manipulate public opinion and international institutions. In 2007, many Burmans were up in arms because of the domestic fuel price increase. Demonstrations spread as Buddhist monks took a leading role in the protest. This was the « Saffron Revolution » [13]. Washington could not care less about the Rangoon regime; however they were interested in orchestrating the people of Burma in order to exercise pressure on China which holds strategic interests in Burma (pipelines and military bases for electronic intelligence gathering). It was therefore crucial to distort people’s perception of reality. Pictures and films shot on mobile phones started to appear on YouTube. They were anonymous, impossible to verify and without context. It was precisely their lack of reliability that gave them authority, and allowed the White House to fit them with their interpretation of the situation. More recently, a 2008 student demonstration brought Greece to a grinding halt following the murder of a 15 year old young man by a policeman. Hoodlums were soon seen rioting. They had been recruited in neighboring Kosovo and brought in by bus. The city centers were devastated. Washington was trying to scare foreign investors away in order to secure a monopoly on the investments in the gas terminals that were being built. The weak Karamanlis government was portrayed as being iron fisted. Facebook and Twitter were used to mobilize the Greek Diaspora. Demonstrations spread to Istanbul, Nicosia, Dublin, London, Amsterdam, The Hague, Copenhagen, Frankfurt, Paris, Rome, Madrid, Barcelona, etc. The Green Revolution The operation conducted in 2009 in Iran belongs to the long list of pseudo revolutions. First, a 400 million dollar budget was voted in 2007 by Congress to orchestrate a « regime change » in Iran. This was in addition to the ad hoc budgets of the NED, the USAID, the CIA & Co. How this money is being used is unclear, but the three main recipients are the following: the Rafsanjani family, the Pahlavi family and the People’s Mujahedin of Iran. The Bush Administration decided to instigate a « color revolution » in Iran after confirming a decision by the Joint Chiefs of Staff not to conduct a military attack of that country. This choice was then approved by the Obama Administration. The plans for a « color revolution » which had been drawn up by the American Enterprise Institute in 2002 with Israel were then reopened. I had published an article at that time regarding this plan [14]. In it, one can identify the current protagonists: that plan has not changed much since then. A Lebanese chapter was added which predicted an uprising in Beirut in case of a victory of the patriotic coalition (Hezbollah, Aoun), but it was later cancelled. The script included huge support for the candidate chosen by Ayatollah Rafsanjani, the disputing of the presidential election results, widespread bombings, the toppling of president Ahmadinejad and of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, setting up a transition government headed by Mousavi, restoring the Monarchy and creating a government headed by Sohrab Sobhani. According to the 2002 plans, the operation was overseen by Morris Amitay et Michael Ledeen. It mobilized in Iran the Irangate network. Here is a necessary quick historical background: the Irangate (Iran–Contra affair) was an illegal arms deal. The White House wished to supply weapons to the rebels in Nicaragua (to fight against Sandinistas) and to Iranians (in order to drag the Iran-Iraq war for as long as possible), but was prevented from doing so by Congress. Israelis then offered to act as subcontractors for both operations. Ledeen, who has both US and Israeli citizenships, served as a link in Washington, while Mahmoud Rafsanjani (the brother of the Ayatollah) was his counterpart in Tehran. This took place over a background of widespread corruption. When the scandal broke out in the United States, an independent inquiry committee was headed by Senator Tower and General Brent Scowcroft (Robert Gates’ mentor) to investigate. Michael Ledeen is an old fox involved in many secret operations. He could be found in Rome during the assassination of Aldo Moro. He also appears to have been linked to the fake Bulgarian connection after the assassination attempt on John Paul II, or more recently to the fake claims of Nigerian uranium supply to Saddam Hussein. He currently works for the American Enterprise Institute [15] (with Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz) and for the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies [16]. Morris Amitay is a former director of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). He is today the vice president of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA) and the director of a consulting company for the weapon industry. On April 27, Morris et Ledeen held a seminar on Iran with Senator Joseph Lieberman at the American Enterprise Institute, regarding the Iranian elections. On May 15, a new seminar was held. The public part of the event consisted of a round table discussion headed by Senator John Bolton about the « haggling » over Iran: would Moscow agree to end its support of Tehran in exchange for Washington renouncing its missile shield project in Central Europe? French expert Bernard Hourcade took part in the debates. At the same time, the Institute launched a website, intended for the press, about the coming crisis: IranTracker.org. The website includes a section on the Lebanese elections. In Iran, the responsibility for overthrowing old rival Ayatollah Khamenei rested on Ayatollah Rafsanjani. Born in a family of farmers, Hashemi Rafsanjani built his fortune on real estate speculation during the time of the Shah. He became the main pistachio dealer in Iran, and increased his wealth during the Irangate. His assets are estimated to several billion dollars. After he became the wealthiest man in Iran, he became successively president of the parliament, president of the Republic, and now chairman of the Assembly of Experts (an arbitration body for the parliament and the Guardian Council of the Constitution). He defends the interests of Tehran’s merchant class. During the electoral campaign, Rafsanjani required Mir-Hossein Mousavi, his former adversary who became his protégé, to promise he would privatize the oil sector. With no connection to Rafsanjani, the People’s Mujahedin of Iran have been used by Washington [17]. This organization, protected by the Pentagon, is considered a terrorist organization by the State Department and has been considered as such by the European Union. Indeed, it is responsible for dreadful operations in the 80s, including a huge bombing which killed Ayatollah Beheshti, four department heads, six department head assistants and one fourth of the parliamentary group of the Islamic Republic party. The People’s Mujahedin of Iran is headed by Massoud Rajavi, who first married the daughter of former President Abol-hassan Banisadr and then the cruel Maryam. Its headquarters are located outside of Paris and its military bases in Iraq, first under the orders of Saddam Hussein, are now under the Defense Department. The People’s Mujahedin provided the logistics for the bombing attacks which took place during the electoral campaign [18]. They were responsible for instigating clashes – which they probably did – between Pro Ahmadinejad supporters and their opponents. Should chaos have followed, the Supreme Leader could have been overthrown. A transition government, headed by Mir-Hossein Mousavi, would have privatized the oil sector and brought back the Monarchy. The son of the former Shah, Reza Cyrus Pahlavi, would have ascended to the throne and would have nominated Sohrab Sobhani as prime minister. With this in mind, Reza Pahlavi published in February a number of interviews with French journalist Michel Taubmann, the director of Arte’s information office in Paris, and who presides the Cercle de l’Observatoire, the club for French neo conservatives. It is useful to remember that Washington had made similar plans for the restoration of the Monarchy in Afghanistan. Mohammed Zahir Shah was supposed to ascend to the throne again and Hamid Karzai would have become prime minister. Unfortunately, at age 88, the pretender had become senile. Karzai thus became president. Both Sobhani and Karzai hold United States citizenships. Both were involved in the Caspian sea’s oil sector. As far as propaganda was concerned, the initial plan had been given to Benador Associates, a public relations firm. But it evolved with the influence of Goli Ameri, the United States Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs. This American Iranian woman is John Bolton’s former colleague. As a new media specialist, she implemented infrastructure and Internet training programs for Rafsanjani’s friends. She also developed radio and television programs in Farsi for the State Department propaganda, in conjunction with the BBC. Iran’s destabilization failed because the main drive behind the « color revolutions » was not appropriately initiated. Mir-Hossein Mousavi did not manage to make Mahmoud Ahmadinejad the focus of popular anger. The Iranian people did not fall into the trap; they did not hold the outgoing president responsible for the United States’ economic sanctions against the country. Therefore the protests were limited to the northern suburbs of Tehran. The authorities refrained from creating counter demonstrations, and let the plotters expose themselves. However, it must be noted that the propaganda was successful with the Western media. International public opinions really believed that two million Iranians took to the streets, when the real figure was ten times lower. The fact that foreign correspondents were under house arrest facilitated these exaggerations because they were exempt from having to provide evidence for their allegations. Having given up war, and having failed at overthrowing the regime, what is Barack Obama’s remaining option? Thierry Meyssan
Journalist and writer, president of the Voltaire Network.

English version by J.C.

[1] The numerous reports and documents published by these committees are available online on the following website: The Assassination Archives and Research Center.
[2] « New York Intellectuals and the invention of neo-conservatism », Denis Boneau, Voltaire Network, November 26 2004.
[3] « The NED, the networks of democratic interferenceVoltaire Network, January 22 2004. », Thierry Meyssan,
[4] « The Albert Einstein Institution: non-violence according to the CIA », Thierry Meyssan, Voltaire Network, January 4 2005.
[5] « Tiananmen, 20 ans après », professor Domenico Losurdo, Réseau Voltaire, June 9 2009.
[6] At the time, the NED was relying in Eastern Europe on the Free Congress Foundation (FCF), operated by Republicans. Later on, this organization disappeared and was replaced by the Soros Foundation, operated by Democrats, with the assistance of which the NED would plot new « regime changes ».
[7] Concerned with smoothing out relations between France and the US, French president Jacques Chirac tried to establish better relations with the Bush Administration on Georgia’s back, all the more because of French economic interests in Georgia. Salomé Zourabichvili, number 2 in the French secret services, was nominated as ambassador in Tbilisi. She then switched nationalities and became the Foreign Secretary for the « Rose Revolution ».
[8] «The Secrets of the Georgian Coup», Paul Labarique, Voltaire Network, January 7 2004.
[9] « Géorgie : Saakachvili jette son opposition en prison » (Georgia: Saakachvili jails the opposition) et « Manifestations à Tbilissi contre la dictature des roses » (Protests in Tbilisi against the dictatorship of the roses), Réseau Voltaire, September 12 2006 and September 30 2007.
[10] The Bush Administration was hoping that this conflict would act as a smoke screen. Israeli bombers were supposed to take off simultaneously to strike neighboring Iran. But even before attacking Georgian military installations, Russia bombed the airports that had been rented out to Israel, pinning its planes to the ground.
[11] « Opération manquée au Venezuela » (Failed operation in Venezuela), Thierry Meyssan, Réseau Voltaire, May 18 2002.
[12] Llaguno Bridge. Keys to a Massacre. Documentary by Angel Palacios, Panafilms 2005.
[13] « Birmanie : la sollicitude intéressée des États-Unis » (Burma: United States’ selfish concern), Thierry Meyssan, Réseau Voltaire, November 5 2007.
[14] « False reasons to intervene in Iran », Thierry Meyssan, Voltaire Network, February 12 2004. [15] « The American Enterprise Institute in the White House », Voltaire Network, June 21 2004.
[16] « Les trucages de la Foundation for the Defense of Democracies » (The Foundation for the Defense of Democracies’ tricks), Réseau Voltaire, February 2 2005.
[17] « Les Moudjahidin perdus » (The lost Mujahedin), Paul Labarique, Réseau Voltaire, February 17 2004.
[18] « Le Jundallah revendique des actions armées aux côtés des Moudjahidines du Peuple » (The Jundallah claims responsibility for actions with the People’s Mujahedin), Réseau Voltaire, June 13 2009.